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Regional Merry-Go-Round – While Key Issues Continue to Dog Lebanon’s Government in Formation, End to Syria’s Civil War in Sight

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The muddle called the Middle East gets murkier

It has long been said somewhat cynically that Lebanon’s raison d’etre is to serve as the proxy battlefield for everything in contention in the region and beyond. Certainly, contemporary events bear that out as PM Saad Hariri struggles to build consensus around a new government and ministerial statement while regional players continue to shuffle the policy cards to determine what’s next on their agendas.

Distinctions between the players’ existential concerns and their dominate current interests are muddled at best. The Assad regime draws closer to its immediate goal of restoring its punishing control over Syria; Iran seeks to strengthen its regional role despite rising domestic opposition; Turkey is…well Turkey; Russia and Israel look to their interests with fervor; and the Syrian refugees await their fate.

Here’s a quick summary of several current events that are adding to the continued uncertainty despite the latest battlefield outcomes in Syria, a small détente between Israel and Syrian government forces near its borders, Syrian refugees moving in larger numbers back home, and Hezbollah’s quest for meaning after Syria.

Lebanon-Syria relations, always contentious, seem to be the chicken bone in the throat of PR Hariri. Despite prodding from Speaker Nabih Berri, pro-Syrian members of Parliament, Gebran Bassil, the acting Foreign Minister and son-in-law of President Michel Aoun, and others, the PM is standing his ground that the ministerial statement, which outlines the new government’s priorities, will not address restarting formal relations with Syria. Can he hold out? There’s no immediate consensus as there are other MPs supporting the PM. Proponents of the move argue that the step is needed to facilitate the return of Syrian refugees, re-open border crossings to allow goods to transit to export markets to Lebanon’s neighbors, and potentially give Lebanon a piece of the Syrian reconstruction pie.

Syria meanwhile seems to be holding refugee repatriation hostage to resuming relations. Over the past two weeks, a number of statements have come from Syrian sources, as well as its friends in Lebanon, that formal relations are the key to accelerating recent repatriation actions. It is worth noting that despite allegations that the Assad regime has a list of a million or so unwanted returnees, it also craves to be recognized as a legitimate government that can manage the resettlement process.

The reality though may be much different, and Russia has already indicating that it will play a key role as well so that it can task the international community with the cost of reconstruction in exchange for pressuring Syria to work with Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey on refugee issues. So, as reported by Refugees Deeply, “Russia and Syria are seeking bilateral agreements to begin mass returns. This could be disastrous given that the Syrian government and its allies lack the capacity and perhaps the will to enable refugees to return safely and reintegrate into the country.”

The UNHCR is directly bound up in this quagmire as it serves as the mediating body for the international community on refugee affairs. It has outlined its criteria for conditions required to move ahead with large-scale voluntary repatriations in cooperation with the Syrian government. To date, however, the regime has imposed restrictions on UNHCR activities in Syria, which could leave returnees without adequate aid and exposed to more danger.

While some analysts believe that Russia and the US are winding down their roles in Syria, Israel is exerting greater efforts to ensure that Iran and its proxy Hezbollah do not become an even greater security threat. Israel is concerned with Iran’s role in the region, especially the increasing stocks of various grades and types of Iranian-supplied missiles in Lebanon and Syria; thus its insistence on Iran’s withdrawal from all of Syria. As Stratfor notes, “On the diplomatic front, Israel has focused its approach on the United States and Russia, striving to convince the two superpowers to heed its interests in Syria by containing and limiting Iran’s influence and presence in the country.”

What’s in the cards for Hezbollah’s hands in Syria and Lebanon is a subject of much speculation. Will it return to its traditional role as a political-military state within a state in Lebanon? Will it maintain a presence in Syria to enable Iran to continue to have a pressure point on Israel? Will it maintain an aggressive posture towards Israel so that Israel leans on Russia and the US to exercise what little leverage they have over the Iran-Hezbollah axis to keep tensions from boiling over?

