Posts

The Wheel of Misfortune – Russia Takes Advantage of US Lethargy in North Africa

/0 Comments/in , , , , , /by

Those who follow US policy in the Middle East and North Africa are increasingly concerned with a lack of a robust or consistent American presence in the region outside of support for Israel and mixed messages on Syria and Iraq. Arab governments initially were pleased that the Trump Administration took a high profile on pursuing a Middle East peace settlement, inserting itself into the Israel-GCC-Iran quagmire, and issuing some soothing words in the Qatar boycott fracas. But the rest of the region, including Egypt and Yemen, are apparent afterthoughts in policy discussions at the State Department and National Security Council, while North Africa may as well be on another planet.

Aside from bewildering our Arab allies and stoking Israel’s anti-Iran fury, it is hard to discern the strategy or results of the Administration’s actions to date. Among the signs of discontent are mutterings about the lack of Ambassadorial appointments to the majority of Arab countries and the opaqueness surrounding the work of the President’s special envoy to the region. As with the Obama Administration, Arab leaders are wondering what can be done to engage the US outside of its seemingly very narrow agenda.

Another consequence of the Administration’s perceived lack of engagement was recently highlighted in an article from the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP), remarking on the extensive outreach of Russia in North Africa, ostensibly a region of low priority to the US.

In the article, the authors, Sarah Feuer and Anna Borshchevskaya, make a point of the heightened pace of Russia’s dealings with the region in hopes of offsetting traditional US influence and promoting its own “geostrategic, economic, and political interests.”

They point out that, “In Putin’s estimation, Russia’s ascendancy depends on countering the United States and its European allies. Expanded access to the Mediterranean serves this broader goal by establishing a foothold in a European sphere of influence and reducing the U.S. ability to maneuver militarily. In economic terms, North Africa presents an opportunity for Russia to sell arms, forge partnerships in the energy sector, and invest in infrastructure development. Moscow can also claim it is in the region to fight terrorism.”

Although Russia has traditionally had strong relationships with Libya and Algeria, its moves into Tunisia and Morocco should be troubling to the US.

In Libya, Russia is seeking to maintain its foothold by supporting Gen. Khalifa Haftar and positioning itself as a neutral force between the major factions in the country. In addition to its energy resources, Libya offers important access to Egypt and port facilities that expand Russian presence on the Mediterranean.

Russia’s relationship with Algeria is perhaps the longest one it has enjoyed in North Africa, dating from the time of its enormous weapons sales as the Soviet Union. More recently its dealings with Algeria encompass debt forgiveness, more weapons sales, intelligence sharing, and cooperation in the energy sector, despite Algeria being a competitor in natural gas exports. Russia has also signed exploration and development agreements covering oil and gas concessions in the country.

Although Tunisia has long been considered pro-Western, it is benefitting from closer ties to Russia. The article notes: “since 2011 the bilateral relationship has focused on counterterrorism, nuclear energy, and tourism… In 2016, roughly 600,000 Russian tourists visited Tunisia, a tenfold increase from the previous year and over 10 percent of the country’s visitors that year. Tunisian retail businesses have welcomed Russians’ presence, and the government has spoken positively of Russia’s assistance in counterterrorism. Officials have also publicly acknowledged Russia’s growing regional sway, including in Syria.”

Morocco-Russia relations are where the hedging of bets by traditional US allies in securing their interests is most apparent. Since his trip to Moscow in 2016, King Mohammed VI has “strengthened economic relations through a renewal of the countries’ free trade agreement and an expansion of Russian access to Moroccan fisheries on the Atlantic coast.” While Morocco-US relations flounder without clear signals from the US side, Russia has continued to build its ties by becoming a major importer of Moroccan agricultural products, providing technical assistance in the energy sector, and supplying liquefied natural gas to the country.

As importantly, “As it does Tunisia, Russia views Morocco as an economic gateway to Africa; it also regards the kingdom as a model to emulate in countering Islamist extremism in its own vicinity.”

Given the stasis that seems to permeate US diplomacy outside of conflict situations, there is much more that the US could do to assert its common interests with the Maghreb countries, starting with appointing competent and active Ambassadors to fill all the empty posts.

