ECFR Report Gives Mixed Grades on Counterterrorism Strategies to Morocco and Tunisia – Part 1

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A recent study by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) illustrates the challenges of proposing approaches to terrorism prevention in other countries whose methods may at times conflict with Western values of due process, reflect local power dynamics that are unique to each country, and reflect how those governments view tradeoffs between short vs long-term efforts to combat terrorism.

Europe is increasingly concerned that the large numbers of foreign fighters returning from the Middle East to the Maghreb, particularly Tunisia and Morocco, will in time spill over to Europe creating much larger threats than previously encountered. “European countries have a strong interest in understanding security threats that emanate from North Africa, and in working with North African countries to address them,” according to the study. The study has several themes: the nature of security challenges in the Maghreb with attention to how they counter threats within their borders; the types and level of cooperation with the EU on countering terrorism; how each country is fighting terrorism given their unique societies and histories; and how their strategies impact the EU’s options for cooperation and collaboration.

While most of the analyses believe that Tunisia and Morocco are making important and successful efforts in their struggle with countering terrorism, “Nevertheless, the countries’ counter-terrorism strategies share a common shortcoming: both Morocco and Tunisia have prioritized the prevention of attacks and the disruption of terrorist cells, but have failed to pay sufficient attention to the legal and judicial framework for handling people detained on terrorism charges – or to the wide range of factors that contribute to radicalization.” This caveat has as much to do with the historical roots of notions of justice in both countries as well as structural and resource constraints faced in dealing with those groups at risk of radicalization.

The study calls for stronger cooperation and integration of efforts between the EU members and Morocco and Tunisia who “make up the front line in the EU’s efforts to establish zones of security on the southern shore of the Mediterranean.” It specifically mentions the need for “greater attention to areas such as the treatment of arrested suspects, socioeconomic factors that may contribute to radicalization, and the state’s broader relationship with communities that are disproportionately vulnerable to terrorist recruitment,” as critical priorities in terrorism prevention.

Tunisia – changing of the guard

Given the terrorist attacks in 2015 that exposed the weaknesses in Tunisia’s security platform, “With substantial foreign support, the Tunisian authorities responded to this moment of crisis by launching a program that restructured the security services and improved the country’s defenses against terrorism.”

On balance, the study gives the government high marks in that since 2014, it has markedly improved the army and internal security forces’ capabilities, training, equipment, and coordination.

“In 2015, the government launched the National Commission on Counter-Terrorism, which joined the National Security Council in developing the new, comprehensive strategy on counter-terrorism and extremism unveiled in 2016.” As the study points out, it bears “a strong resemblance to European models, this strategy centers on the four pillars of prevention, protection, prosecution, and response to attacks. Finally, in early 2017, Tunisia set up the National Intelligence Centre, an institution designed to overcome problems with coordination and information-sharing between intelligence agencies that had plagued the country’s counter-terrorism efforts since the revolution.”

These steps, plus the construction of barriers in a militarized zone bordering Libya and Algeria, along with enhanced surveillance and detection equipment, are key factors in the country’s upgraded capabilities. The report states that “Tunisia stands out among North African countries for its readiness to work with international partners on reforming and improving the capability of its security sector. European officials generally agree that Tunisia’s security services have considerably improved their capacity to prevent and respond to terrorist threats since 2015.”

On the other hand, it notes that, “Nevertheless, the overhaul of Tunisia’s security and counter-terrorism strategy and structures has failed to resolve some problems and even created a few new difficulties. The reform of the security services under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior has made little headway… as many officials continue to believe that police transparency and accountability would be an impediment to fighting terrorism.”

While Tunisia has sharpened its skills to prevent terrorist attacks, there still remain several concerns that must be addressed according to the report. First of all, the internal security services need to be reformed, especially reducing its immunity for violating human rights and arbitrary arrests and detention. “Using emergency powers, the security forces have carried out thousands of raids and house searches without judicial authorization, and placed dozens of people under assigned residence orders,” it states, calling for independent oversight of its operations.

Additional challenges include the economic impact of border closures with Libya, which severely restrict cross-border trade; and more importantly, the lack of a comprehensive government-wide strategy for dealing with radicalized individuals. Also of concern is the lack of intelligence on Tunisian diaspora in Europe, in sharp contrast with Morocco, which has significant interactions with its intelligence counterparts in Europe.