If it remains in Syria, deployed in areas under its control, it is hard to imagine that, despite its alliance with Assad, the Syrian regime will allow it to exercise the same freedom it has in Lebanon. According to an article in Al-Monitor.com, “There is no withdrawal for now, only redeployments of troops in the various areas,” said one source. “If the situation stabilizes definitely, Hezbollah would pull out from certain regions, but there are areas it considers strategic that it will never leave.”

Nicholas Blanford, longtime journalist based in Beirut, describes the link between Hezbollah’s presence in Syria and Iran’s regional game plan. “Iran will play the long game in southwest Syria by relying either on Hezbollah or Iraqi militant groups. Tehran will also want to extend what Hezbollah has on its Lebanese frontier with Israel, to the Golan, and leverage southwest Syria in its confrontation with Israel in the long run. Iran is trying to shape its strategic interests in Syria as time passes by, to maintain its land bridge there against Israel.”

Ironically, Russia, which, it can be argued, saved the Assad regime, seems to risk a diminishing influence on Iran and Syria as it draws down its military role in the region. Having gained basing rights in Syria, the acknowledgement of all the local players that it is the top player in the region, and with its finger on any eventual peace and reconstruction effort, it is loath to act against Iran in Syria. As Blanford noted, “Israel and the US seem hopeful that Russia will serve as a block to Iranian ambitions in Syria, but this could be wishful thinking.”

So is the other great power, the US, still searching for a regional strategy? It appears that the Trump Administration has conceded that the war in Syria is now at a stage where the US should move on to focus on a formal end to the civil war and reconstruction. Jim Jeffrey, former US Ambassador to Turkey and Iraq, a distinguished fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP), who served as the principal DAS for the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs at the State Department, and deputy national security adviser to President George W. Bush, has been appointed as Representative for Syrian Engagement by Secretary Pompeo. His job is to run US negotiations with other regional players over Syria’s future.

He has extensive experience in the region that should serve him well. As Ambassador to Iraq, he opposed the US withdrawal from the country under the Obama Administration, arguing that without a tangible presence in country that Iran’s influence would prevail. So he has no illusions about Iran’s regional ambitions.

One of his first challenges is to ensure that the latest deal made by the Administration, to have others pay for Syria’s stabilization fund, is carried out effectively. In announcing the US cut of its commitment of $230 million in stabilization assistance, the State Department pointed out that the Gulf States and others have agreed to fund the program. Stabilization aid is intended to provide basic services that allow Syrian residents to return to their homes and some semblance of normal life after a devastating seven-year civil war.

Al-Monitor.com reported that the “US has elicited approximately $300 million in contributions and pledges from coalition partners to support critical stabilization and early recovery initiatives in areas liberated from [the Islamic State (IS)] in northeast Syria, including a generous contribution of $100 million by Saudi Arabia and $50 million pledged by the United Arab Emirates.” Other commitments have been made by Kuwait, France, Germany, Italy, Denmark, Norway, the European Union, Australia. and Taiwan.

At the same time, a Reuters.com post noted that The US has also made it clear that “There will be no global reconstruction funding for Syria until a ‘credible and irreversible’ political process led by the United Nations is underway.” The State Department emphasized that “We will continue to provide life-saving, needs-based humanitarian assistance to vulnerable Syrians, support for the White Helmets and the UN’s International Impartial and Independent Mechanism to hold the [Syrian President Bashar] Assad regime accountable for serious crimes, as well as equipment and other measures to counter the effects of chemical weapons in northwest Syria.”

The spokesperson, Heather Nauert, explained that the decision “does not represent any lessening of US commitment to its strategic goals in Syria.” Which again raises the earlier question, does the US have a viable regional strategy that represents its long-term interests in the region?

 

 

Russia Benefits from Lack of US Leadership in the Levant

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One can argue that America’s absent leadership from the quagmire of Libya to the ongoing shame of civilian casualties in Syria, through to border tensions between Lebanon and Hezbollah and Syria, to the gradual erosion of Iraq’s sovereignty, is a strategic choice by the Trump Administration, in some ways mirroring the Obama posture of light-handed engagement in the region. When one throws in the downturn with Turkey, the weaknesses of our overtures with Egypt and the GCC, and the absence of depth of State Department experts dealing with this convulsive part of the world, then Trump’s genius may be that letting Russia get bogged down, as it did in Afghanistan, will in the long run be the winning hand…but don’t count on it.

