Is Morocco On Course?

Morocco’s second election since the adoption of the new constitution in 2011 resulted in the appointment of Abdelilah Benkirane as head of government, since his moderate Islamic party, PJD, had the highest number of votes. He is currently in the process of negotiating a governing coalition.

To outside observers, this seems consistent with the norms of a democratic election and so is not remarkable. However, it has a much larger significance for several reasons. First of all, the results reinforce the reality that free and fair elections are a consistent feature of political life in Morocco. There are winners and losers, and the process moves towards peaceful outcomes and transitions, if necessary. Secondly, the results indicated the rise of a strong party, the PAM, in opposition to the PJD-led government, another healthy sign of a society in which no one party has the monopoly on the national discourse. A third consideration is that King Mohammed VI showed his support for the electoral process by immediately appointing Benkirane to form a government, a critical step since PAM is known to be strong supporters of the palace.

Most important in the long run, the election underscores Morocco’s advance towards greater civic engagement and government accountability, a consistent theme in the King’s speeches, most recently to the opening session of Parliament, itself continually including more women and youth members. And this is probably Morocco’s strongest asset, the blending of the King’s leadership with a government supporting ongoing reforms that bring Morocco in line with human and civic values that solidify its democratic elements.

Intentions are certainly not enough. The reform agenda is still incomplete. And the gap between passing and implementing legislation cannot be ignored. The King himself complained about the inadequate understanding and enforcement of the Family Law (Moudawana), which provides significant policies for women’s empowerment. Judicial independence is still to be attained; the regionalization process devolving certain powers to local governments has yet to be fully codified with institutions and human resources prepared to implement it; and there are gaps in the educational infrastructure and approach that are an obstacle to fully developing the country’s human potential.

These issues and many more were raised during the election, another positive sign for Morocco’s democracy. Most importantly, aside from a defensible prohibition on pre-election polling (which can be appreciated given the cornucopia of contradictory results of the myriad polls in the US at this time), Morocco has achieved a seasoned election process. As the political parties mature and the number of serious parties shrinks from the 30+ in the recent election, the opportunities for more robust and vibrant political campaigns can be realized.

Casting Ballots are only one small piece of democracy

Casting ballots are only one small piece of democracy

Over the longer term, Morocco’s elections have another very important function – to build needed credibility in the political system. Some international election observers suggested that the turnout of 43%, while comparable to democratic elections elsewhere, may signal dissatisfaction with political parties. In fact, there are signs that the political parties are getting the message that defining positions, seeking to be more inclusive, and listening to constituencies are critical to their survival and success. Shake-ups are already underway in those parties that fared poorly. Another lesson learned in the recent elections.

Finally, another issue to be reckoned with is how legitimate political mechanisms, such as elections, contribute to Morocco’s internal coherence and ability to govern. The lack of credible mechanism is commonly mentioned an indicator of “state fragility.” As Thomas Carothers points out in a recent Policy Brief produced jointly by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Center for a New American Security, and the United States Institute for Peace, a common feature of fragile states is the systematic exclusion of its citizens. And the commonly defined prescription is “inclusive governance.”

If inclusiveness is the glue for building stability and the social contract, then Morocco is surely headed in the right direction. Elevating the Amazigh language as an official language for the government and educational system, broadening the role of civil society in in policy-making, and the King’s insistence, in his latest speech, that the government remain focused on providing quality services to the people – are all positive trends towards inclusion. People are already more empowered due to digital technologies; the government and institutions must keep pace develop credible and effective communications strategies in order to proactively discharge their responsibilities.

As the Policy Brief concludes:

When a government closes off space for independent civil society, it is creating a significant structural obstacle to achieving inclusive governance and positive state-society relations. An active, diverse civil society is the key to empowering marginalized groups, creating multiple channels for citizen participation, mediating diverse interests in a peaceful fashion, and in general creating state-society relations based on mutual communication, respect, and consensus.

This is where Morocco is headed and the country is well on its way.