Additionally, “In cooperation with its European allies, policymakers should promote greater regional counterterrorism cooperation among the Maghreb states and expand the US Navy’s presence across the Mediterranean. Stationing more vessels out of Rota, Spain, for example, would help constrain Russian actions.”

Despite the cuts to foreign assistance programs, the US must continue to build its cultural, education, and capacity-building programs with North Africa whenever possible, developing regional programs when useful. North African countries could greatly benefit from encouragement to strengthen civil society and protect individual liberties; the U­S can do much more in this regard.

Promoting stronger economic relations can also play a role in enabling local economies, which are in need of resilient and sustainable projects that create valued jobs and include women and youth. Programs that support entrepreneurship and the creation of SMEs should be continued and expanded as an antidote to the growing numbers of restless, unemployed youth susceptible to negative messaging.

North Africa should not be Russia’s for the taking. The US has invested decades of efforts in supporting the development of these societies. Many individuals within these countries’ public and private sector leadership have taken advantage of US exchange and educational programs and have an inclination to support closer ties. Without a commitment to husbanding these ties and building long-term relationships that engage North Africans across sectors and parties, the US is signaling its intentions to become a second-rate friend in the region, and American influence will wane accordingly.

Can Anything be Done to Push Broad-based Economic Growth in North Africa?

/0 Comments/in , , , , , /by

After more than three years, what we’ve learned about increasing jobs and growth

Now that the “Arab Spring” has become an integral part of any analysis of the future of the Middle East/North Africa (MENA) region, it is worthwhile to see what we are learning about two core issues raised during the demonstrations – increasing youth employment and economic growth. While governments have worked with international agencies and donors to launch or revise programs addressing these concerns, and the related issues of governance and transparency, three challenges persist: scalability – what to do to make small-scale programs succeed when greatly expanded; sustainability – how to make the programs cost effective so that funding costs do not limit the utility and shelf-life of the efforts; and inclusiveness – how to impact beneficiaries in the broadest possible demographics of gender, ethnicity, age, and education.

Meeting of Maghreb Employers Union

Government, Donors, Private Sector partners for growth

Morocco is a good example of the challenges faced by policy makers and intermediaries who manage the programs. It has always had technical and vocational programs for young people, and the government has been working for the past two years to include other key inputs, such as market needs to shape skills training and career support for graduates to help them find jobs. So by the end of 2014, Morocco will roll out new and improved programs that aim to close the gap between skilled workers and job opportunities. With an overall target of 60,000 jobs for graduates per year, the Minister of Employment Abdeslam Seddiki noted that as of 2016, some 10,000 unemployed people will benefit from these specific programs in addition to jobs generated by other agencies, international donors, and the private sector.

USAID, the World Bank, various EU agencies, and others are funding and running programs in Morocco dealing with youth employment. There is concern that more needs to be done to ensure collaboration among the donors to maximize the impact and lessons learned. If a stable, economically active country such as Morocco faces problems with ensuring consistent, cooperative, measureable efforts for job creation, others in the region that are less stable are in much more difficult situations.

A Different Formula

A sacred cow that is coming under scrutiny is microfinance. It is no surprise that programs in limited environments, such as microfinance schemes in poorer urban communities and rural areas are an attractive first alternative. The common wisdom is that if a program just provides loans and oversight, people, especially women, will find ways to use loans

Promoting the growth of the informal economy can be facilitated by cash transfers

Promoting the growth of the informal economy can be facilitated by cash transfers

productively. But a growing body of research shows that “it ain’t necessarily so.” So much of the success of microfinance loans depends on the metrics of success. Repayment rates have long been the staple metric. Yet a number of recent convincing studies using rate of expansion of existing business activities and levels of beneficiary consumption as indicators show the limitations of microfinance programs, especially when they are introduced across more populated and economically diverse locations.

In a recent intriguing article in Foreign Affairs, the authors review several studies of the option of cash grants instead of microfinance loans. Some general conclusions are that recipients have more insights regarding how to expand their business and acquire the needed skills than external agencies. This is particularly relevant as there is a prevailing perception that the informal economy, where most of these recipients work, is “bad” because it deprives a country of a significant portion of the population’s contribution to GDP. The authors report that “many of the poor are working below their potential because they lack the capital, credit, or insurance products necessary to grow their businesses. In the absence of financial services, which can take decades to develop, cash can fill the gap.”