The election this weekend in Russia is seen as potentially significant if there is low voter turnout, indicating to some the unhappiness with Russians with its overseas adventurism. Independent polling being what it is in Russia, we may never be able to analyze the election in depth, but it is quite clear that the Kremlin is concerned that its foreign policies seem reasonable and necessary to protecting the motherland.

As Al Monitor reported, “In the Syrian conflict, the tables have been turning quickly. The sense that things aren’t working out properly is strong in Moscow, with even staunch advocates of Russia’s Syria policies now wary and calling for policy updates. Moscow has been cautious not to take any radical steps before the March 18 election day to dodge possible risks. But Russia’s plans to amend its strategy are underway and will have been implemented once Putin receives his fourth-term mandate.”

What this means in Syria and beyond is not clear as the conflict there is a muddle of competing agendas among regional actors, militias, government forces, and assorted non-state actors seeking to move resolution of the war to their advantage. While some players, such as Russia and Iran, are quite clear about their goals, sway over the Assad government and large slices of the reconstruction pie, others, including Israel, Jordan, and Lebanon’s government, put security at the top of their lists.

It was only three weeks ago that, according to Real Clear Defense.com, that only a phone call from Russian President Putin to Prime Minister Netanyahu prevented a large-scale Israeli engagement with both Syrian and foreign forces as a “lesson” about Israel’s resolve. In reality, it mirrored the long-standing US role in cautioning Israel to stand down, now it is Russia that “has the ability to limit Israeli freedom of action.”

The article went on to say that “At a minimum, without strong American leadership to deal with the Iranian threat in Syria, Israel must stomach the presence of Russia as a major power. Indeed, Russia offers little help in solving the Israeli security dilemma. After all, Russia’s involvement in Syria enabled the Iranian expansion that presently undermines Israel’s security.”

It is troublesome that Russia has generated its own arms race in Syria, going beyond what Hezbollah has amassed from Iran in Lebanon, including advanced surface-to-air missile systems and stealth aircraft. This last engagement made it clear that Israel must think twice before continuing its overflights over Syrian territory. As the article indicates, it is even more worrisome that “Russia has only a marginal interest in limiting Iranian expansion along the Golan, as evidenced by multiple violations and Iranian abuses under Russia’s watch.” Thus while Israel continues to rattle its sabers at Hezbollah in Lebanon, the country with the most to benefit, Iran, continues to collaborate with Russia when its interests are at stake. As the article ruefully concludes, “American cannot cede its leadership role to Russia, particularly while Moscow continues its partnership with Iran.”

With America’s eyes now focused on North Korea, and with the dearth of expertise at the State Department and conflicting signals from the Department of Defense and National Security Council, there does not seem to be any hope of righting the US position any time soon.

So in some ways, if the US was as agile as Russia in influencing elections through social media, there would have been some opportunities for mischief despite the overwhelming odds of Putin’s reelection. As the Washington Institute for Near East Policy opined, “While Putin is assured a victory, the Kremlin appears concerned about its longer-term political future, leading it to rely more on military mobilization and anti-Westernism to bolster its domestic legitimacy and slide back to its authoritarian past. This means the Middle East will likely remain an arena for competing with the West and expanding Russian influence.”

Much like President Bush 43 pulled out a victory in the 2010 mid-term elections by calling up fears of impending foreign policy crises, Putin has adopted this strategy to overcome “a deteriorating economy, growing poverty, and little government interest in development…” Despite its weak economic health, Russia, like Iran, expects to be well compensated for its Syrian adventures, and has extended its reach as the dynamic outlier to Turkey and Iran as well.

It is no wonder that almost every Arab head of state has made the pilgrimage to Moscow in the last two years, giving Putin the leverage to keep US interests out of the region. As the article concludes, “Following the election, Moscow will likely treat the Middle East even more as a privileged sphere of influence similar to the post-Soviet space, with an increasingly aggressive, expansionist, and anti-Western posture all but assured.”

