International Donors Conference on the Sahel, Much Ado…Will It Make a Difference

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According to a number of reports, more than 60 delegations and 14 partner countries gathered in Brussels last month to put meat on the bones of the G5 Sahel force set up in 2017 to enable Mali, Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad build their military capabilities to conduct anti-terrorism operations in their countries and along their borders. There were also discussions concerning the need for social and economic development to address underlying local issues that feed dissatisfaction and instability.

The meeting was co-hosted by the EU, the UN, the African Union (AU), and the G5 under the auspices of Nigerien President Mahamadou Issoufou. Pledges were made totaling some $509 million for the joint force’s operating budget. Issoufou pointed out that it would only support the first year’s operations and that subsequent annual budgets of $150 million would be needed. France also announced that it would increase its contributions to development and government assistance to the region to more than $1.5 billion over the next five years.

As a post in Euractiv explained, “The aim of the military force is to drive out terrorist groups, smugglers, and organized criminal gangs that are taking advantage of the weakness of the state in certain areas of the region. It is a critical region since poverty, climate change, and the collapse of the Libyan state have turned it into an ideal breeding ground for all sorts of smuggling and could also be a haven for Daesh fighters fleeing Syria.”

Given this complexity, among concerns expressed by several delegations were “There is also a risk that an overly securitized approach could squeeze out equally necessary work on governance, justice, and the protection of local populations,” according to ECFR coverage.

In order to address concerns regarding the appropriate use of the funding, the G5 has set up a fiduciary fund for donations, and the EU now has set up a “coordination hub” for channeling international donations to aggregated and disburse funds within the GF effort. Hopefully, this will “help alleviate the risk already posed by so many international actors intervening in the Sahel, ideally avoiding duplication of efforts and wasted investments,” the article noted.

Coordination of both military and development efforts poses a tricky balancing act for the EU and G5 countries as the EU wants the G5 with intimate local knowledge to play the lead role in developing the military interventions while ensuring that support and assistance are channeled to projects that will best benefit at-risk populations and not exacerbate discrimination against local groups.

Unfortunately, the military situation continues to deteriorate. Attacks by jihadist groups aimed at French and G5 forces, often abetted by locals, have increased; and security operations by the joint forces sometimes agitate local civilians and have created refugee situations in some cases. It has been mentioned that as G5 operations continue, “The tactical need to work with “friendly” local armed actors could end up further destabilizing local security arrangements in the name of combating terrorism.”

This makes it even more imperative that the EU Training Mission (EUTM) and security sector reform in the G5 countries proceed apace, that the rights of minorities are protected, and that development assistance is effectively targeted. As Federica Mogherini, High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs remarked, “This isn’t only about security but also about development. Because there can be no real conditions for security without social and economic development, such as opportunities for young people and women in the region.”

The Euractiv post listed that “France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the UK, the EU, the World Bank, the African Development Bank, and the UNDP have announced that the Sahel Alliance will collect a total of $7.4 billion to finance development projects for the next five years. These funds will go towards the 500 projects that will be set up in the countries of the G5 Sahel, and will be based on six main areas: employment for young people, rural development, food security, energy and climate, governance, decentralization, and access to basic services and security.”

Concerns with a balanced, coordinated strategy were also emphasized in a Devex post noting that Mogherini made the point that the EU had invested more than $9.8 billion in the Sahel in the past seven years. Yet, Friederike Röder, director of ONE France, was skeptical of the durability of the commitments. “It’s great to hear announcements for more investment into development in the Sahel, but we need to ensure that the primary objective of this funding is the eradication of extreme poverty and not controlling migration or military objectives,” she said.

Achieving positive results in the next few years will take more than infusions of money. Reliable coordination and collaboration across the spectrum of military and development programs can only be built on commitments to transparency, effective communications, transnational cooperation, and consensus that is a rare commodity in the region. With the Sahel still liable to increased infiltration by outside militants and jihadists, and the existing unstable political environment, it will take leadership that embodies a long-range vision of building states out of insecure territories based on tribal alliances.