While they recognize that cash grants are not appropriate or effective in every case, “the evidence is stacking up faster in favor of cash than it is for a lot of the alternatives, and direct cash transfers deserve to shed their reputation of being eccentric.” If one goes further and links the impact of better and more effective assistance programs with the dynamic role played by the informal sector in terms of basic business experience, then the value of utilizing rather than constraining this human energy becomes apparent. In a recent video released by the Initiative for Global Development (IGD), Austin Okere, Founder/CEO of Computer Warehouse Group made the point quite emphatically. He said that there are 17.7 million companies in the informal economy in sub-Saharan Africa. If each added just one employee, they would create more jobs than the African governments combinedare able to generate.

Hernando De Soto addresses MENA growth

Hernando De Soto addresses MENA growth

A similar effort is underway in Egypt, where the Sisi government is trying to make good on its economic development promises. They have recruited famed economist Hernando de Soto, who long ago studied property rights in Egypt and was consulted by both the Mubarak and Morsi governments for advice as to how to free up Egypt’s moribund economy. His answer was quite simple, “This is where most of the country’s resources that can give you…the high growth rates are…it’s the informal economy.” Rather than try to constrain its vitality through more regulation, de Soto recommends an extensive plan to integrate the informal economy into the economic system by reforms and incentives to drive economic growth. The bottom line, as in this proposed initiative and the others, is to develop strategies that generate large-scale employment and robust and sustained inclusive economic growth.

 

Mobilizing Human Capital

The paths to linking effective strategies for growth and employment are still unclear. A major effort is underway at the Brookings Institution, with partners in sub-Saharan Africa, to assess programs addressing youth unemployment to gauge effectiveness and lessons learned. So far, the studies indicate far more about lessons learned than what works under a variety of conditions. What’s critical to the studies is that they are done on a country-by-country basis by local NGOs, thus providing vital first-hand data and insights that might not be obvious to outsiders.

The authors are releasing the studies individually so that researchers can do both country-specific and comparative analyses. “A number of lessons can be drawn from these country-focused studies,” they point out. First of all, know your beneficiaries, their backgrounds, demographics, social indicators, past and current experience in the informal and formal sectors, relevance of ethnicity or minority status, motivational profiles, and educational backgrounds.

Secondly, there is data that supports the effectiveness of government-sponsored vouchers and subsidies when they allow individuals to make choices that reflect their ambitions. This is particularly relevant to those who have experience in the informal economy and have a strong entrepreneurial sense of what is needed to expand and grow their business. Finally, they stress the importance of good data, not just focusing on unemployment rates, but digging deeper into categories of unemployment, quality of available jobs, and mismatches between jobs and potential employees.

Good Decisions Require Reliable Information and Critical Insight

While these studies focus on sub-Saharan Africa, the same types of challenges exist in the Maghreb, and the same in-depth

Fez - combining the best of old and new

Fez – combining the best of old and new

assessments are needed to understand not only what works and what doesn’t but why. A good starting point for this undertaking is to parse the recently released report on the impact of the first National Initiative for Human Development campaign in Morocco. The report categorizes the results of this most important effort to lift people out of poverty through introducing sustainable development projects. In his most recent Throne Day speech, King Mohammed VI tasked the Economic, Social and Environmental Council to look at the human development indicators in the country for the past five years and come up with recommendations to ensure equitable growth that supports the quality of Morocco’s “intangible capital.” It is this integration of political will, well-developed research, strategic thinking, and close attention to all stakeholders that will provide the clearest insights and policies for advancing growth and employment throughout Africa.

A Tale of Two Cities…well, Actually Three Countries

/0 Comments/in , , , , , , , /by

Finding the Middle Path in Politics is Fraught with Challenges yet Better than No Discourse at All­­­­

When Driss El Yazami, the chairman of Morocco’s National Human Rights Council (CNDH) spoke recently in Washington, DC, he was asked about the so-called Arab Spring and its impact on human rights protections. He was quite candid in his response. “The core issue is about identity; it is about dignity. It is the loss of the connection between one’s identity and one’s dignity that is at the heart of today’s unrest.” He believes that human rights protections derive from the value that governments place on their relationship with their people. Human rights protections are a conscious effort by governments to have a social contract that applies to all people in the country.