Yet Russia lacks control over its convenient “friends” Turkey and Iran that have their own interests that for hundreds of years have resisted Russian encroachment. One possible liability from this strategy is the lack of control that Russia has over the non-state actors, aside from its own, one the fighting in Syria is in remission. “Senior US officials believe that up to 80 percent of the Syrian army is made up of foreign fighters, many of whom are loyal to international forces, including Hezbollah and other Shiite militias with ties to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards and Iraqi Popular Mobilization Units (PMU),” according to the Middle East Institute.

There are no straight lines given the proliferation of arms, agendas, and alliances of convenience. As David French noted in the National Review, “It’s imperative that the American people understand the risks, understand the administration’s vision, and approach these potential confrontations with their eyes wide open. We should not stumble into war.”

The Debate Is Not Over – Dissociation Vs Hezbollah’s Regional Ambitions

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Although the government of Lebanon agreed this week to a renewed commitment to dissociation, Hezbollah’s representatives said that it was nothing different in content from the previous Cabinet agreement and reserved the right to issue its own position. Importantly, the restatement enabled Prime Minister Saad Hariri to withdraw his resignation and take up his position in the government, which has a full agenda in advance of the May 2018 Parliamentary elections.

As a recent article by an analyst at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy put it, “Now that Hariri has returned to Lebanon and suspended his resignation, the question is no longer about him. Rather, it is how Iran will move beyond this hurdle to consolidate its achievements in Lebanon and the region.”

This is the obvious conundrum. Will Hezbollah continue to act as Iran’s proxy across the region and continue ramping up its military presence in Lebanon threatening Israel, or will it resume its Lebanese character and limit its ambitions to its home country?  As the article points out, “When Hizballah decided to join Iran’s regional foreign legion, it was only a matter of time before Lebanon would be dragged with Hizballah to the regional confrontation. Now, any dialogue among the Lebanese people or possible resolution to nation’s crisis is going to be tied to regional negotiations over the conflicts in Syria, Iraq and Yemen.”

To successfully navigate between its commitments, to Iran and Lebanon, Hezbollah will have to choose between continuing its involvement in Yemen and Iraq while advancing towards a more nuanced and evolving posture in Syria. In fact, Hezbollah could be helpful in working with the Lebanese government to reduce threats along the border as hostilities wind down, and provide pathways for solving the refugee presence in Lebanon and well as its participation in Syria’s reconstruction.

Analysts are offering two contradictory scenarios: the entire episode has strengthened Hariri’s hand and weakened Saudi Arabia, or weakened Hariri and strengthened Hezbollah. What is even murkier is how public opinion will morph from now until the 2018 Parliamentary elections.

And what are the Lebanese saying about this?

Implications of the Hariri crisis on the election results are very hard to predict. According to NDI, despite some naysayers, the new election law does not of itself favor Hezbollah. It puts more districts up for grabs, and Hezbollah may benefit because of its better organization. If enough young voters are mobilized in these competitive districts around capable candidates, the results may not reflect the usual sectarian patterns.

According to a Washington Institute article on political affiliations among Lebanese, it points out that “a reasonable estimate is this:  around 40 percent are Shia Muslim; 30 percent Sunni Muslim; 25 percent Christians (Maronite, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholic, Armenian, Protestant, and other); and the remaining 5 percent mostly Druze, plus a few other small minorities.”

“Asked about their attitude toward Hezbollah, the extent of Lebanese sectarian polarization is sharply evident. Among Sunnis, 85 percent express a negative view and just 14 percent a positive one.  But among Shia, the proportions are almost exactly the reverse:  88 percent voice a positive opinion of Hezbollah (including a striking 83 percent “very positive”); while a mere 11 percent say they have a negative opinion.”

What is critical about these numbers is that they are no longer the only indicator of voting outcomes in the Parliamentary elections. Political affiliations in the abstract do not always coincide with voter behavior. “For example, in the 2016 local elections, 45 percent voted against Hezbollah and affiliated Amal candidates, even in their supposed stronghold of Baalbek.”

