Regional Merry-Go-Round – While Key Issues Continue to Dog Lebanon’s Government in Formation, End to Syria’s Civil War in Sight

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The muddle called the Middle East gets murkier

It has long been said somewhat cynically that Lebanon’s raison d’etre is to serve as the proxy battlefield for everything in contention in the region and beyond. Certainly, contemporary events bear that out as PM Saad Hariri struggles to build consensus around a new government and ministerial statement while regional players continue to shuffle the policy cards to determine what’s next on their agendas.

Distinctions between the players’ existential concerns and their dominate current interests are muddled at best. The Assad regime draws closer to its immediate goal of restoring its punishing control over Syria; Iran seeks to strengthen its regional role despite rising domestic opposition; Turkey is…well Turkey; Russia and Israel look to their interests with fervor; and the Syrian refugees await their fate.

Here’s a quick summary of several current events that are adding to the continued uncertainty despite the latest battlefield outcomes in Syria, a small détente between Israel and Syrian government forces near its borders, Syrian refugees moving in larger numbers back home, and Hezbollah’s quest for meaning after Syria.

Lebanon-Syria relations, always contentious, seem to be the chicken bone in the throat of PR Hariri. Despite prodding from Speaker Nabih Berri, pro-Syrian members of Parliament, Gebran Bassil, the acting Foreign Minister and son-in-law of President Michel Aoun, and others, the PM is standing his ground that the ministerial statement, which outlines the new government’s priorities, will not address restarting formal relations with Syria. Can he hold out? There’s no immediate consensus as there are other MPs supporting the PM. Proponents of the move argue that the step is needed to facilitate the return of Syrian refugees, re-open border crossings to allow goods to transit to export markets to Lebanon’s neighbors, and potentially give Lebanon a piece of the Syrian reconstruction pie.

Syria meanwhile seems to be holding refugee repatriation hostage to resuming relations. Over the past two weeks, a number of statements have come from Syrian sources, as well as its friends in Lebanon, that formal relations are the key to accelerating recent repatriation actions. It is worth noting that despite allegations that the Assad regime has a list of a million or so unwanted returnees, it also craves to be recognized as a legitimate government that can manage the resettlement process.

The reality though may be much different, and Russia has already indicating that it will play a key role as well so that it can task the international community with the cost of reconstruction in exchange for pressuring Syria to work with Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey on refugee issues. So, as reported by Refugees Deeply, “Russia and Syria are seeking bilateral agreements to begin mass returns. This could be disastrous given that the Syrian government and its allies lack the capacity and perhaps the will to enable refugees to return safely and reintegrate into the country.”

The UNHCR is directly bound up in this quagmire as it serves as the mediating body for the international community on refugee affairs. It has outlined its criteria for conditions required to move ahead with large-scale voluntary repatriations in cooperation with the Syrian government. To date, however, the regime has imposed restrictions on UNHCR activities in Syria, which could leave returnees without adequate aid and exposed to more danger.

While some analysts believe that Russia and the US are winding down their roles in Syria, Israel is exerting greater efforts to ensure that Iran and its proxy Hezbollah do not become an even greater security threat. Israel is concerned with Iran’s role in the region, especially the increasing stocks of various grades and types of Iranian-supplied missiles in Lebanon and Syria; thus its insistence on Iran’s withdrawal from all of Syria. As Stratfor notes, “On the diplomatic front, Israel has focused its approach on the United States and Russia, striving to convince the two superpowers to heed its interests in Syria by containing and limiting Iran’s influence and presence in the country.”

What’s in the cards for Hezbollah’s hands in Syria and Lebanon is a subject of much speculation. Will it return to its traditional role as a political-military state within a state in Lebanon? Will it maintain a presence in Syria to enable Iran to continue to have a pressure point on Israel? Will it maintain an aggressive posture towards Israel so that Israel leans on Russia and the US to exercise what little leverage they have over the Iran-Hezbollah axis to keep tensions from boiling over?

If it remains in Syria, deployed in areas under its control, it is hard to imagine that, despite its alliance with Assad, the Syrian regime will allow it to exercise the same freedom it has in Lebanon. According to an article in Al-Monitor.com, “There is no withdrawal for now, only redeployments of troops in the various areas,” said one source. “If the situation stabilizes definitely, Hezbollah would pull out from certain regions, but there are areas it considers strategic that it will never leave.”