The Best Intentions Do Not Always Make Great Policy

To Fix Its Middle East Policy, US Must Support Assets while Confronting Challenges

If you think the label “silly season” only describes tsunamis whirling around the national elections, you’re missing an important contest among US think tanks to frame policy options for the next administration. What’s interesting about the exercise is that it doesn’t matter who wins, since the same realities, domestic and foreign, face whoever is elected.

Options and solutions proposed by think tanks, in any case, reflect their particular points of view, priorities, and insights into what the previous administration has done right or wrong, or didn’t pay enough attention to, or ignored at America’s peril. And this is especially clear with countries where our interests diverge, such as China, and more intriguing with those countries where the US has shared interests, such as the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). What is also clear from past administrations is that the MENA region is where good intentions regarding countries from Morocco to Iraq often fail to deliver consistently sound and actionable policies.

The Center for a New American Security (CNAS) recently launched its foray into this tangle of good intentions with the analysis, “Reset, Negotiate, Institutionalize – A Phased Middle East Strategy for the Next President.” It is well-reasoned and documented, enumerates feasible steps, and clearly focuses on protecting what remains of America’s alliances in the region without jeopardizing our ability to adapt to changing circumstances.

That said, whether it’s CNAS, SAIS, CSIS, AEI, CEIP, or any other of the more than 100 foreign policy think tanks in Washington, DC, almost any position on an issue can be found. For example, the recent GCC Heads of State meeting generated pro and anti Saudi Arabia and pro and anti Iran articles, providing support for obviously opposing views, all reflecting someone’s definitions of America’s national interests in the region.

And then there is the question of priorities – when will Morocco, for example, receive the same attention as the UAE or Qatar? All are allies and have important regional roles to play in promoting stability and security, yet it seems that unless  a country or a region is in triage, it has to speak up loudly and visibly to be heard.

Secretary Kerry Greets King Mohammed VI

Secretary Kerry Greets King Mohammed VI

Morocco is an excellent case in point. The only mention of Morocco in the CNAS report is as the host for the talks to constitute a government in Libya. Absent from the only map in the report is everything west of the Levant. No mention is made of the growing threats to North Africa, and Morocco in particular, from Daesh and other extremists, nor is there any commentary on the flow of fighters from the region to the Syria-Iraq war zones and back.

Yet Morocco has steadfastly support America’s interests throughout the region, and for this, Daesh has issued numerous threats against the country. Morocco plays a key role in Jerusalem through King Mohammed VI’s role as head of the Jerusalem Committee. It also has the most robust security service cooperating with the EU and the US in combating terrorists who have already caused great damage to Europe’s sense of equanimity and attitudes towards immigrants fleeing combat zones.

Morocco recently became co-chair of the Global Counterterrorism Forum, and the country’s special counterterrorism bureau recently intercepted jihadists intent on bringing chemical weapons into Europe through Morocco. What more can be asked of our ally? If the report is an example, without being more proactive, the US is in danger of a growing breach with our friends.

It is in this context that King Mohammed spoke out at the recent GCC-Morocco Summit about the impact of not respecting old and tested friendships. “There have been new alliances which may lead to disunity and a reshuffling of roles and functions in the region. In fact, these are attempts to foment strife and create chaos, and no country would be spared. It could have serious consequences for the region, even the world at large.”

The king then went on to detail how Morocco was diversifying its “partnerships at political, strategic and economic levels,” to include Russia, China, and India. He believes that the GCC and Morocco and Jordan “Are facing conspiracies which seek to undermine our collective security. They want to destabilize the few countries which have managed to safeguard their security, stability and political systems.”

So when think tanks look at the MENA region, it may be more impactful to think beyond conflicts in the Levant and Gulf to also address threats to America’s interests at the other end of the Mediterranean. For example, the CNAS report recommends that as a first step, the next president make a trip “focused on America’s closest regional partners,” starting with the Levant and the Gulf, “and possibly Egypt,” clearly aimed at damping down instability in Iraq and Syria.