The Christian voters are likewise is flux. “Lebanon’s substantial Christian minority remains split almost down the middle on Hezbollah: 45 percent in favor, 55 percent opposed.  Yet almost half of Lebanese Christians still apparently adhere to the view of the country’s Maronite president, Michel Aoun, that Hezbollah represents a positive player in the Lebanese arena. How his position evolves, if at all, in the coming months will be telling.

Despite disagreements about Iran and Syria evident among the respondents, there was a high degree of agreement regarding support for coexistence between Sunnis and Shias and the overriding importance of domestic reforms compared to foreign policy.

Moving on

The international pushback that reversed Hariri’s sojourn in Riyadh demonstrated that Lebanon has an intrinsic value to Western countries that value its role as a buffer state that strives to preserve it tolerant, multi-confessional character in a very tough neighborhood, made more dangerous by Iran’s aggressive policies in the region. The zero sum game between Saudi Arabia and Iran can have no winners without dangerous and unprecedented instability throughout the region.

Even President Trump’s official recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel will only for a moment be a common cause among Sunnis and Shias. It only opens the door for Hezbollah to reassert its presence in the south and make menacing noises that may, though misjudgment and miscalculation by either party, lead to a catastrophe for Lebanon.

So the tension around the resignation and restoration, coupled with the US announcement on Jerusalem may only result in more instability in the near term, hopefully dissipating before the election season begins.

As the European Council on Foreign Relations noted in an article, “The collective memory of Lebanon’s own civil war and the buy-in of key political leaders to the current order still hold firm. But renewed political paralysis and associated economic shock – which could be made considerably worse if Riyadh tightens the financial noose – will feed intensified instability and the further hollowing out of the state.”

It further states that “These are precisely the conditions which will help Hezbollah reinforce its parallel, non-state ascendancy,” which may be worsened if the war of words about Jerusalem turns violent.

Lebanon’s hope in the run-up to the election is that “A broad-based government and legitimate parliament, even if it includes Hezbollah, still likely represent a better means of establishing some political counter-weight to the group’s dominance. It is also key to providing the governance services needed to maintain the semblance of a functioning state able to act as a legitimate alternative to Hezbollah.”

The Hariri episode is but the latest in the continuing and challenging efforts to rebuild Lebanon’s role in the region as a hub for intellectual, cultural, and economic progress.

 

What’s At Stake in Lebanon’s Survival?

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 Speculation continues to swirl around ‘what’s next?’ after Prime Minister Hariri’s return to Lebanon and the ongoing discussions among key players in and outside Lebanon. So it may be worthwhile to take stock of what’s at stake if Lebanon, as imperfectly as it operates, would become a failed state, i.e. looks more like Libya without even a modicum of central government authority and returns to a civil war with outside parties holding their contests for regional power inside Lebanon.

Of course the first question is survival as what? The status quo is certainly untenable with Hezbollah acting as a state within a state, Parliament divided among those who support an independent and secure country and those who welcome outside intervention, and those reluctant to stand for fear of losing their piece of the pie that is Lebanon. Add to that over 2 million refugees of uncertain status and the price of stability becomes astronomical.

Lebanon has never been a fully free and independent country, capable of defending its territory and preserving its institutions. But it certainly has been more free than it is today. Its survival depended on balancing the interests of national and regional players, whose agendas, often in competition, usually benefited from Lebanon’s role as a dynamic center of culture, business, tourism, and political discourse.

In broad terms, most analysts draw a direct line between Black September in Jordan, pushing Palestinian forces in exile to Lebanon, whose state within a state status precipitated the civil war and birthed Hezbollah, resulting in continuous and blatant foreign meddling that characterizes the current political morass. No wonder I go silent when asked to explain “what’s going on over there?”

The consequences of destruction and disabling 

Those who care about Lebanon want a free, independent, secure, and stable country that enjoys territorial integrity and a functioning government providing adequate services to its people. Yet, none of these qualities are assured in the current context where very little is certain except obscure outcomes. But we can point to what is on the doorstep if the regional competitions between Sunni, Shia, and Israel are not resolved without destroying Lebanon as collateral damage.