Among its conclusions regarding Tunisia, the study recommends, “In Tunisia, international partners should follow through on existing reform programs, encouraging further openness within the Ministry of the Interior to help the institution improve its cooperation with the country’s citizens. Greater professionalism within the security services would make it easier for European partners to share intelligence with Tunisia. European countries and the EU should also encourage and support Tunisia in developing programs to promote religious education and awareness, gearing them towards pupils and their families from an early age.”

In my next blog, I’ll look at the ECFR assessment of Morocco’s counter-terrorism capabilities and strategies.

Of Note: MEI Panel weighs in on Protests in Morocco and Tunisia

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The Middle East Institute (MEI) recently presented a panel discussion on “Protests in North Africa: parallels and prospects.” Speakers addressed “the social and economic drivers behind the recent demonstrations [in Morocco and Tunisia], as well as prospects for resolving these inequities.”

The Washington, DC panel included Intissar Fakir (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), Dokhi Fassihian (Freedom House), William Lawrence (George Washington University), and moderator Paul Salem, MEI’s senior vice-president for policy research and programs.

Although the immediate causes of the most recent demonstrations are very different – in Tunisia protesters want a change to the country’s new austerity laws, while in Morocco the flashpoint is the death of two young coal miners, Houcine and Jedouane Dioui in Jerada – the root causes are the same: economic inequality, perceived lack of investment and development resulting in high unemployment, and ineffective government responses to local needs due to corruption and lack of accountability.

In Tunisia, protests have been continuing for many months due to the lack of economic growth in the country, corruption and lack of government accountability, and strong feelings of marginalization among youth. Laws exonerating wealthy businessmen and politicians from persecution for actions during the Ben Ali regime overthrown in 2011 have soured public confidence in the government. Despite large amounts of international assistance, some significant international investment, and large doses on congratulations for Tunisia’s democratic progress, many citizens are unhappy with the government’s inability to develop sustainable and equitable strategies for moving forward. Its nascent democracy is challenged by these protests as the government is resorting to tougher security measures, arresting hundreds of demonstrators.

Although Ms. Fassihian, senior program manager for MENA at Freedom House, characterized Tunisia as “more free” than Morocco due to its strong and more open human rights record, she notes that the continuing demonstrations have led to extensive arrests and to trials in military courts, further undermining the civilian government’s credibility. Arrests are both planned, i.e. targeted at certain leaders, and random of people at the demonstrations. This has resulted, according to Ms. Fakir, who is the Editor-in-chief of Sada, CEIP’s Middle East blog journal, in a growing lack of trust in the government and impatience with its inability to resolve the economic crisis. The lack of transparency in decision-making has also undermined the public’s faith in the government.

In Morocco, one can link the Jerada protests to the 2016 marches in the Rif protesting the death of fishmonger Mouhcine Fikri in El Hoceima. Both incidents highlighted the regional and local governments’ lack of accountability and corruption, leaving them unable to move effectively to solve local programs of unemployment, lack of investment in infrastructure and social services, and providing the services, education, and job opportunities that citizens expect.

The protests, which spread beyond the Rif region, drew a strong response from King Mohammed VI who showed his displeasure with those officials charged with not having carried out the more than $100 million of development projects allocated to the region over the past six years. He fired and blacklisted past and current ministers, director generals, and other officials responsible for the economic development and governance of the region. The King sent his personal envoy, Aziz Akhannouch, Minister of Agriculture, to meet with leaders of the Rif protests.

Now, the King faces a similar crisis some 120 miles away where young men, working to mine coal in abandoned quarries, died in attempts to scrap out some income for their families. Again, there are charges of local government inaction, extensive unemployment, corruption and lack of accountability, and insufficient investments to retool the local economy, create jobs, and build needed infrastructure.

While Ms. Fassihian pointed out that Morocco is at least attempting to observe freedom of assembly by allowing protests, security forces eventually cracked down on the protestors. The judicial system is still dominated by the security forces, controlled by the Palace. So without an independent judiciary, there is an observable regression in observing civil and human rights, more protests, and a decline in public confidence. Hence, demonstrators continued to come out in order to reach out to the King as the ultimate arbiter in the country.