Nicholas Blanford, longtime journalist based in Beirut, describes the link between Hezbollah’s presence in Syria and Iran’s regional game plan. “Iran will play the long game in southwest Syria by relying either on Hezbollah or Iraqi militant groups. Tehran will also want to extend what Hezbollah has on its Lebanese frontier with Israel, to the Golan, and leverage southwest Syria in its confrontation with Israel in the long run. Iran is trying to shape its strategic interests in Syria as time passes by, to maintain its land bridge there against Israel.”

Ironically, Russia, which, it can be argued, saved the Assad regime, seems to risk a diminishing influence on Iran and Syria as it draws down its military role in the region. Having gained basing rights in Syria, the acknowledgement of all the local players that it is the top player in the region, and with its finger on any eventual peace and reconstruction effort, it is loath to act against Iran in Syria. As Blanford noted, “Israel and the US seem hopeful that Russia will serve as a block to Iranian ambitions in Syria, but this could be wishful thinking.”

So is the other great power, the US, still searching for a regional strategy? It appears that the Trump Administration has conceded that the war in Syria is now at a stage where the US should move on to focus on a formal end to the civil war and reconstruction. Jim Jeffrey, former US Ambassador to Turkey and Iraq, a distinguished fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP), who served as the principal DAS for the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs at the State Department, and deputy national security adviser to President George W. Bush, has been appointed as Representative for Syrian Engagement by Secretary Pompeo. His job is to run US negotiations with other regional players over Syria’s future.

He has extensive experience in the region that should serve him well. As Ambassador to Iraq, he opposed the US withdrawal from the country under the Obama Administration, arguing that without a tangible presence in country that Iran’s influence would prevail. So he has no illusions about Iran’s regional ambitions.

One of his first challenges is to ensure that the latest deal made by the Administration, to have others pay for Syria’s stabilization fund, is carried out effectively. In announcing the US cut of its commitment of $230 million in stabilization assistance, the State Department pointed out that the Gulf States and others have agreed to fund the program. Stabilization aid is intended to provide basic services that allow Syrian residents to return to their homes and some semblance of normal life after a devastating seven-year civil war.

Al-Monitor.com reported that the “US has elicited approximately $300 million in contributions and pledges from coalition partners to support critical stabilization and early recovery initiatives in areas liberated from [the Islamic State (IS)] in northeast Syria, including a generous contribution of $100 million by Saudi Arabia and $50 million pledged by the United Arab Emirates.” Other commitments have been made by Kuwait, France, Germany, Italy, Denmark, Norway, the European Union, Australia. and Taiwan.

At the same time, a Reuters.com post noted that The US has also made it clear that “There will be no global reconstruction funding for Syria until a ‘credible and irreversible’ political process led by the United Nations is underway.” The State Department emphasized that “We will continue to provide life-saving, needs-based humanitarian assistance to vulnerable Syrians, support for the White Helmets and the UN’s International Impartial and Independent Mechanism to hold the [Syrian President Bashar] Assad regime accountable for serious crimes, as well as equipment and other measures to counter the effects of chemical weapons in northwest Syria.”

The spokesperson, Heather Nauert, explained that the decision “does not represent any lessening of US commitment to its strategic goals in Syria.” Which again raises the earlier question, does the US have a viable regional strategy that represents its long-term interests in the region?

 

 

Why does Yemen Matter?

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In Yemen, the pressure is on both sides to move toward a negotiated settlement.

There are several different views in the U.S. on the Yemen War depending on who is making the pronouncement. One views the U.S. as supporting a naive and destructive effort by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to restore the previous Yemeni regime. A second asserts that Yemen matters because of its geostrategic importance to the U.S. A third holds that the war is a mistake because it is a regional conflict between Sunnis and Shias that can have no positive outcomes for U.S. interests in the Middle East.

Bruce Riedel, writing in Brookings and elsewhere, has attempted to provide the basic facts about the Shia Houthi rebels, who are of course Yemeni, and why we are enmeshed in a conflict that goes back at least several generations. In a series of recent articles, he describes their origins and brings us up to date on how a seemingly backwater breakaway movement seeking autonomy in Yemen has become a surrogate of Iran in its sectarian warfare against member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).

One key indicator of the strategic nature of the conflict was U.S. President Donald Trump’s  reference to Tehran’s role in Yemen, in remarking that the Iran nuclear agreement placed “no limits at all on its [Iran’s] other malign behavior, including its sinister activities in Syria, Yemen, and other places all around the world.”

In Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s follow-up to the US withdrawal from the deal, he mentioned Iran’s role in Yemen. “In Yemen, Iran’s support for the Houthi militia fuels a conflict that continues to starve the Yemeni people and hold them under the threat of terror,” Pompeo said. “The IRGC [Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps] has also given Houthi missiles to attack civilian targets in Saudi Arabia and the Emirates and to threaten international shipping in the Red Sea.” As one of the 12 conditions for restarting nuclear talks with Tehran, he noted, “Iran must also end its military support for the Houthi militia and work towards a peaceful political settlement in Yemen.”