A failed state in Lebanon brought about by willful acts or unintended consequences of regional powers will have catastrophic outcomes – none of which support US interests or those of Israel, America’s primary ally in the region. To note only a few:

  • Instability along Israel’s northern border, which will require Israeli boots on the ground – an occupation army will yield no good outcomes over time.
  • War against Lebanon will make Christians, the backbone of the country’s social, economic, and cultural integrity, targets of opportunity for militias looking for scapegoats.
  • Lebanon which represents, one of the few successful bulwarks against radical Islam in the region, will be lost.
  • And the destruction and occupation of Lebanon will exert enormous pressure on our other ally, Jordan, which is also threatened by Syria and Iran.

The US cannot give a blank check to Israel to defend itself/attack Hezbollah as a proxy for Syria and Iran without considering consequences to America’s own safety and security, and its relations in the region. Consequences in the US of Lebanon’s failure cannot be overlooked. Heightened tension and warfare in the region will ratchet up domestic threats to the US, seen as the enabler of Israel’s disregard for Lebanese and Muslim lives.

Nor can the US stand by while Gulf Arab countries hammer Lebanon over the reality of Hezbollah’s paramount position in the government. Among the many unanswered questions emerging from the current crisis with Saudi Arabia are the many ways in which the Kingdom can undermine Lebanon through economic means, such as withholding funds from the Central Bank, cutting Lebanese imports, or deporting Lebanese workers or limiting their remittances, which are so crucial to Beirut’s budget.

To diminish the threat of state failure in Lebanon, the target of Saudi ire, Hezbollah, must decide if it is a Lebanese party or Iran’s proxy. It cannot be both. An accommodation, outlined in previous agreements and resolutions, to resolve its military status, now that its political role is demarcated, is central to returning Lebanon to a neutral position of disassociation that is its historical role. It is the ultimate win-win for the region.

The Saga Continues – Lebanon’s Stability Compromised by Regional Intrigues

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Since Michael Hudson penned his opus on Lebanon, “The Precarious Republic,” I have been addicted to looking behind the curtain to try and understand goings-on in that sliver of a country, endowed with incredible beauty, and multiples of people who claim it as home. The book was written in 1968, that’s 50 years ago, yet the core facts resonate today – Lebanon is a multi-sectarian home to affinity groups that lack a central defining identity as “Lebanese,” always adding a hyphen for their sect, tribe, or religion.

When I first went to Lebanon in the early 70s, this was apparent in the Palestinian, Armenian, Syrian, and other peoples one routinely met in the cabarets and alleyways of Beirut. The World Lebanese Cultural Union was pushing to have Lebanese abroad included in the political life of the country, and Israel routinely bombed “guerilla” havens to remind the country that it had an obligation to protect Israel’s border. Newspapers flourished, each subsidized by a regional power broker or a local one with enough money to literally give away their opinions. It was heady and crazy at the same time. The seeds sowed for Lebanon’s coming traumas were real, constant, and obvious to anyone who took the time to push past the reality show and ask “what’s next?”

Well, it’s show time…Lebanon is deep in crisis, with deepening domestic fault lines being exacerbated, as usual, by external actors who think that Lebanon is the school playground for beating on rival gangs.

The Prime Minister resigning as a “hard shock” to the nation; the Maronite Patriarch visiting the King of Saudi Arabia; Hezbollah’s Secretary-General appealing for calm; the President calling on the PM for clarity; and conspiracy theories and realpolitik crashing headlong into the Mediterranean, only to end up floating on the polluted shoreline. What are we to think, what are we to hope about resolving this latest mess before Lebanon is caught between the Iran-Syria-Hezbollah-Israel vise or the Saudi Arabia-Israel-Hezbollah-Iran conundrum?

First reality check, Security for Israel at any cost is not a sustainable security. While Hezbollah and Lebanon may be relatively easy to attack, the consequences to regional stability are quite complex. The resulting high number of civilian casualties, widespread destruction of infrastructure, and deterioration of the Lebanese central government’s authority will actually exacerbate threats to Israel’s security, further destabilize the region, and leave the main protagonists, Syria and Iran, backed by Russia, unscathed.