One of the recurring themes mentioned by the panel is the need for credible decentralization or regionalization that devolves effective decision-making from the central government to local elected authorities. Both countries have committed to decentralization as a means of promoting political and economic development. Ms. Fassihian noted that although Morocco is a leader in the region in decentralization, the process is very slow and many obstacles are due to lack of clarity from the central government on issues such as power-sharing between elected and appointed leaders, budgetary guidelines and allocations, and standards of accountability and transparency in government transactions and services.

Despite these challenges, there was agreement among the panelists that US policy can play an effective role in both countries. Dr. Lawrence pointed out that he US government has many links to Morocco and Tunisia through various agreements, assistance programs, training programs, as well as educational and cultural ties. A more strategic and targeted approach, especially focused on economic issues and youth can have a significant impact as these are the root causes, along with corruption and accountability, that drive the protestors.

It is a conundrum in Morocco and Tunisia, as well as other emerging economies in Africa, to meet the rising expectations of the majority of their citizens without a more efficient use of their limited resources. There are no single or simple solutions. Each country, given its historical and recent experiences, must confront dilemmas that arise from inequities in their societies that reinforce social, economic, and political disparities. Morocco is fortunate in that it has a King, widely respected, but a government which lacks widespread credibility with the people is not trusted to carry out needed policies.

Tunisia’s struggles are well-known, some historical, others part of the generational shift from an authoritarian regime to a democracy that seeks to balance its forward progress without weakening the country’s economic, cultural, and social infrastructure.

A major step in the right direction could be a firm and consistent commitment to forms of decentralization/devolution/regionalization implemented within a context of clear government authority, responsibility, and accountability. The people of Tunisia and Morocco are demanding to be at the core of their countries’ futures. The US can continue to upgrade its commitment to its partnerships by working to target both the short and long-term efforts to enable and ennoble the government-citizen relations.

 

The Wheel of Misfortune – Russia Takes Advantage of US Lethargy in North Africa

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Those who follow US policy in the Middle East and North Africa are increasingly concerned with a lack of a robust or consistent American presence in the region outside of support for Israel and mixed messages on Syria and Iraq. Arab governments initially were pleased that the Trump Administration took a high profile on pursuing a Middle East peace settlement, inserting itself into the Israel-GCC-Iran quagmire, and issuing some soothing words in the Qatar boycott fracas. But the rest of the region, including Egypt and Yemen, are apparent afterthoughts in policy discussions at the State Department and National Security Council, while North Africa may as well be on another planet.

Aside from bewildering our Arab allies and stoking Israel’s anti-Iran fury, it is hard to discern the strategy or results of the Administration’s actions to date. Among the signs of discontent are mutterings about the lack of Ambassadorial appointments to the majority of Arab countries and the opaqueness surrounding the work of the President’s special envoy to the region. As with the Obama Administration, Arab leaders are wondering what can be done to engage the US outside of its seemingly very narrow agenda.

Another consequence of the Administration’s perceived lack of engagement was recently highlighted in an article from the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP), remarking on the extensive outreach of Russia in North Africa, ostensibly a region of low priority to the US.

In the article, the authors, Sarah Feuer and Anna Borshchevskaya, make a point of the heightened pace of Russia’s dealings with the region in hopes of offsetting traditional US influence and promoting its own “geostrategic, economic, and political interests.”

They point out that, “In Putin’s estimation, Russia’s ascendancy depends on countering the United States and its European allies. Expanded access to the Mediterranean serves this broader goal by establishing a foothold in a European sphere of influence and reducing the U.S. ability to maneuver militarily. In economic terms, North Africa presents an opportunity for Russia to sell arms, forge partnerships in the energy sector, and invest in infrastructure development. Moscow can also claim it is in the region to fight terrorism.”

Although Russia has traditionally had strong relationships with Libya and Algeria, its moves into Tunisia and Morocco should be troubling to the US.

In Libya, Russia is seeking to maintain its foothold by supporting Gen. Khalifa Haftar and positioning itself as a neutral force between the major factions in the country. In addition to its energy resources, Libya offers important access to Egypt and port facilities that expand Russian presence on the Mediterranean.