Yet the conflict and chaos that drive these priorities are inexorably moving across the region and will metastasize if not confronted with a robust US and EU led strategy in partnership with friends like Morocco.

Sowing Democracy – a Messy Affair

Can the US get it right?

I’ve just read an article by Stephen M. Walt* in Foreign Policy, “American Values Are to Blame for the World’s Chaos – Why trying to spread democracy, liberalism, and human rights always backfires.” It appeared just two days before we celebrate America’s Independence Day, perhaps our most beloved national holiday, and started me thinking about how liberal values become part of a country’s political culture, and if there are better questions we might ask to get the right answers for advancing liberalism.

Stephen M. Walt

Stephen M. Walt

While on the topic of liberal values, I took part in a discussion last week in which a professor from the UK called out multilingual/multicultural programs in North Africa as a tool by which ruling classes maintain power. Her thesis is that multilingual programs divide people by social and ethnic background, affecting their economic advancement. She made this claim despite the fact that officially sanctioning one’s native language, in this case Amazigh, has been a long-standing demand across the Maghreb.

I rebutted her charges against “neo-liberalism” on historical and factual grounds, indicating that the issue of “identity” tied to language/culture expression was far more salient in countries such as Morocco that are still integrating complex national identities. And so it was quite interesting to find neo-liberal Stephen Walt, for whom I have tremendous respect, taking a one-way-street view of democracy promotion.

His basic thesis, with which I don’t disagree is, “the moral appeal of these basic liberal principles [democratic government, rule of law, freedom of expression, market economies] does not mean that they are a sound guide for the conduct of foreign policy.” He goes on to claim that “In fact, the past two decades suggest that basing a great powers foreign policy primarily on liberal ideals is mostly a recipe for costly failures.” My contention is that, in the 21st century, most countries believe that they are able to make choices about governing without reference to liberal values promoted by the “Washington consensus.” Moreover, with the erosion of the US as the global hyper-power, countries perceive more options for circumventing even the most stringent condemnation by other nations, short of outright warfare.

Furthermore, looking at neoliberal values only from the US perspective alleviates receiving countries from responsibility and accountability for their actions, positive and negative. It is true “that liberalism does not translate its moral absolutes into clear, effective strategies for bringing them about.” It is as guilty of this charge as any political ideology that posits “truths” and not tactics. And besides, there is the nagging reality that one size does not fit all and so neo-cons and neoliberals need to do much more homework in order to recognize where opportunities for and obstacles to their democratic agendas occur.

Taking the Plunge – Democracy Lite

There are lessons to be learned in various post-World War II democracies illustrating that liberal values are still critical to the functioning of tolerant, progressive systems of government. Morocco, which is working towards a parliamentary democracy, is a good illustration of the road forward for integrating liberal values into a traditional society that has honored the family over the individual, cooperation over competition, and consensus over innovation.

Morocco-US relations, full of firsts

Morocco was the first country to recognize the US in 1777

Morocco’s receptivity to liberal values begins with the articles of faith often heard in any discussion of Morocco’s relations with the US: first country to recognize the nascent republic; first US Treaty of Friendship and Commerce, still in force today; first multilateral treaty in which the US agreed to help fund a lighthouse in Tangier; first US Free Trade Agreement in Africa, and other hallmarks including the first Strategic Dialogue in North Africa, and other defense and security ties.

So can we learn anything about advancing democratic values by looking at our relationship with Morocco? And the corollary query, can Stephen Walt’s thesis be clarified by understanding the path Morocco has chosen if we agree that it is a liberalizing society?

Interestingly, Morocco’s only colonial experience was with France, which originated human rights as a contemporary political concept. It has historically been a kingdom, ruled by elites appointed by the ruler or pledging fealty to the sovereign for some six hundred years or more. Its transition to the 21st century has not been without difficulties as traditional interests and networks resist change and have little interest in sharing power. Yet it is changing. Initiatives stem from a visionary king working to empower civil society and citizens to challenge “business as usual” and remake politics and governance into tools that promote human and economic development.