Israel may thunder all its wants at Lebanon for its legitimate as well as its contrived agenda, the bottom line is the same – Lebanon cannot change its internal reality, it is in an impossible situation. Hezbollah outguns the LAF but doesn’t want another civil war, since that would distract from its self-defined role as a defender of Lebanon’s territorial integrity. Israel’s war messages give Hezbollah greater credibility in the minds of the local Lebanese and Arab people.

Second reality check, Hezbollah has to decide, is its future in a multi-confessional Lebanon or is it truly an Iranian proxy that will allow hundreds, perhaps thousands of Shia and other Lebanese to die for Iran? The Saudi distemper towards Hezbollah corresponds to Hezbollah’s disregard for solidly endorsing a policy of disassociation from regional conflicts. It is time for the party of God to calculate where it should be placing its bets and realize that it has a very good deal in Lebanon but only if it is committed to the country’s independence and territorial integrity.

If war comes, the likely humanitarian crisis, which has already resulted in Lebanon hosting 1.5 million Syrian refugees in addition to the hundreds of thousands of Palestinians, Iraqis, and others in the country, will add large numbers of internally displaced Lebanese to the mix, resulting in a fragile state teetering on becoming a failed state…just what the region doesn’t need.

As Tensions mount in the Region, is Lebanon in Danger?

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I am concerned that cross-border and internal tensions are placing even greater burdens on Lebanon’s stability and independence. There is no mistaking that the deepening challenges engulfing Lebanon are due to its unique political composition and preferred policy of “disassociation” from regional conflicts, unfortunately more observed in the breach than in reality.

These tensions are real and numerous, including:

  • Internal concerns with refugees and Hezbollah’s military dominance,
  • Domestic issues surrounding the government’s performance and upcoming elections,
  • Israel’s increasing pressures on Lebanon to rein in Hezbollah,
  • Israel and the GCC’s hate-fest with Iran,
  • Iran’s manipulations in Iraq, Syria, and with Hezbollah,
  • And now, Saudi Arabia’s push to isolate Lebanon even further from it and other members of the GCC.

Lebanon is facing many obstacles to its stability, the most compelling is the specter of another conflict waged between Israel and Hezbollah. It appears that Washington is doing too little to keep the march to war from mobilizing. In Lebanon, US military and diplomatic officials have held extensive discussions with the Lebanese government, speaking warmly of the relationship with the LAF and support for Lebanon. However, this has not been carried through in Washington where a steady stream of media and panels has been discussing the next Israel-Hezbollah war and how it will decimate Lebanon.

When questioned about Israel’s goal is, the answer lies somewhere between a preemptive strike to eliminate Hezbollah’s arsenal that threatens Israel, sending a signal to Syria about stability along its border with Israel, to letting Iran know that Israel will destroy its proxy Hezbollah before it will allow Iran to enlarge its scope of influence from Tehran to Beirut.

This puts those who support strong US-Lebanon relations in a quandary, – how to support Lebanon’s territorial integrity, independence, and stability, which we believe are clearly US interests as well, while addressing the consequences of Hezbollah’s role in the country, which, we believe has both negative and helpful results. For example, the first response from Hezbollah upon hearing of PM Hariri’s resignation was to call for calm and continued cooperation in the government to stand fast against external pressures.

 So if brutalizing Lebanon is intended as a signal to Iran…why not go to the heart and head of the threat in Syria and Iran? Israel has already demonstrated that it knows where the weapons flowing to Hezbollah are being manufactured and transported, so it has identified the primary targets. It has also made it clear that it knows that Hezbollah has infiltrated villages in southern Lebanon and has fighters and supplies among the civilian populations. Aren’t there better means for reducing threats to Israel and to the Lebanese civilians than assaulting entire villages as Israel has threatened?

More importantly, there is a fallacy in looking for a military solution as that only guarantees that there will be no peace in the region. An Israeli military campaign in Lebanon – while it may mean no war now, it also means no peace ever for Israel. If Palestine continues, after 70 years, to be a core issue with Arabs and Muslims worldwide, it isn’t hard to imagine the highly negative impact of the destruction and occupation of Lebanon that will reverberate in the West as well.