Yet this Iranian assistance to the Houthis is seldom a news headline. Most often, reporting on the conflict highlights the humanitarian costs, with little effort to provide information on the contenders’ incentives to keep fighting. According to the United Nations, more than 10,000 people have been killed and over 53,000 injured in the conflict. This is in addition to 3 million who fled their homes along with countless others who are “living with the threat of mass starvation and disease, including the world’s worst cholera outbreak.”

With the news that US Special Forces are engaged in the southern border of Saudi Arabia assisting allied troops to locate and destroy missile sites aimed at targets in the kingdom, it is vital to take a broader look at the conflict, avoiding images that feed retribution rather than reconciliation, and dissecting efforts to bring about a negotiated settlement to the war.

As one commentator noted about Senate hearings on the U.S. presence in Yemen, “Senators certainly should be asking these tough questions, yet their narrow focus resulted in a missed opportunity to ask equally important questions about the opaque U.S. mission to fight terrorism in Yemen, which the Trump administration has conducted with growing intensity.” The same article pointed out that the Houthis are but one of the terrorist groups operating in Yemen: “In late 2017, United States Central Command (CENTCOM) assessed that the Islamic State’s Yemen presence had doubled in size over the last year and that it uses the country as a hub to direct attacks against America and its allies.”

The troubling challenge of accepting a scenario in which the U.S. is a “bad actor” is the means by which the Houthis spread their mission. Just as with areas under the control of extremists in Iraq and Syria, the Houthis have adopted their tactics to bludgeon local communities into supporting militant positions, down to inculcating young people with an intense hatred for the U.S. and its allies.

Every day, according to sources on the ground and interviews conducted in liberated areas, as well as confiscated schoolbooks, classes for local youths and Houthis begin with a chant called al-sarkha, with the goal of recruiting child soldiers. It goes: “God is great, death to America, death to Israel, damnation to the Jews; Islam is the answer.” It is repeated in schoolbooks, on flags, graffiti, stickers, and other media. To Houthi leaders, as with militants of past generations, Zionism and the U.S. are the key culprits manipulating Saudi Arabia and the UAE, who would otherwise be incapable of managing the war.

It is with this vivid scenario in mind that we need to balance the competing claims: The Gulf Arabs are determined to restore the previous Yemeni government, while the other side, led by Houthis trained in Iran, wants to set up their own emirate in what is now northern Yemen and southern Saudi Arabia. Since Iran has become the enabler of the Houthi rebellion, the war has become an existential issue for Saudi Arabia in the spiraling conflict between Sunnis and Shias.

Negotiated Settlement

The pressure is on both sides to move toward a negotiated settlement, perhaps by offering and financing an autonomous Houthi area in northern Yemen. The most recent UN resolution unfortunately calls for disarming the Houthis and leaving occupied areas before talks begin. A new resolution is needed that takes into consideration the physical and psychological obstacles to overcome. Former neighbors, now at war, need strong social, economic, and humanitarian support to put the past behind them.

GCC members have already begun the process of pledging aid to rebuild Yemen. Yet the path forward is not simply to disarm and join hands. As Osamah al-Rawhani, program director of the Sanaa Center for Strategic Studies, said, “The international community could show its serious commitment to achieve peace in Yemen by working towards a new UN resolution that pressures all sides to bring this conflict to an end.  Yemenis have suffered for so long.”

The longer the situation on the ground is not addressed effectively to stop hostilities, the more likely a generation of young Yemenis and Houthis will grow up to mistrust and label their counterparts as enemies. This has long-term consequences for Yemen, the Middle East, and U.S. stability and security objectives to protect the homeland and America’s allies abroad.

The Trouble with Black and White Perspectives

I spent a year in Yemen in 1974 as U.S. Peace Corps Training Director. It was a remarkable place, historically, culturally, and socially. It was the prototype of Arab tribal society. Since then, having worked in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere in the Arab world, I saw first-hand the contributions expatriate Yemenis played as shopkeepers, domestic help, semi-skilled labor, and builders of the local economy.

Looking today at the Houthi forces and their tactics of inculcating their ideological messages is difficult to reconcile with the gracious and accommodating people I experienced then. Usually, youth are enlisted as flag bearers, carrying on the customary role allocated by resistance movements to inoculate the young and marginalized into their ranks. When the al-sarkha is chanted, it reflects the creed of those who believe that a movement need only be in opposition to be credible. Often guided by an ephemeral vision of victory over an oppressor, it provides little in the way of a substantial prospect for peace and prosperity. Victory is all that matters.