There are three parts to this equation if forces supporting constitutional democracy are to succeed: continued clear messaging in support of liberal values from a well-respected king; growing cadres of civil society and political participants who utilize constitutional reforms to promote power and resource-sharing at all levels; and benefits accruing to the population from a more receptive, responsible, and accountable government.

Morocco's Parliament

Morocco’s Parliament

How does this fit with Walt’s thesis? Well, turns out his real target is “perfecting these [liberal] practices at home instead of trying to export them abroad…[if so] people in other societies will want to emulate some or all of these practices, suitably adapted to local conditions [emphasis added].” And here is the rub: even if the US were the paragon of liberal values, would others follow this pied piper of democracy and rule of law? Since the end of the 20th century, it is apparent that there are no pure models of neoliberal values, and each country will move to its own rhythm in reaching new social contracts defining relations between government and citizens.

It is important for the US to show that, despite our own uneven progress, these values are worth striving for and are the true measure of closing the gap between a country’s aspirations and its achievements. The Morocco-US relationship illustrates that when liberal values are shared across a range of political and economic activities, and are promoted by a trusted leadership without forcing concepts that are antithetical to the local culture, the outlook is worth supporting and encouraging.

 

* Stephen M. Walt is the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University.

USAID Expands Civil Society Capacity Building Programs in Morocco: Part 2

In my previous posting, I previewed some of the key features related to youth employment programs in the recently announced Country Development Cooperation Strategy (CDCS) 2013-2017 for Morocco launched by USAID during the November visit of His Majesty King Mohammed VI with President Obama.

The major sections of the strategy with the relevant goals and objectives are:

 CDCS Goal: Advance Moroccan initiatives for peaceful reform

Development Objective 1: Employability of target youth enhanced

  • Access to quality employability services improved
  • Improved alignment of workforce programs to market needs

Development Objective 2: Increased Civic Participation in Governance

  • More responsive and representative political parties
  • Civil society contribution to public policy increased

Development Objective 3: Enhanced educational attainment for children at primary level

  • Reading skills of primary level students improved
  • Learning delivery systems improved

Youth employment efforts include providing mechanisms for increased data and metrics to assess training efforts being made by the government, NGOs, and the private sector; more programs focused on enabling women and youth to acquire market-ready skills; and greater stakeholder engagement to “collaborate with the Ministry of Employment and other relevant actors in identifying and advancing creative and flexible working arrangements that incentivize the hiring of Moroccan youth.”

In the section on increased civic participation, USAID mentions its long-time support for civil society in Morocco and its assessment that the quickening pace of political reforms opens additional space for public policy engagement. Its particular focus is on enabling civil society, especially the political parties, to play a more robust and responsible role as outlined in the 2011 Constitution.

Engaging civil society in building Morocco’s future

As the CDCS notes, “Article 12 of the new Moroccan Constitution states that “The associations [and NGOs] interested in public matters … contribute, within the framework of participative democracy, in the enactment, the implementation and the evaluation of the decisions and the initiatives of the elected institutions and of the public powers.” Given this mandate, “Thus, civil society and political parties are now constitutionally empowered to participate in governance. By increasing the capacity of civil society to engage the government on behalf of citizens and facilitating the development of institutionalized mechanisms of civic participation in government decision-making, Morocco will be better situated to implement its reform agenda in a peaceful and sustainable manner.”

The key targets defined by USAID for capacity building are women, NGOs, and political parties. It bases its priorities on the initiatives included in the 2011 Constitution as well as the public’s simmering dissatisfaction with the political parties. As the report notes: “Moroccan citizens have long been detached from political parties due to a lack of clear policy vision or consideration for citizen involvement, particularly by women and youth, in public-policy making.” To repair this situation, “USAID will help political parties to improve their credibility by increasing the transparency and accountability of their internal operations, developing platforms reflective of citizen needs, and enhancing the involvement and leadership of youth and women in politics.”