This is the rationale behind the CNDH’s campaigns for migrant rights, the end of military trials for civilians, enhanced rights for the mentally ill, and eliminating child labor, to list several of their most recent efforts. And Morocco has earned praise for its continuing human rights reforms, largely as a result of the government adopting CNDH’s recommendations and turning them into legislation. Mr. El Yazami contends that this is the characteristic of democracy that goes beyond elections. It is a space where all opinions can be heard and debated without fear and with respect for differing perspectives and the outcomes of the debate.

Keeping Faith with Tunisia

In the past few months, Tunisia has garnered extensive praise from the international community for its “National Dialogue,” which weathered a very difficult drafting of a constitution and installation of a transitional technocrat government leading to presidential and parliamentary elections in late 2014. The contentious constitutional process avoided the poor outcomes that have plagued Egypt and Libya where significant disagreements have produced unsatisfactory conclusions. It should not be taken for granted, however, that the transitional success of the National Dialogue means that there is unity in Tunisia’s political landscape.

Human rights advocates are concerned that political expediency will mar steps needed to genuinely move Tunisia forward. As Yasmine Ryan writes, “…ignoring deep structural inequalities will only lead to further instability. Add to this the desperate need for major reforms to the judiciary, security forces, the education system, and decentralization, among others—and Tunisia’s challenges can sometimes seem insurmountable.” And the questions of national identity and defining with some precision the relationship between the state and religion continue to be unresolved, promising more contentious maneuvering as the elections approach.

Amna Guellali, director of Human Rights Watch for Tunisia and Algeria, remarked in an article in World Policy Journal  that contradictions and vague definitions in the constitution “could have grave consequences for the country.” It is in this gap between the constitution and how the enabling legislation is drafted, finalized, and implemented that human rights protections face their greatest challenges. One compelling example is the potential contradictions in the role of the government as “the guardian of religion” and “protector of the sacred,” while also ensuring “liberty of conscience.” Given that the first article of the new constitution states that Tunisia’s religion is Islam, there are understandable concerns about how this will play out. Without a national independent body akin to CNDH that can shed light on inclusive steps towards real democracy, the task of defenders of human rights is more difficult as the economic and social development needs of Tunisia will dominate the agenda of any incoming leadership.

And In Algeria, the Same may not Hold

It is difficult to have a forward-looking discussion about human rights reforms in a country    with such an opaque political process. John Entelis, writing in Muftah, notes “Riots and protests have been a regular feature of Algerian political life” and mentions that critics have pointed out that there is no timeline for implementing reforms announced since 2011. Some see reforms as a mouse caught “between the president’s office and the military-industrial complex, between executive authority and the country’s powerful intelligence services.”

The run-up to the presidential election this week has seen the withdrawal of candidates, boycott calls from Islamic and leftist parties, and the virtual campaign for Bouteflika’s re-election run by surrogates who are assuring Algerians that reform is his priority – once he is returned to office. “One pro-government politician went so far as to declare, ‘I will vote for him [Bouteflika] dead or alive because he has done so much for the country.’”

How much-needed human and social development challenges will be addressed after the elections has yet to be discussed. “It is a testament to the extreme disconnect between the country’s formal political structure and its civil society that the overwhelming majority of ordinary Algerians have been completely unaffected by the virtual absence of presidential authority…” With the debate yet to begin on a new constitutional amendment providing for the office of Vice-President and the installation of that person, human rights has little visibility within the debate over the new power balance that will emerge with Bouteflika’s departure. As James D. Le Sueur wrote in a monograph for the German Marshall Fund, “Politically, Algeria has managed to weather the storm brought on by the Arab Spring through swift and deliberate police presence meant to suppress real calls for reform.” It is hard to imagine a meaningful national dialogue in Algeria on identity and dignity emerging any time soon.