When I lived in Yemen, it was a romantic location beyond description, with no running water, intermittent power, few Yemeni English-speakers, and the seeds of coming conflicts being sown daily. Much like Mali and the Western Sahara, there were pockets of tribes that resisted any central government role, demanding autonomy, and a fair share of the country’s few resources.

How a seemingly remote, inter-tribal conflict turned into the awful and desperate situation that is Yemen today can largely be attributed to external forces: Saudi Arabia and Iran being the most recent. They have infused their Sunni-Shia confrontation into the fiber of the life of Yemen, disrupting any opportunity for the initial agreements arrived at through a national dialogue to bear fruit. Iran enabled the Houthis to acquire the arms and discipline needed to join with former president Abdullah Ali Saleh to overthrow the democratically elected government and put an end to any aspirations for national reconciliation. They quickly took over some 70% of the territory, and, with an ISIS insurgency in the southeast of Yemen, ensure that the country would be damned into instability for some time.

This is not to excuse or justify the reactions of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and the Arab Coalition battling the Houthis. Those transgressions are well publicized, if sometimes exaggerated. Those Arabs will eventually go home; there really is nothing to keep them in Yemen. What is of concern is how the Houthis are changing the character of the Yemenis, so that retribution trumps reconciliation and coming generations are imbued with norms that are hardly conducive to compromise and innovation.

As recounted in a recent publication,  “The Houthis originally sought an end to what they observed as efforts to marginalize Zaydi communities and beliefs; but their aspirations amplified both in magnitude and resolve in the wake of the 2011 uprisings (Yemen’s Arab Spring) and government collapse, and embraced a broader populist, dissident message to counter the establishment.” As the civil war wore on and control of territory and people moved back and forth between the combatants, the Houthis undertook re-education of the people and youth under their control both to reduce dissident voices and to build a generation of committed fighters.

They dusted off educational methods evolved from Mao’s China and Fidel’s Cuba to more recent versions adapted by Iran and Da’esh, to foster a behavioral outlook filled with an acute anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism. This view encourages youth to rage against the U.S. and Israel as the primary evil attacking Yemen by manipulating Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and other Arab countries and European allies.

But extremist ideology is only one part of the complex threat from this distant conflict. Yemen has a geopolitical prominence as the southern entrance to the Red Sea. The Houthis continue to threaten maritime transit of naval forces, oil tankers, and freighters. The threat to freedom of navigation and the world’s oil and commercial goods transiting the Red Sea via the Bab al-Mandeb Strait cannot be ignored.  Ironically, this is also not in Iran’s interests if it were ever to resume commercial shipping through the Suez Canal.

Iran has a long-term stake in stoking the Yemen conflict, both as the weak southern border from which to attack Saudi Arabia to expanding its footprint on the Arabian Peninsula. It continues to gain strength throughout the region via local militias trained and mobilized by Hezbollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. Additionally, the Arab Federation for Human Rights found that the Houth­is have planted more than half a million anti-personnel mines in different parts of Yemen, not to mention mines in sea lanes.

These challenges — radicalized youth, aggression against Yemeni and Saudi civilians, missiles used against a range of land and sea targets, and the fundamental issue of what will happen to this lost generation of Yemeni young people who could be the next terrorist threats to the US and Europe — argue for a more concerted effort to reduce the violence, support revised and realistic UN efforts for a national reconciliation, and provide the ingredients for long-term, inclusive and sustainable solutions.

The U.S. must bring its influence to bear on Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and the Arab Coalition, as well as Russia, to bring the parties to the table with few preconditions.  Unfortunately, according to a UN report in January, “the UN Panel of Experts suggested that neither side’s leaders have suffered enough to make them compromise—in sharp contrast to their civilian constituents.”

There is never a fortuitous time for taking risks for peace. The international community must recognize that further delay at peace-making will only wreck more lives, spread even more catastrophe among the civilian populations, and harden positions beyond compromise. The time is now for responsible actions that lessen threats emanating from the Yemen war and its consequences for the youth and people of that country.

 

 

 

 

Deciphering Russia’s Levant Strategy – Can it Herd all the Cats?

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Make no mistake about it; Russia is the most influential great power in the Middle East and the Gulf. The US has enabled this role over time through a continuing disengagement from those countries that once relied on us as the final arbiter and guarantor of their security and economic development. You can blame the Obama Administration all you want, but the Trump Administration, aside from putting even more weapons and intelligence in their hands, has not been able to assert US leadership as deftly and broadly as the Russians.