Among the various tools that USAID has defined as part of its agenda with political parties are “the effective use of public opinion to inform policy agendas, the development of youth and women branches at the national and local levels and the development of individual plans to strengthen internal party capacity.” It is critical to Morocco’s reform aspirations that political parties become more focused on building constituencies that coalesce around specific political platforms that address local, regional, and national issues, as well as facilitate greater inclusiveness across age, gender, and ethnic lines.

The CDCS is in many ways an affirmation of the long-standing friendship and cooperation between Morocco and the US.

It also highlights the central importance of implementing the initiatives in the 2011 Constitution for broadening citizen participation in public policy making, including regionalization, enhanced roles for women and youth, and increased stakeholder engagement across all areas of human development.

While other North African states are struggling to maintain secure and safe public spaces, Morocco is moving ahead with its second decade of political reforms. Its results to date have earned support from the US and the international community, and the CDCS and other agreements both confirm Morocco’s path and offer partnerships to proactively move ahead.

When is a failed state not?

I have to believe that one of the least favorite jobs in Washington is being an author or contributor to one of the annual reports that make you a target of unhappy embassies. Whether it’s from the roll call of State Department publications, which includes Human Rights Reports, International Religious Freedom Reports, Trafficking-in-Person Reports, Advancing Freedom and Democracy Reports, or those from NGOs such as Reporters without Borders, Amnesty International, The Heritage Foundation, or any of the dozens of other national and international reports used by the Millennium Challenge Corporation in its selection criteria, being the messenger is no easy task.

Over the past decade, there is a special place of skepticism reserved for the annual Failed States Index (FSI) published by the Fund for Peace, now in its ninth year and increasingly detailed and sophisticated. The title is a bit misleading as the report is not a predictive tool of state failure but rather an assessment of more than 100 internal factors that affect a country’s stability. Of course, since the data is based on the calendar year, the first yellow flag is what has occurred following the six months it takes to prepare the report that could affect a country’s ranking. The natural inclination is to look at a country’s rating and then compare it to others, breathing a sigh of either relief or exasperation. But that’s not where the substance is, and those who take the time to read the key indicators grouped into 12 categories can benefit from the extraordinary analytical efforts the FSI involves.

What makes the FSI useful

Why am I a fan?  Because I believe that the real benefit of FSI is as a tool to facilitate discussion among a country’s stakeholders about its ambitions, core values, and means of delivering credible governance and equitable opportunities. It is less important to be chagrined that the 2012 rankings have France and Portugal in better shape than the US, and more important to drill down into the social and economic indicators (demographic pressures, group grievance, refugees and Internally Displaced Persons, human flight and brain drain, uneven economic development, poverty and economic decline) and political and military indicators (state legitimacy, public services, human rights and law, security apparatus, factionalized elites, and external intervention) to understand why.

In terms of methodology, the FSI relies on crunching tens of millions of pieces of information from around the world, which is then sorted into the 12 key indicators. “The content analysis is further triangulated with two other key aspects of the overall assessment process: quantitative analysis and qualitative inputs based on major events in the countries examined.” Final quality control is a review of the results and comparison with a “comprehensive set of vital statistics …as well as human analysis to ensure that the software has not misinterpreted the raw data.”

Lessons about state building

So what do we learn about state building from this year’s index? In the first instance, countries that work harder on capacity building over the long term are better able to withstand natural and man-made shocks that would drive weaker countries into crisis. It is a country’s ability to deliver a broad range of social services to greater numbers of its citizens while driving more equitable political participation that parallels the recommendations in the CFR report I mentioned last week.

Secondly, there are no magic bullets—not elections, not foreign assistance or intervention, nor increasing social benefits—that will reduce instability rooted in economic inequality, political marginalization, and degraded rule of law. Countries with large disparities in wealth, political access and influence, and public safety tend to be less stable than those that have fewer gaps (yes, Egypt was worse than Mali, but barely). In the section on the Arab Spring, it notes that the 2010 data “tells the story of a storm birthed in North Africa…indicators for Group Grievance and Human Rights were gradually and inexorably getting worse. In November 2010, there was a dramatic regional increase (not a good thing, the higher the score, the worse the ranking) in the State Legitimacy score…that has yet to come back down.”