Unclear Prognosis for Human Rights in the Maghreb

Laudatory as the results of the Tunisian National Dialogue are, its new constitution exemplifies the challenge of closing the space between values and politics. As Tunisians prepare for end-of-year elections, the priority given to human rights may become clearer as candidates address voters concerns about social and economic inequalities. Morocco has its plate full with recommendations from the CNDH as well as judicial reforms, a new civil society framework, and reducing economic disparities to address through the end of this year. In Algeria as well as Libya, where basic rule of law has yet to be established, internal dissensions, power moves among various players, and uncertainty among the populace as to their countries’ future stability will have a major impact on the importance given to human rights under new governments. It will be a long year ahead.

Middle East economic reform requires robust and constructive citizen participation

/in , , , , , , , , /by

A great deal of hand wringing goes on as bad news continues to drown out progress in the transitions going on in the Middle East and North Africa. From Egypt and Syria to Libya and Yemen, nay-sayers and pundits readily point out that there are few short-term solutions that don’t require some pain in the process of moving forward. As national identities crumble under the assault of religious and partisan appeals, it is problematic to come up with short-term remedies that don’t have long-term consequences for the political and economic health of the countries.

It seems to me that, aside from Tunisia at the best of times, which is not often enough, there is a failure by governments in transition to sustain effective messaging that people can understand on how the government is going to concretely tackle unemployment and corruption. Blaming the IMF for subsidy reforms is not a credible strategy for laying the groundwork for other steps that must be taken to reduce public debt incurred as a result of inflated bureaucracies, inefficient labor regulations, and insufficient investment capital available for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Even Morocco’s parliament is encountering problems passing needed reforms to reduce expenditures and stimulate sustainable economic growth.

The challenges in the Maghreb are enormous, and yet citizens are rarely being mobilized to take part in economic development. Rather, they are pulled in different directions by political forces more concerned with scoring points and securing power than contributing to a way forward that is balanced, equitable, and contributes to necessary long-term changes.

Considering the options

Outside organizations are working in the MENA to provide mechanisms to bridge the messaging gap between governments and citizens. The George C. Marshall Foundation in cooperation with the Stimson Center and L’Insitut Arabe des Chefs d’Enterprises recently held a conference in Tunis that “brought together business people, academicians, policy planners and other thought leaders for a day and a half discussion on regional economic integration in the Maghreb…” The purpose of the conference was to determine how the action principles behind the success of the Marshall Plan in rebuilding Europe “might best be applied to contemporary situations where economic reconstruction or mass relief is needed.” One of its principal tenets seemed quite relevant to my thinking about the challenge of promoting both top-down and grassroots support for economic reform, “Political leadership and elements of self-sacrifice and determination are essential to the success of aid programs.”

In the US, Bill Clinton’s first presidential campaign, built around the message “the economy, stupid,” illustrated how critical it is to capture the public’s imagination and involvement in a dialogue about progress that has consequences beyond slogans. Similarly, the pressures of trying to reverse decades of economic and political mismanagement have resulted in a credibility barrier, especially for the transitional governments in Libya, Tunisia, and Egypt. As is evident from the competing demonstrations in those countries, evolving a consensus on key solutions without some parties feeling marginalized is an overwhelming challenge at times.

 Reaching the people

A key lesson in “participatory democracy” that seems to have emerged from the trials of the transitional governments is that the process of engaging citizens effectively in participatory and respectful politics is daunting under the best of circumstances. Their previous experiences with the former governments in Libya, Tunisia, and Egypt in particular have not given people a sense of national citizenship that transcends more particular allegiances. To help address this “communications gap,” the U.S.-Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) has launched a series of civic engagement programs in the Maghreb to enable youth, civil society, and advocacy organizations to more effectively engage in the political process.

The World Bank Institute (WBI) along with the World Bank Middle East and North Africa (MENA) recently “brought together government officials and civil society practitioners from Morocco, Jordan and Tunisia to discuss how citizen engagement can contribute to more informed policies; how to develop codes of practice for public consultations; and how to use online tools to facilitate consultations.” The program aims to enable governments to “make informed decisions while creating public trust” by ensuring that the voices of those most impacted by the policy have been heard and addressed. Moreover, the program supports an inclusive process to ensure that the right players are involved, recognizing that public consultations can be critical “since the government may not have all the solutions at hand.”