And now, a real test of Russian leadership is rising out of the faltering resistance to President Assad. Israel recently made a serious demarche to Moscow regarding the encroachment of Iranian and allied militias towards its northern border and the Golan. The trade-off: get them out of the area, let us target forces that violate our sense of security, and we won’t attack Russian targets in Syria. The US, with a Trump-Putin summit coming up, is also being enticed by Putin’s words that Syrian forces will not interfere with US advisors closing in on one of the last holdouts of Islamic militants, and then the US can leave.

Similarly, Putin has engaged Turkey on its role along its border with Syria and with Iran on its residual presence in Syria after Assad reclaims most of the country. As an article in Al-Monitor points out, “Putin’s leverage in Syria is unmatched, as he has managed complicated relations with all of the key parties — the Syrian government, Iran, Turkey, and Israel — while keeping up regular contacts with Arab Gulf leaders.” This is no accident. Putin has sensed US reluctance over the past decade to reaffirm is regional leadership and has gradually expanded his sphere of influence as evident by the many leaders who have made the pilgrimage to Moscow.

The US about face on the JCPOA with Iran, its inability to ease the GCC crisis over Qatar, and the lack of a strong diplomacy while the State Department floundered under Tillerson, have only eased Moscow’s rise to prominence. So the arrangement with Israel, if it holds, will be a strong indication of Russia’s influence with Iran, which is loath to leave Syria after investing so many resources and prestige in its efforts to save the Assad regime.

As Maxim Suchkov noted, “Despite all the complexities, the situation in southern Syria doesn’t look hopeless at this point. A far bigger challenge in this conundrum is Iran’s long-term presence in the rest of Syria. There’s an understanding in Moscow that Hezbollah may always find a reason to stay in Syria as long as its leadership feels it needs to ensure Lebanon’s security. There’s no way for Russia or any other external power to guarantee an Iran-free Syria, as there are no means of verifying Iran’s presence or its influence.”

And what about Iran’s objectives?

An article on Foreign Policy.com takes the view that Iran has little to show for its efforts if it agrees at this point to withdraw its forces and limit its presence in Syria. “But Iranian officials and other experts say the country has invested too much blood and treasure — upwards of $30 billion to date — to fold to international demands, regardless of Israeli airstrikes, or even Moscow’s pressure. Having already made such a massive investment, Iran is determined to reap the potential long-term strategic rewards Syria has to offer — even if it comes at the expense of more lives and money in the short term.”

As with its goals in Iraq, Iran has a much broader goal than Syria per se, seeing regional hegemony as the prize, especially upping pressure on Saudi Arabia and the UAE to acknowledge Iran’s dominance and simultaneously increasing its pressure on Israel. This latter point cannot be overlooked as a means of attracting Sunni support for Iran’s combative position vis-à-vis Israel. So a visible presence in Syria is essential in that “It gives Iran good leverage against Israel. The ground is very important, and Iran is very skillful at managing the ground — the one area where even Russians are weak. The one who has control of the ground doesn’t take seriously those who don’t,” according to an Iranian source quoted in the post on Foreign Policy.com.

According to Nawar Oliver, a researcher at a Turkish think tank, “Iranian forces currently operate out of 11 bases around the country, as well as nine military bases for Iranian-backed Shiite militias in southern Aleppo, Homs, and Deir Ezzor provinces as well as about 15 Hezbollah bases and observation points mostly along the Lebanese border and in Aleppo.”

In addition, the challenge of funding so many investments in Iraq and Syria, among others, has to play into the rising discontent in Iran regarding the failing economy, devaluation of its currency, high inflation, and other problems. Yet the leadership persists in its strategy. As the post concludes “But Iran’s involvement in Syria goes beyond a conventional military presence, and it has already begun to plant there the seeds of its unique financial and ideological institutions. Along with about a dozen other Iran-linked organizations, the Iran-backed Jihad al-Binaa, the Islamic charitable foundation that financed and organized the reconstruction of southern Beirut after the 2006 summer war, is already working on large projects to rebuild schools, roads, and other infrastructure in Aleppo and other towns, as well as providing aid for the families of slain Iran-backed Syrian militiamen.”

The balancing act is underscored in a recent Carnegie Middle East Center post, “In the end, Russia can’t allow Israel to initiate a direct military confrontation with Iran, as this would negatively affect Moscow’s calculations in Syria, while Israel can’t accept the unlimited growth of Iranian influence in Syria, as this threatens its own national security. Moscow has to take into account both Israel’s and Iran’s security concerns, and these are mutually exclusive.”