From Analysis to Action – How to Address the Food, Water, Energy Nexus in Africa

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Over the past five years, foreign and security policy makers have become more attentive to the need to treat natural resources policies in terms of how they intersect with each other. No topic is more important than the food-water-energy “nexus” that was addressed by a conference at the Atlantic Council on February 12. Working from a draft paper, the discussion was divided into three sections: “Core Nexus Principles,” “The Nexus in Practice I: Transatlantic Perspectives,” and “The Nexus in Practice II: the Case of Africa.”

In Morocco, though environmental conditions may not be as dire as in other African countries, there are challenges in addressing this “nexus” in both the short and long term. For example, in any given year, the production of food depends on adequate rainfall and its management. Annual rainfall has a significant impact on the GDP share of agricultural production, which swing from 9 percent during periods of low rainfall to upwards of 17 percent in a good year, and the agricultural sector is the largest employer in the country. Reducing the impact of these swings requires more efficient use of land, fertilizer, recycled water, farming and irrigation techniques, and similar factors – all of which require inputs of energy, whether solar, wind, or fuel sourced, not to mention sunshine!

Morocco is fortunate that most of its environmental factors are largely internal, as no rivers originate in any of its neighbors. However, as an energy importer of more than 95% of its needs, the country cannot avoid the potential for a short term financial catastrophe if a “perfect storm” occurs that lifts energy and imported food prices way beyond the country’s capacity to manage them. It is the same for Morocco’s neighbors in Africa, whether energy rich or not, as the water-food-energy nexus demands dedicated attention in the next decade and beyond to manage supply. This is especially significant in the face of the growing demands of young and urban populations who have legitimate demands for services and want the government to meet these needs without mortgaging their futures.

 How to Move Ahead

Over the next month, I will report on the key issues raised during the conference and examine policy implications for Morocco and Africa, where most forecasts project significant growth in the coming decade. Expanding economies and rising numbers of consumers are generating increased demands on the food-water-energy nexus that cannot be overlooked. “One recent estimate predicted global demand to rise as much as 35 percent for food, 40 percent for water, and 50 percent for energy by  2030…The global demand for food might rise by as much as 70 percent or even more by 2050” according to the draft paper “Addressing the Food, Water, and Energy Nexus.”

Treating food, energy, and water resources as interconnected elements avoids policies and practices that might lead to misdirected investments, lagging economic sectors, and poor development choices. “The potential losses from ignoring interdependencies might be catastrophic, ranging from greater volatility in food and energy markets to absolute scarcities of water and food.”

It is in the face of these challenges, Morocco, with its growing leadership role in human development projects in Africa, is taking a key role in this solution-centered policy discussion on the nexus that is at the heart of the conference. As the Stockholm Environment Institute paper on the same theme notes, “Focusing on the nexus interdependence encourages policymakers, business and community leaders, and producers to think systematically about ecosystems, build coherent policies using multi-stakeholder structures, focus on improving resource productivity, treat waste as a resource, and internalize externalities.”

Drawing on global experts from the US, Africa, and Europe, the conference emphasizes that “despite the justified concerns about threats arising from scarcities, there exist ample opportunities to embrace forms of multilateral cooperation in order to avoid resource-related conflicts…For countries in Europe, the Americas, and Africa, therefore, the key challenge is to construct systems that build the political and technical capacity to understand, monitor, and address possible nexus-related problems before they begin to decay national and/or transnational stability.”

The search for practical solutions that address these food-water-energy requirements to avoid shocks to local, national, and international security and stability will be addressed in future blogs.

US plan to Power Africa can benefit from Morocco’s renewable energy

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On his recent trip to Africa, President Barack Obama announced his Power Africa initiative to spend $7 billion over 5 years to fund an electricity program in sub-Saharan Africa that includes geothermal, hydro, wind, and solar power.

Critics have attacked the plan from all directions: it is too small and doesn’t involve a long-term commitment; it doesn’t give enough attention to solar power; it doesn’t deal with distribution issues; and it doesn’t bring enough focus on cleaning up conditions that keep the global private power industry wary of investing in Africa—“poorly enforced property rights, corruption, and patchy enforcement of the rule of law.”