This program complements others in the region such as the National Dialogue on Civil Society in Morocco focusing on how more inclusive and transparent communications between governments and citizens can reduce conflict and promote consensus around key development and governance issues. An essential element is training trainers in both government agencies and NGOs on the principles of public consultations as a tool for civic engagement.

While these efforts may be small steps in terms of bringing governments and citizens together, they are critical for directing “street” energy into advocacy tools using social media and other outreach technology and e-government programs to provide better access for people and greater knowledge and awareness for public officials. For the international donor community, there is a lesson here from the Marshall Foundation’s tenets: “Any successful aid program must be driven by the country and not imposed by outside countries or institutions.” When people speak as part of a respectful dialogue and government listens and acts to credibly engage its citizens, the street will return to being a thoroughfare rather than an avenue of protest and disorder.

From winning to working: challenges of moving beyond the Arab uprisings

/in , , , , , , /by

I must admit that sometimes I am a bit confused by how some very good people frame their analyses of MENA issues. A recent case in point is a blog by Frederic Hof, one of my favorite writers on the Levant. He writes that the major question for the Arabs is “what will follow the Ottoman system as the true source of political legitimacy? The emerging answer is that for governments to be legitimate, they must ultimately derive their powers from the consent of the governed. This, in my view, is the meaning of the Arab Spring.”

Well, historical antecedents aside…that is a useful, as yet un-validated, position. He goes on to write, “Since the downfall of the four hundred-year empire only ninety years ago, Arabs have struggled to find the location of the stabilizing political legitimacy that once resided in the system of the Sultan-Caliph. Legitimacy has nothing to do with whether people approve or disapprove of the performance of a particular leader or government. It has everything to do with the right of a government to govern, whether it does so well or poorly. It is the system that is important; not the person.”

To speak of the Ottoman system or any of its predecessors as having the “right” to govern the Arab lands any more than other colonial powers turns history a bit on its head. However, his point that “it is the system that is important” is a hypothesis worth testing under the current tempest of transitions in the MENA region.

Perhaps the first consideration is where political legitimacy resides. Since the only clear example of retained legitimacy in North Africa after the Arab uprisings is Morocco, which was not ruled by the Ottomans and certainly did not cede legitimacy to the French and Spanish occupations, the legitimacy question is more applicable to Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt. None of these countries yet has a constitution as the basis for governing, and so the jury is still out on the “system” of governance. In the contestation between Islamic parties and their “secular” counterparts, it is unclear where the mantle of leadership will be awarded by “the consent of the governed.” Those who are not fans of the Islamic government in Egypt should as well be concerned about the “tyranny of the majority” from the left or the right.

In a recent Viewpoints paper produced by the Wilson Center, Marina Ottaway analyzes the steps secular parties can take to be more competitive in Tunisia and Egypt. Her central theme is that “the secular opposition…has been unable to develop a clear message, build viable political parties, or overcome its fragmentation.” It is a telling assessment when combined with a recent remark by an Arab head of state visiting Washington, DC, who said that “there is no Arabic or Hebrew word for strategy,” focusing on the need for Arab countries to consult more seriously on complex issues such as Syria and the peace process.

While it may be that political leadership in these countries is still in flux, the bottom line, according to Ottaway is, “The transitions that started with the 2011 uprisings will not lead to a democratic outcome unless a better balance is established between Islamist and secular forces…The real issue is that democracy does not depend on the behavior of one party or faction, but on a pluralistic and balanced political spectrum. And that balance must be established in the electoral arena.” [emphasis added] And here is the challenge of history: How do societies wherein political, religious, ethnic, and socio-economic differences have been exploited for generations regard others as fellow seekers for justice and equality? How do elections, which historically have been engineered to satisfy narrowly defined constituencies, all at once become an expression of the will of the people, of “the consent of the governed?” How do issues of emerging political identities avoid being strapped with religious or personality-driven labels that stereotype their agendas before they are subject to the realities of the political marketplace of negotiation?

Ottaway offers several prescriptions to secular parties on how to capture the high ground in the political landscape: develop a clear message; develop an organization; and unite their leadership. She points out that the Islamic parties in Egypt and Tunisia have yet to articulate clear economic platforms that define their actions for governing. The secular parties “have also failed so far to suggest their own remedies in a way designed to gain broad support.” Let me suggest that perhaps this is an area where the Morocco experience may be helpful. The government’s economic plans are well articulated and targeted but have foundered in winning Parliamentary approval. At least the people know what they voted for, even if it has not yet been delivered.