Russia’s relationship with Algeria is perhaps the longest one it has enjoyed in North Africa, dating from the time of its enormous weapons sales as the Soviet Union. More recently its dealings with Algeria encompass debt forgiveness, more weapons sales, intelligence sharing, and cooperation in the energy sector, despite Algeria being a competitor in natural gas exports. Russia has also signed exploration and development agreements covering oil and gas concessions in the country.

Although Tunisia has long been considered pro-Western, it is benefitting from closer ties to Russia. The article notes: “since 2011 the bilateral relationship has focused on counterterrorism, nuclear energy, and tourism… In 2016, roughly 600,000 Russian tourists visited Tunisia, a tenfold increase from the previous year and over 10 percent of the country’s visitors that year. Tunisian retail businesses have welcomed Russians’ presence, and the government has spoken positively of Russia’s assistance in counterterrorism. Officials have also publicly acknowledged Russia’s growing regional sway, including in Syria.”

Morocco-Russia relations are where the hedging of bets by traditional US allies in securing their interests is most apparent. Since his trip to Moscow in 2016, King Mohammed VI has “strengthened economic relations through a renewal of the countries’ free trade agreement and an expansion of Russian access to Moroccan fisheries on the Atlantic coast.” While Morocco-US relations flounder without clear signals from the US side, Russia has continued to build its ties by becoming a major importer of Moroccan agricultural products, providing technical assistance in the energy sector, and supplying liquefied natural gas to the country.

As importantly, “As it does Tunisia, Russia views Morocco as an economic gateway to Africa; it also regards the kingdom as a model to emulate in countering Islamist extremism in its own vicinity.”

Given the stasis that seems to permeate US diplomacy outside of conflict situations, there is much more that the US could do to assert its common interests with the Maghreb countries, starting with appointing competent and active Ambassadors to fill all the empty posts.

Additionally, “In cooperation with its European allies, policymakers should promote greater regional counterterrorism cooperation among the Maghreb states and expand the US Navy’s presence across the Mediterranean. Stationing more vessels out of Rota, Spain, for example, would help constrain Russian actions.”

Despite the cuts to foreign assistance programs, the US must continue to build its cultural, education, and capacity-building programs with North Africa whenever possible, developing regional programs when useful. North African countries could greatly benefit from encouragement to strengthen civil society and protect individual liberties; the U­S can do much more in this regard.

Promoting stronger economic relations can also play a role in enabling local economies, which are in need of resilient and sustainable projects that create valued jobs and include women and youth. Programs that support entrepreneurship and the creation of SMEs should be continued and expanded as an antidote to the growing numbers of restless, unemployed youth susceptible to negative messaging.

North Africa should not be Russia’s for the taking. The US has invested decades of efforts in supporting the development of these societies. Many individuals within these countries’ public and private sector leadership have taken advantage of US exchange and educational programs and have an inclination to support closer ties. Without a commitment to husbanding these ties and building long-term relationships that engage North Africans across sectors and parties, the US is signaling its intentions to become a second-rate friend in the region, and American influence will wane accordingly.

So What about Tunisia?

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Government Faces Legacy and Aspirational Challenges

Perhaps it was too much to expect, that Tunisia could overturn a decades long autocratic state, create inclusive political space and a responsive and inclusive economic strategy, and fight off external security threats, all in ten years. Regardless, one thing is clear, the majority of Tunisians are committed to peeling back years of political and economic decay and restructuring their society to be more inclusive and equitable, but how?

There are many analyses of where Tunisia is headed – it even comes up during US wine tastings of Tunisia’s finest (another one of those pesky Muslim countries that grows and enjoys wine!). And there is consensus on the key issues, but the how to get there and who will have to make the sacrifices engender a great deal of debate.

As I noted in my recent blog on Morocco, forming a national strategy is a bit easier when you have a king who reminds his citizens about their obligations towards each other and responsibilities within the context of government serving the people. Yet, even King Mohammed VI has expressed frustration with officials and cultural luddites that see the past as the only guide to the future. And he is giving the Parliament, civil society organizations, and NGOs plenty of space to figure out how democracy will work in Morocco and the burdens of not delivering.