With no restraints on Iran’s leadership and the erosion of sanctions that might otherwise continue to hobble Iran’s finances, it is a dilemma as to how Russia will constrain Iran’s behavior. One avenue is Russian pressure paired with trade-offs for development assistance, which would even be trying for Moscow, given its own weakened economy. The other is for Iran to miscalculate and feed the beast of another war in the region, one that would be devastating for Iran and its allies, and one in which Lebanon would suffer enormously.

 

 

War again tops political agenda in the Levant as Israel asserts its security privileges

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Now that the Lebanese and Iraqi elections are over and the countries’ political parties brace for the implications of whatever internal power-sharing arrangements emerge, the long shadow of Israel makes itself felt in Beirut and Baghdad.  Both countries have critical internal issues to address as well as keeping an eye on regional concerns that could undo whatever domestic progress is possible.

Lebanon cannot ignore its neighbors – an ascendant Assad regime in Syria that is close to achieving control over most of its urban areas; an Israel that continues to issue hostile statements regarding Lebanon’s internal political arrangements that allow Hezbollah key political and security roles; and as yet unfinished business on defining its borders with Israel. And then there is a very long domestic agenda that is made more challenging by the need to satisfy so many entitlements claimed by the competing parties.

Iraq’s struggles are even more complex. A coalition government that can be formed in a reasonable period of time will buy the leadership some space to address multiple internal security, economic, and social issues. And there is much more: what to do with Iran’s military, political, and economic presence that has only deepened with the success of its militias and proxies in combating ISIS and other militants; how to bring some sense of security on its border with Syria where US and coalition forces are working to eliminate terrorist threats in the area; how to manage relations with Erdogan’s Turkey and the restive Kurds; and an Israel government that is suspicious of Iraqi intentions under perceived Iranian influence and outright military muscle.

There is no escaping the reality that conditions are ripe for a significant rise in hostilities. Analysts warn that although none of the parties seem intent on ratcheting up tensions at this time, there is broad agreement that a miscalculation by any of the potential combatants can unleash a firestorm. With Israel toughening its redlines concerning Hezbollah’s activities in Lebanon and Syria, Iran’s deepening presence in Syria, the likely movement of Syrian and allied forces into areas close to Israel’s border, and Russia’s reluctance to take on a more proactive role in defusing tensions, opportunities for a flame-up are multiplying…and this is not even including what the UAE and Saudi Arabia are intending.

As an article in Foreign Affairs noted, “Another war between Israel and Hezbollah is almost inevitable. Although neither side wants a conflict now, the shifting balance of power in the Levant and shrinking areas of contestation are indicators of a looming showdown. The real questions are how and where—not if—the impending conflagration will occur.”

So the question is, how are the governments-to-be in Lebanon and Iraq to demonstrate wisdom in forming governments to avoid as much as possible the tipping points that undermine their countries’ stability? Can the leadership rise above sectarian and community identity politics and agree on a statement of principles and policies that diminish prospects for being dragged into regional conflicts? Will the new governments, based on broad consensus, be able to withstand external pressures on their internal politics?

It is interesting that Muqtada al-Sadr’s coalition won the largest number of seats in the elections running a populist, even Trump-like campaign, wanting to drain the swamp in Baghdad, fight corruption, and return government to the people. Sunnis were drawn to his lists as they were to Haider al-Abadi’s lists, challenging age-old sectarian divides.

But the wild card of the standoff between Iran and Israel casts a pall on the government formation process in both countries. Unspoken in Lebanon but obviously on the agenda is what can be done to diminish Hezbollah’s ties to Iran and its antagonism towards Israel? With Israel intent on brandishing its “privilege” of US guarantees of military dominance in the region, and its anti-Iran campaign in sync with many US political leaders, its power  cannot be overlooked in formulating scenarios and discussing policy options. Similarly, Iraq, still facing ISIS and the remnants of the ISIS caliphate, wants to be able to manage its own affairs, a goal that may not be possible without alienating some military, political, and religious factions in Iran.

It will be a long, hot summer.

So you Ask, Will there be a War in Lebanon?

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Going through dozens of articles over the past month on this issue has convinced me that the prospects for war between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon in the next six months vary somewhere between 20 and 80%! Not very helpful, I know, which means that there is even a greater need to monitor communications and actions to avoid triggering a miscalculation leading to a conflict. As recently as this week, at least six articles have appeared in journals and media listing the tripwires.