Another misjudgment in targeting Lebanon and not the sources of instability in the region, is that an all-out assault brings the region closer to a nuclear Armageddon as Syria and Iran cannot ignore the consequences of a failed state in Lebanon. Another war in Lebanon may set off a civil war in the country between armed camps, while the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), the only non-sectarian stabilizing force in the country, will have the impossible task of restraining local militias from further chaos. Israel’s northern and northeast borders will be hotbeds of instability and conflict.

All of this, of course, plays directly into Russia’s goal of destroying American influence, restraining democracy, and promoting autocratic rule throughout the Middle East and North Africa. Is this what the US wants…more war, less stability, diminished influence, greater threats to our friends in the region, and promoting Russian ascendancy even more?

Red Lines of Dubious Value – Mostly, Better Not Draw Them

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I have used the expression ‘red line’ before in reference to defining constrained topics in media and political discourse in Morocco. That got me thinking about how often, aside from President Obama’s now infamous red line on chemical agent use by Syria, that red lines have influenced foreign policy, or not.

A quick Wikipedia search brought up a most interesting coincidence. The phrase first arose as a result of Western machinations in the Middle East after World War I. It first appeared in English in the “Red Line Agreement” of 1928 when the oil companies with the connivance of the governments of the UK, US, and France, were dividing up the last vestiges of the Ottoman Empire. “At the time of signature, the borders of the empire were not clear and to remedy the problem an Armenian businessman named Calouste Gulbenkian, took a red pencil to draw in an arbitrary manner the borders of the divided empire.”

This is the same Calouste Gulbenkian who is credited with opening up Iraqi oil fields to the West though his part ownership in a company he helped form called Royal Dutch Shell! As you would expect, the phrase caught on quickly and became part of the UN’s lexicon. Of course France has its own name for this concept, the “yellow line” (franchir la ligne jaune). I wonder if it has variants in China, Russia, and other hot spots?

But I digress. My favorite variation of this expression is President Bush 41’s statement addressing Saddam Hussein in August 1990 that the United States had “drawn a line in the sand” in the deserts of the Arabian Peninsula to protect Saudi Arabia, free Kuwait, and maybe see Saddam on his way. Little thought was given by his speechwriters to the image of “lines in the sand” indicating nothing to people who see shifting sands, erasing lines, daily.

assadThen the now infamous “red line” by President Obama in what many consider a failed Syria policy regarding the use of chemical weapons by Syria, which Senator John McCain observed was “apparently written in disappearing ink,” due to the perception the red line had been crossed with no action.

In Geneva, we hear the Syrian government calling President Bashar’s future a “red line,” asserting that his fate should be decided by the people of Syria, without any intention, it seems, of saying how that should happen, or when, or who will participate.

Speaking of red lines, what about the curtailing of the use of barrel bombs on civilians; the targeting of hospitals and schools in Yemen and Syria; the wholesale destruction of religious and cultural heritage sites; and red lines around non-existent safe zones that have yet to materialize.

Invoking red lines does not prevent actions and activities that further undermine the stability and security of the MENA region. Who will draw the red lines for Iran’s increasingly belligerent behavior, echoing its counterpart in North Korea? What is the use of red lines when it comes to separating an increasingly belligerent Israeli government from stripping Palestinians of even more land and reducing their access to their own neighborhoods? Are there red lines limiting Palestinian attacks on Israeli citizens, regardless of their motivations?

With the useless use of “red line” as a concept and a reality, one could anticipate that the wordsmiths for the world’s leaders would try to move beyond rhetoric to focusing on sustainable solutions. But, to coin a phrase, “words speak louder than actions” in diplomacy surrounding issues in the MENA region, and possibly the South China Sea, the Korean Peninsula, and other examples where fatigue undermines resolve to engender order through resolution.

Although there is no strategic progress in more meaningful diplomatic discourse on the horizon, a good start would be to avoid provocative and vacuous rhetoric and admit that sometimes problems will not be resolved as easily as holding a referendum, or swapping notes, or drawing a red line.