Yet no one denies the need as nearly 590 million people lack access to power in sub-Saharan Africa. Ironically, “indoor air pollution from wood stoves now kills 3.5 million people per year, more than AIDS and malaria combined.” In some cases, US regulations will have to be changed to support the project because some environmental rules restrict OPIC funding for projects that emit greenhouse gases. And due to the rural locations of many of those in need, renewable power, according to the International Energy Agency, “could be the most cost-effective option for expanding energy access in about 70 percent of rural areas in developing countries.” One solution already provided by the US company SKYei, is the installation of mini-grids powered by a hybrid of solar and gas that are inexpensive and well suited to rural areas. So far, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria, and Tanzania have signed up for the first round of projects. Andrew Mayock of the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) believes that the initial fund of $7 billion, which has already attracted an additional $9 billion in commitments from private sector investors, could grow to $30 billion in energy infrastructure investments annually.

Morocco and WAPP – where the roadmap is already en route

While Power Africa moves forward, there are burgeoning opportunities across the continent in central and west Africa. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), through its West Africa Power Pool (WAPP), has made regional power grid access a priority for the next decade. WAPP intends to integrate the various national power systems “into a unified regional electricity market – with the expectation that such mechanism would, over the medium to long-term, assure the citizens of ECOWAS Member States a stable and reliable electricity supply at affordable costs…facilitating the balanced development of diverse energy resources…for their collective economic benefit, through long term energy sector cooperation, unimpeded energy transit and increasing cross-border electricity trade.”

It should come as no surprise that Morocco is a significant player in WAPP through its close ties to ECOWAS and revived leadership of The Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD). More importantly, Morocco is a strong partner for energy development due to its dominant role in Africa in investing in renewable energies; its success in bringing electricity to 98% of its rural areas; and the logistical ties that exist between Morocco and the countries in Central and West Africa.

As this illustration from the African Development Bank indicates, trends in energy consumption and production favor a strong regional grid between Morocco and its neighbors to the south. Given the expanding utilization of its national resources for local projects, the region is collectively demanding more efficient and productive investment in all types of infrastructure. With this strong commitment to economic and human development, more reliable energy supplies are a core requirement. Reliable energy is an enabler and multiplier of opportunities across many sectors and is a key driver in attracting foreign direct investment, creating jobs and enhancing stability.

”The development of Africa’s electrical power sector is a prerequisite for growth in other industries. A regular, consistent power supply will do much to attract foreign investment and entice international companies to establish operations in Africa…Power sharing has become more prevalent in the African electrical power context in recent years…[as] neighboring countries have seen benefit on the sharing of electricity…countries with limited or unreliable power generation capacity will now have access to power, without the intensive capital investment required to construct new facilities.”

Despite the fading demand from the European leg of the Desertec project, which linked renewable energy from the Maghreb to European customers, it is now obvious that, given projected high growth for sub-Saharan Africa, Morocco’s strategic investments in renewable energies and extension of its power grid southward will provide a critical backbone for regional power distribution. Given the already extensive inputs in power generation and distribution in West and Central Africa, the US should consider broadening its Power Africa program in partnership with Morocco to accelerate the delivery of sustainable energy along the north-south power corridor in the region.

The challenges to “making democracy” in the Sahel and the Sahara

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One of my favorite debates goes something like this: in conflict environments and/or fragile or failing states, what are the relative benefits of short-term democracy promotion versus longer term development programs?

In the context of what to do in the Sahel, recent charges that Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM) has access to SA-7 surface-to-air missiles bring into sharp focus these issues for those striving for stability and security in the Sahel/Sahara region.

At a recent joint hearing before three House subcommittees with responsibilities for African affairs, government, think tank, and private-sector witnesses provided their assessments of efforts to tackle short and longer-term obstacles to securing the region’s future. In reviewing their testimonies, several critical recurring themes emerged in addition to the current military engagement.  At the top of the list are the humanitarian challenges.