Take Mara Karlin, of Johns Hopkins SAIS, writing in Foreign Affairs that “Another war between Israel and Hezbollah is almost inevitable. Although neither side wants a conflict now, the shifting balance of power in the Levant and shrinking areas of contestation are indicators of a looming showdown. The real questions are how and where—not if—the impending conflagration will occur.”

She goes on to enumerate the calamitous conditions in the region, from the casualties, displaced people, and refugees in Lebanon, the uncertainty surrounding next steps for those temporary allies aligned against ISIS, and the shifting regional balance of power that has a marginal role for the US and outsized Russian and Iranian influence. Karlin writes that “The resulting tensions are likely to bring Israel to the brink of a regional war even bigger than the last one in 2006, when it invaded southern Lebanon.”

With ISIS defeated and anti-regime foreign fighters dispersing throughout the Middle East, North Africa, and beyond, she believes that “the resulting shifts in focus will clarify the increasingly complex and dangerous relations between [Israel and Hezbollah]. Hezbollah has lost nearly 2,000 fighters in Syria, damaged its reputation through unfettered support for the regimes in Iran and Syria, and is rumored to face financial trouble. Despite all that, it remains popular with its core constituency, Lebanese Shiites.” This bodes poorly for Lebanon as Hezbollah, which Karlin predicts will win big in the upcoming parliamentary elections, will have even a strong chokehold on government policies.

She concludes however, that “Hezbollah’s and Israel’s long-term strategic goals are thus entirely at odds. Nevertheless, as of today, neither Hezbollah nor Israel wants to trigger a war. A deliberate escalation by Israel or Hezbollah is unlikely to occur in the near term; an inadvertent one, however, is possible, as is an escalation courtesy of other actors currently tearing up the Levant, such as Iran, the Assad regime, or Russia.”

Commenting on Hezbollah’s overwhelming political power in Lebanon, a NY Books article argues that “There is real anxiety about Hezbollah’s domination in Lebanon, and about Iran’s not very subtle aim of expanding Shia power from Tehran to Beirut.”

This theme is echoed in a Washington Institute for Near East Policy article in which the presence of senior Iranian military officials along Lebanon’s southern border sends two messages, one, “so long as Lebanon is kept stable, the group will be left alone to continue its takeover there.”  The other that “Hezbollah and Iran still needed to reaffirm that no one in Lebanon can stop the group from intervening wherever it likes.”

The article takes issue with the notion that the Lebanese official policy of dissociation, by which it commits to not be involved in external conflicts, has any impact on Hezbollah’s activities. “The cover provided by the dissociation policy may buy the group enough time to position itself for victory in the May 2018 parliamentary elections. With the new electoral law that Hariri’s government passed this summer, Hezbollah will probably manage to bring its allies into parliament and consolidate its power democratically. This in turn would allow it to choose the next prime minister and president, make top military and security appointments, and even change the constitution as it sees fit.”

If Lebanon is to survive as an independent entity, the article concludes “The international community should therefore buttress its talk of stability with a focus on reforming state institutions in order to protect Lebanon’s values of freedom and diversity. Perhaps more important, Hariri’s dissociation policy needs to be accompanied by more aggressive measures against Hezbollah and its regional operations, though that seems unlikely given his recent moves.”

Similar pessimism is to be found in the International Crisis Group report on the Syrian conflict. It notes that “’Rules of the game’ that contained Israeli-Hezbollah clashes for over a decade have eroded. New rules can be established in Syria by mutual agreement or by a deadly cycle of attack and response in which everyone will lose. A broader war could be one miscalculation away.”

There is an emerging consensus that the US has relinquished any leadership role in reducing tensions in the area despite the recent pronouncements by Secretary of State Rex Tillerson on his recent trip to the area and the presence of US forces in Syria. Although the seeds for this lack of engagement were the official policy of the Obama Administration, it continues. An article in Al Monitor put it this way, “But despite US President Donald Trump’s sharp criticism of everything his predecessor did to diminish American deterrence in the region, the impression for now is that Washington is stronger in words than in deeds. Yet soon it will have to decide which direction it is going to take.”

CNN focused on Russian perceptions that a war would be disastrous to its objectives in the region as being seen as the power broker. “Russia has no desire to undermine three years of investment in saving the Assad regime, only to see Israel become involved militarily in Syria, which could weaken the Syrian regime and strengthen the United States’ hand against Iran. Iran isn’t looking for war with Israel either, as it could jeopardize its own gains in Syria.”

Sadly the consensus around the marginal role of the US is echoed in the Israeli press, which noted the weak American hand in dealing with the tit-for-tat fighting two weeks ago when the Israelis shot down an alleged Iranian drone in its airspace, bombed a control center in Syria, lost a plane to a Syrian missile, then severely damaged Syrian air defense positions, almost leading to the feared escalation.