Well, there may be a claim that this is all hindsight, and in fact the human analysis that is part of the process makes it inherently biased. Or one could take lessons from where the data and negative events have a high correlation, as in the example above, and draw analytical and policy lessons that increase our understanding of managing conflict before it become chaos or worse.

The FSI draws back the curtain on the complexities of state-building by enumerating the challenges, represented by the 100+ indicators that make up the profile of a country’s internal heartbeat. Rather than wait until the patient is in triage or functional failure, international donors and organizations can use this data and other sources to support dialogues with countries at risk to enable them to develop more robust strategies for reducing instability. Even isolated countries such as North Korea or far-away places like Somalia impact our lives. The FSI is a tool that helps us understand the caution flags that increasingly populate our mental maps of countries. It is this kind of solid data tied to the concurrence of values and interests that will enable policy makers and stakeholders to make the right choices.

Can Corporate Social Responsibility Aid Reform in the Maghreb?

The Rise of Corporate Social Responsibility – A Tool for Sustainable Development in the Middle East argues that companies can contribute to sustainable economic development in the MENA region through corporate social responsibility (CSR). The report was issued by Booz & Company’s Ideation Center, its “think tank in the Middle East [providing] thought leadership through insightful research, analysis, and dialogue that is true to the Middle East’s dynamics.”

The report raises several questions; some are existential, while others focus on distinguishing between short-term – “give him a fish” – approaches and long-term “teach him to fish” options. I have never been a great fan of CSR, simply because it is not, in my analysis, a substitute for investments in sustainable economic development that directly create jobs. This report takes a different tack, saying that “Companies, as good corporate citizens, must become involved in sustainable development and contribute to the broader improvement of their societies … [by aligning] themselves with these national goals [job creation, poverty alleviation, and the environment] that are built around sustainable development, using the powerful tool of CSR initiatives to help achieve them.” CSR, in their assessment, is both a social force for reducing economic inequality and a means of improving environmental conditions. Their case studies in the region are helpful yet do not address the core issue: can CSR have a long-term impact beyond philanthropy that supports greater opportunities for more equitable economic growth?

What is CSR?

Perhaps the first issue is definitional, as the United Nations Development Project (UNDP) defines sustainable development as “distributing the benefits of economic growth equitably, regenerating the environment rather than destroying it, and empowering people rather than marginalizing them.” Is this consistent with what the region is thinking? According to the Booz report, “Companies and government officials interviewed in our study most frequently cited the need for robust job creation to nurture economic growth and spread benefits among the population as the most salient issue.” This is the dilemma, as few of the examples provided in the report are about job creation. More are about philanthropy, which, while laudable, does not necessarily lead to enhancing job growth over the medium to long term.

I am not saying that CSR is not important. In fact it is a key component of a mature approach to economic growth; but it lacks a defined connection to job creation. As the report highlights, “half of the region’s population is under the age of 25…among those 14-24 years of age, approximately 25 percent lack a job…” So building homes for the poor, insisting on higher environmental standards for manufacturing facilities, and encouraging literacy are laudable, yet my assessment is that these programs must be part of a larger coherent CSR strategy that is wedded to generating meaningful employment if it is to go beyond alleviating short-term social and environmental issues.

And the challenges for recruiting partners into CSR programs can be quite daunting, as there are few if any incentives for employees to participate. Less than 14 percent of firms surveyed have formal CSR-related key performance indicators, “and just 11 percent include CSR performance in their bonus schemes.” So to make CSR effective over time, the report points to a process to close the gap between a company’s individual CSR programs and a country’s national development priorities.

Another challenge is that countries diverge in their CSR priorities, making it critical to define local needs rather than using an imported template. In the MENA, the focus is on issues ranging from alleviating poverty and supporting charities and community projects to education and employability. There is not a broad consciousness of the need to address environmental issues, which is a priority elsewhere. “Executives [in the MENA] are struggling to relate environmental issues to profitability and long-term business objectives.” In many cases, environmental concerns are still seen as external to the company rather than incorporated into its internal operations.