Mali pushed to rush elections in July

In Mali, a country of around 16 million people, more than a half-million people are internally displaced or refugees in neighboring countries.  In addition, a severe drought in 2012 put almost 19 million people at risk for food security, “including one million children at risk of severe acute malnutrition.” Today, although the US has expended more than $550 million in humanitarian assistance (not to mention funds from international donors), “an estimated 10 million people remain at risk of food insecurity.”

As Acting Assistant Secretary Donald Yamamoto, of the Bureau of African Affairs at the State Department remarked,

…our short term successes may be fleeting if we fail to address the longstanding political and economic fragility that make the Sahel susceptible to persistent crisis and conflict. Poor governance, weak democratic institutions, and a lack of development and economic opportunity cultivate fertile ground for instability. Helping those countries to strengthen their institutions and be more responsive and inclusive is equally critical to addressing the region’s deep-seated security, political, and development challenges.

And here is the dilemma. When asked by Rep. Chris Smith (R-NJ) if elections in July 2013 could be free and fair, Nancy Lindborg of USAID replied “While we have not yet solved all of the structural issues in Mali that could impede free and fair elections, it is imperative that we hold these elections so that they can begin to rebuild democratic institutions.” What is missing from the public record is a reminder that US legislation prevents foreign military assistance to countries whose governments came to power via non-democratic means, in this case the coup that led to the secession of northern Mali. This type of restriction is also why the French support the July election, because it then allows Paris to write “mission accomplished” and withdraw its forces.

So what are some of the other ‘structural issues’ referred to by Ms. Lindborg. In a response to a question from Rep. Tom Cotton (R-AK) about Mali’s previous attempt at democracy, A/S Yamamoto offered, “Mali was a very democratic country, but its democratic institutions were fragile. What we’re trying to do is give aid in order to stabilize it, address the humanitarian crisis and extremism, and promote dialog between the north and Bamako.” Excuse me…if it was a “very democratic country,” where were the institutions that reflect the bonds between government and citizens? Where was the civil society? Where were the mechanisms for engaging minority and marginalized populations? Where was the independent judiciary and armed forces that protect order and respond to civilian leadership? Where was the transparency that characterizes government transactions and policies both domestic and international? What happened to the previously agreed “dialog between the north and Bamako?” Or as a colleague from the State Department mused, “Why are we so enamored of elections in countries with no functioning civil societies or competing political parties that are at the heart of a democratic process? It allows us to wash our hands and move on to the next hot spot.”

The humanitarian challenge

Quoting Yamamoto again “Creating viable economic opportunities and meeting the basic needs of its citizens remain a daunting task for countries that consistently rank at the very bottom of any measure of human development.” His colleague, Ms. Lindborg, in response to Rep. Paul Cook (R-CA) added “Progress is possible, but it will take time. We need to help countries, communities, the private sector, and regional NGOs feel that they have a And yet the US and France continue to insist that the July elections proceed, while other voices raise concerns with the timing and inclusion issues.

For example, Rudy Atallah of the Michael S. Ansari Africa Center at the Atlantic Council told the hearing “I agree that we should push elections, but first it is critical that we address the local grievances that precipitated the beginning of the crisis. If we force the election without addressing these grievances, it will just be another failed election.” And I will add, perpetuate another failed or failing state in the Sahel/Sahara.

After Iraq, Afghanistan, and other setbacks in US foreign policy, wishful thinking and pious statements about the efficacious effect of elections in troubled countries should not play a role in next steps in the Sahel. History and common sense argue against rushing into an election without a Plan B, which is this case means BEFORE any election is on the short-term agenda. As Nii Akuetteh, a well-known African policy analyst told the Members, “I have to reiterate that we must come up with a contingency plan should the Malian elections become problematic, and we need to more thoroughly review what went wrong with Mali.”

For the best antidote to instability, as A/S Yamamoto said, “we must continue our efforts to approach the Sahel and the Maghreb’s interconnected problems with a comprehensive regional and international effort…to address the immediate security threat posed by violent extremists and transnational criminal networks, while at the same time building the institutional capacity needed to address the Sahel’s political, economic, and humanitarian challenges.”

Amen to that, and to some common sense in our strategies for moving the Sahel/Sahara into functioning democracies.