Ottoway believes that the lack of cohesive secular political parties reflects, in many ways, the “social distance that separates the secular leadership from much of the population.” Again, when I look at Morocco, where the PJD and Istiqlal parties have maintained solid support among their members, they stand in contrast to less cohesive parties elsewhere. As Ottaway remarks, “….they need to decide that the non-glamorous task of building machines is worth the effort and they do not appear to have done so thus far.” This is a lesson across the Maghreb where public patience should not be taken for granted.

Finally, there is the issue of leadership, where “Individuals who in theory share the same ideals of a democratic country that protects human rights and individual freedoms, respects diversity, and takes its place among modern nations are showing little inclination to work together for the common goal.” It is counterintuitive for politicians, who seek the limelight to illuminate their positions, to defer to others and trust in coalition-building in which they are not prominently featured. Many people in the region have long lamented the lack of an Arab Nelson Mandela, but hand-wringing does not enlarge the capacity for thoughtful and effective leadership in the region.

As the Arab peoples embark on perhaps their first realistic opportunity in modern times to own their political legitimacy, the first step may be to actually build a consensus of the governed rather than proclaiming their differences.

“Egypt: Challenges of Crafting Leadership in Foreign Affairs”

/in /by

The summer 2012 issue of the Cairo Review of Global Affairs, includes an article, “Egypt in the World,” by former Egyptian Ambassador to the US, Nabil Fahmy. He is clearly in the secular/modernist/democratic stream of Egyptian political discourse, and provides helpful insights to those who want to understand the Arab world beneath the stereotypes. His main theme focuses on the centrality of Egypt’s foreign policy in the region and the world, which he defines in three concentric circles. His observations flow from the assumption that “Now, in a region transformed by popular upheaval, Egypt has a chance to pick up the mantle and renew her place as a political and ideological wellspring for the Arab and North African Middle East.”

Well, I hope that the government of Egypt isn’t waiting for an invitation from surrounding countries to lead from in front or from behind. This notion of Egypt as the regional leader “… stems not only from the country’s demographic weight, geopolitical location, and military capability, but also from its historic and contemporary role as the heart of cultural and intellectual innovation in the Arab world.” With all respect to my friend and former mentor, I find the notion of Egypt as the resurrected leader of the MENA region a bit of a stretch given the transitions still in store within Egypt as well as the significant political and economic challenges in the region that make any leadership role problematic. This is even more apparent as Fahmy indicates, “… any new government must learn from the lessons of the past.”

Learning from the past or overturning the past? This was obviously written before Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi made waves at the Tehran conference of the Non-Aligned Movement—the first global vehicle for Nasser’s claim to regional leadership, and Morsi’s visit to the opening of the UN General Assembly, where he spelled out Egypt’s new foreign policy perspectives in a long New York Times interview. It is hard to conceive of a country, which may slide to a “collective caliphate,” as an emerging regional power that promotes democratic values when its own legitimizing political process is being sorely tested.

By this I mean that while Salafists call for the new caliphate, one can argue that Egypt must guard against a kind of “collective caliphate” where political and religious/moral leadership is held by a few who claim to speak for the many. We have already seen the problematic and counterproductive impact of Iranian foreign policy for US interests. Can we expect the same from Egypt?

Some more wisdom from Ambassador Fahmy succinctly summarizes the challenges: “Egypt should provide the seeds of freedom by supporting openness, transparency, and the rule of law throughout the Middle East, but the demand for and pace of reform must come from within states, not across their borders.” “…If domestic reality does not match the principled stand of our international proclamations, our newfound legitimacy will be unsustainable and or claim of leadership will fall on deaf ears.”

While I admire Egypt for its past contributions, the reality is that the Arab street has moved towards conflation with its Islamic identity and crossing that line has changed the tone and focus of what leadership means to “the people.” So as Egypt emerges from its transitions and proffers “her natural role as a leader in the Middle East and Africa,” will anyone take up the offer?