So it is with Tunisia. Everyone is rooting for its success, but it is still fighting past demons of inequitable political and economic empowerment, structural discrimination against women and youth, entrenched elite power networks, and lack of robust economic growth to generate badly needed employment. Among the recent reports of note was published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace authored by Maha Yahya, after extensive research in the country. The report came out before the most recent government shake-up so it is useful to compare the recommendations in the report with the latest policies espoused by the government.

The major concern expressed in the report was the “The spreading disillusionment and alienation of large swaths of Tunisia society and their burgeoning misgivings about their prospects for a democratic and stable future.” Both the political and economic spheres are characterized as out of touch with young people, beholden to elites tied to the old regime, not rigorous in developing inclusive strategies to promote prosperity in the inland areas, and lacking long-term strategies to ensure equitable participation in the political and economic life of the country.

Relying on various polling data, Ms. Yahya points out that in 2014, 50% of Tunisians point to corruption, especially in the health services and police, as widespread, and close to 70% believe that the government is not proactive in combating corruption.

Similarly, it is not surprising that 80% of those 35-49 believe that strong economic growth should be the country’s first priority. Less than 9% of rural youth and 31% of urban youth expressed any confidence in the political system, while more than 80% believe that their local imam and religious organizations are credible. This has serious consequences. “In the 2014 elections 80% of 18-24 year olds did not vote in the parliamentary elections and largely abstained from the presidential election.”

As Nabil Fahmy, former Foreign Minister of Egypt recently noted, “Domestic social and sectarian grievances are still very much a part of Tunisian politics. The Tunisian government must tread carefully, and it cannot assume that all of its citizens are satisfied with the new arrangements.”

Recommendations

The primary recommendation made in the Carnegie study is that “Tunisian political elites need to rebuild the bonds of trust between the citizens and their state, strengthen democratic institutions, and uphold the principles of equity and social justice enshrined in the constitution.”

Voters waiting their turn. cartercenter.org

Voters waiting their turn. cartercenter.org

Regardless of the overarching concern with border security and counterterrorism, the country needs to continue to build on the 2012 National Council of Social Dialogue to build “a common platform for dialogue on basic principles among political parties, civil society organizations, and the private sector, and for reflecting the basic concerns of Tunisian citizens.”

The government has committed to far-ranging economic and political reforms, which need to be defined and sequenced with special attention to addressing regional disparities. An innovation in the MENA that definitely has applications throughout the region is the country-wide use of technology to link state and citizen. While Jordan and others have instituted some e-government programs to promote transparency and communications, the Tunisian goal is more robust and has the potential to generate effective bridges between youth and decision-makers.

It was recently pointed out by a former government minister that the country is moving to equip its people with 21st century technology, for example, promising internet access throughout the country by 2020, but the government is narrowly focused on issued defined in the 20th century using laws and institutions based on 19th century or before models…not, he fears, the most effective equation for success.

Some hard facts…the global economy is undergoing traumatic transitions wherein two-thirds of many jobs will disappear, reflecting increased computer-driven capabilities; and all countries are searching for strategies to prepare market-relevant workers. Put building walls and threatening companies aside. The disruption of digital technologies is here to stay. Some countries will remain competitive with human capital as long as the costs are competitive with new technologies, and that won’t last long.

The former minister suggests three points of impact on countries. First, the widespread availability of Internet, either as a government policy or as a result of market forces, will diminish the isolation of rural areas and forge bonds for mobilization and action that can be used for many purposes. Secondly, digital education will provide equality of access not only within a country but to the world of global classrooms, changing the way we value and accredit education and skills acquisition. National education policies will of necessity need to incorporate these opportunities. Also, for many reasons, technology will lead to greater government transparency as administrations forgo paper and rely more on computer-based cashless transactions, hopefully reducing at least one channel for corruption. All of these will change the forms of government structure and services in the coming generation and require a 21st century constitution reflecting the digital ties between state and citizens.

As Tunisia struggles to implement the pledges of the new government, it faces tremendous entrenched interests, from political and economic elites to trade and other unions protecting their turf. Exhorting Tunisians to do more with less will not save the day in the short term. If and how Tunisia succeeds may point the way ahead for other MENA and African countries.