Building effective partners

The report also talks about the importance of proactive government and civil society participation and encouragement of CSR. On this theme, a very interesting CSR project is run by SEDCO Holding, a Saudi Sharia-compliant wealth management company. After a national survey indicated that young Saudis have few skills in managing their personal finances, SEDCO initiated a financial literacy program for university students. It is a private-public partnership that involves an international NGO, resulting in a great example of how CSR can make an economic impact beyond charity. Smarter consumers make smarter decisions and can transfer this knowledge into their own business practices. This is a forward-thinking project that benefits all of the stakeholders and provides best practices that can be emulated elsewhere.

A positive recent development noted in the report is the notion of corporate governance – responsible and accountable company leadership. “It was only within the last 10 years that an Arabic word for corporate governance, hawkamah, was coined.” In the transition from family-owned private firms to corporate-managed public entities, a company’s identity shifts beyond the personality of the founders to values expressed in their corporate mission. It is this redefinition of company identities that holds the most promise for the inclusion of CSR in a firm’s objectives.

Just as long as you don’t forget that the bottom line is profitability and job growth!

“Egypt: Challenges of Crafting Leadership in Foreign Affairs”

The summer 2012 issue of the Cairo Review of Global Affairs, includes an article, “Egypt in the World,” by former Egyptian Ambassador to the US, Nabil Fahmy. He is clearly in the secular/modernist/democratic stream of Egyptian political discourse, and provides helpful insights to those who want to understand the Arab world beneath the stereotypes. His main theme focuses on the centrality of Egypt’s foreign policy in the region and the world, which he defines in three concentric circles. His observations flow from the assumption that “Now, in a region transformed by popular upheaval, Egypt has a chance to pick up the mantle and renew her place as a political and ideological wellspring for the Arab and North African Middle East.”

Well, I hope that the government of Egypt isn’t waiting for an invitation from surrounding countries to lead from in front or from behind. This notion of Egypt as the regional leader “… stems not only from the country’s demographic weight, geopolitical location, and military capability, but also from its historic and contemporary role as the heart of cultural and intellectual innovation in the Arab world.” With all respect to my friend and former mentor, I find the notion of Egypt as the resurrected leader of the MENA region a bit of a stretch given the transitions still in store within Egypt as well as the significant political and economic challenges in the region that make any leadership role problematic. This is even more apparent as Fahmy indicates, “… any new government must learn from the lessons of the past.”

Learning from the past or overturning the past? This was obviously written before Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi made waves at the Tehran conference of the Non-Aligned Movement—the first global vehicle for Nasser’s claim to regional leadership, and Morsi’s visit to the opening of the UN General Assembly, where he spelled out Egypt’s new foreign policy perspectives in a long New York Times interview. It is hard to conceive of a country, which may slide to a “collective caliphate,” as an emerging regional power that promotes democratic values when its own legitimizing political process is being sorely tested.

By this I mean that while Salafists call for the new caliphate, one can argue that Egypt must guard against a kind of “collective caliphate” where political and religious/moral leadership is held by a few who claim to speak for the many. We have already seen the problematic and counterproductive impact of Iranian foreign policy for US interests. Can we expect the same from Egypt?

Some more wisdom from Ambassador Fahmy succinctly summarizes the challenges: “Egypt should provide the seeds of freedom by supporting openness, transparency, and the rule of law throughout the Middle East, but the demand for and pace of reform must come from within states, not across their borders.” “…If domestic reality does not match the principled stand of our international proclamations, our newfound legitimacy will be unsustainable and or claim of leadership will fall on deaf ears.”

While I admire Egypt for its past contributions, the reality is that the Arab street has moved towards conflation with its Islamic identity and crossing that line has changed the tone and focus of what leadership means to “the people.” So as Egypt emerges from its transitions and proffers “her natural role as a leader in the Middle East and Africa,” will anyone take up the offer?