 

image from shutterstock.com

Building Resilient Communities to Combat Terrorism

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Two recent publications tackle the issue of state fragility and policy choices for the US in addressing vulnerable countries and communities. An inaugural paper directed at the incoming administration, is a result of a joint project by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Center for a New American Security, and the United States Institute of Peace. It is aptly titled “U.S. Leadership and the Challenge of State Fragility,” and is co-authored by William J. Burns, Michele A. Flournoy, and Nancy E. Lindborg, all veterans of the US government, respectively at the State Department, Department of Defense, and USAID.  Additional Policy Briefs are already being published “to discuss the implications of fragility on existing U.S. tools, strategic interests, and challenges.”

The second is a series of blogs being published by the National Democratic Institute (NDI), which deals with “supporting democratic resilience to violent conflict.” Both efforts seek to focus conceptual and policy-making energy on lessons learned since our involvement in Afghanistan and how the US can avoid the pitfalls of what had been called “nation-building” and other efforts to promote democracy and governance in emerging political societies.

‘State Fragility’ poses four criteria for making policy choices: clearly articulating US priorities;  allocating limited expertise and resources;  and building on international support and and local capabilities for building resilience.  What is of particular interest is the assumption that those countries that are managing their affairs are less of a priority in this series because the failures of fragile states have a higher probability of destabilizing the country and surrounding nations.

In the MENA region, this means that more effective state actors such as Morocco will have to continue to expend high levels of energy and resources to combat extremist forces that seek to undermine its security, stability, and prosperity. Others working to implement a comprehensive CVE strategy, such as Tunisia, or those with a go-it-alone approach based on local sensibilities, i.e. Algeria, will have to rely primarily on its own capacity to continue the fight against radicals.

Protecting Democratic Gains

In this context, the NDI series aims directly at what we know will enable the path to democracy for those countries already committed to that mission. Although the pace of democratization may be too snail-like for some observers, there can be no doubt that the trend toward greater political accountability and local decision-making is becoming more prevalent in countries not in conflict in the MENA region.

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Why is this critical? As the NDI paper points out, “A key goal of democratization is peaceful politics. Political battles may be inevitable, but in stable democracies they are not waged by armed groups, but through institutions such as elections, parliaments, the media, and civil society organizations.”

Morocco, on the eve of its second parliamentary election since the new constitution was adopted in 2011, recognizes the crucial value of building political institutions resistant to political manipulations. The process has been and continues to be a lengthy one with several moving parts: local elections reflecting the regionalization policy of devolving more political decision-making to locally elected officials, a judiciary and election commission increasingly independent of the central government, a cabinet lead by the party that garners the largest number of votes, and greater freedom of appointments by the government rather than the palace, among other factors.

There are many studies that indicate that countries that mature into full democracies “have the lowest levels of violence towards their own citizens and are more peaceful neighbors than autocratic states.” Thus NDI engages countries that are evolving their democratic institutions, policies, and values.

Morocco is consolidating its democratic advances by empowering civil service organizations to act as advocates and service providers, pressing political parties to build constituencies based on policies and capable candidates, and prodding Parliament to take significant responsibilities for building an accountable process for debating and enacting legislation.

Tunisian faces as many internal as external challenges ranging from manipulations by traditional power centers to sustain the status quo,  parliament that struggles to move out of crisis mode, and rapidly evolving security services to combat internal and external threats.

As the NDI blog points out, its work is to build “conflict resilience at all of these levels – institutions, policies, and norms –  simultaneously, by promoting peaceful elections, bridging conflict divides, supporting effective post-conflict transitions, and ensuring citizen security and inclusive political processes.”

Through its programs in Morocco and Tunisia, NDI promotes the adoption of effective strategies that enable the country to evolve its democratic capabilities. In these efforts, NDI’s programs are strongly facilitated by King Mohammed’s commitment to enhancing the capacities of all members of Moroccan society to take up their full roles and responsibilities as citizens.

In Tunisia, democracy capacity-building is hampered by the need “to foster a more representative political environment where political parties compete effectively on behalf of citizens’ interests, parliament conducts responsive legislating and oversight, and civil society plays an active role in overseeing the political process,” efforts which require a degree of internal stability which is still evolving.

The MENA region needs success stories to encourage citizens to press for needed reforms rather than opting out of politics as usual or turning to more militant alternatives. It is in America’s interests to consistently and sustainable support its friends.

 

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