A Haaretz article said that It is clear that a call from President Putin to Prime Minister Netanyahu kept tempers in check. “The quiet after the Netanyahu-Putin call shows once again who’s the real boss in the Middle East. While the United States remains the region’s present absentee – searches are continuing for a coherent American foreign policy – Russia is dictating the way things are going.”

For now, the border remains much the same as before although there is concern that the Syrian regime may overstep its restraints and attack the de-escalation zone close to the Jordan-Syria-Lebanon-Israel border. Since not even the Russians are sure what the Assad government will do, as shown by its violations of the so-called 30 days cease-fire announced by Russia, there are far too many agendas and personalities in play to expect that a coherent set of rules of engagement will evolve any time soon.

Deep Concern over Potential Escalation between Israel, Syria, and Iran

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Recent cross-border military actions between Israel and Syria, the first since 1982, have raised concerns in Lebanon and the United States over the potential for increased hostilities in the region. The current tensions came on the heels of a February 6 inspection visit by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Avigdor Liberman to the Israel-Syria-Lebanon border area.

As reported in Al Monitor, “According to official reports from the Syrian army, that same night, Israeli aircraft attacked a target on the outskirts of Damascus. That same area, where a Syrian research facility involved in the “Precision Project” for missiles is located, had already been bombed in the past. Indeed, this site is considered by Israel to be a direct strategic threat.” Since the missiles were fired from Lebanon, some analysts opined that Israel was sending a message to Hezbollah as well as Syria.

While the Cabinet was in the north, it received briefings from senior military officials that focused primarily on Hezbollah’s increased capabilities in Lebanon and Syria. As the article phrased it, “In the past few weeks alone, the winds of war blowing across the region have turned into a veritable hurricane.”

It has not taken long for the situation to deteriorate. Despite a Lebanese government statement challenged Israel’s construction of a wall along the Blue Line, which demarcates the border with Lebanon, Israel retorted that it has every intention of moving ahead aggressively. Israel has made clear that if there is a third Lebanon war, “The damage to Lebanon will be enormous, with most of its national infrastructures in ruins and thousands, if not tens of thousands, of casualties. Hezbollah will also suffer a resounding blow, though it is hard to imagine that it will be completely defeated and obliterated,” according to Al Monitor.

Within days of the Lebanese statement, Israel carried out major air strikes in Syria, including facilities that house Iranian and Russian military forces, brought about by the interception of an alleged Iranian drone over Israeli airspace. While Israel’s regular overflights over Lebanon’s territory are tolerated since Lebanon has no air defense system, the same is not true of Syria. When Israel destroyed the drone and attacked the command and control center in Syria, it engaged Russian, Iranian, and Syrian military and Israel lost an F-16 in the strike.

This loss increased tensions, leading to alarm bells going off in the region in advance of US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s visit this week. “The events, including Israel’s direct engagement with Iranian forces, threatened to intensify the crisis in Syria and showed the extent to which the country [Syria] has become a battlefield between Israel and Iran, bitter foes in the region,” noted the New York Times.

From the Israeli side, the warning is clear, “We are ready to exact a very heavy price from whoever acts against us,” said Brig. Gen. Ronen Manelis, the chief spokesman of the Israeli military, “but we are not seeking an escalation.” Spokesperson Lt. Col. Jonathan Conricus added, “Syria and Iran are playing with fire.”

Heather Nauert, a State Department spokeswomen said in a statement that “The United States is deeply concerned about today’s escalation of violence over Israel’s border, and “Iran’s calculated escalation of threat, and its ambition to project its power and dominance, places all the people of the region — from Yemen to Lebanon — at risk.”

United Nations Secretary General Antonio Guterres called for an immediate and unconditional de-escalation, as “civilians in the war-torn country [Syria] suffer through one of the most violent periods in nearly seven years of conflict. In a statement he said that “all concerned in Syria and the region have a responsibility and must abide by international law and relevant Security Council resolutions.”

According to several sources quoted in The Washington Post, the recent strikes “could have serious consequences for the war in Syria – and for the region as a whole.” Israeli leaders and commentators mention three overlapping issues: the presence of Iranian forces including its surrogate Hezbollah on Israel’s northern border, the potential arming of Hezbollah and others with precision-guided missiles, and the continuing upgrading of Hezbollah forces across the border in Lebanon.

“If the conflict escalates, it could end up adding a dangerous angle to the ongoing Syrian conflict — and one that could wind up involving other powers in the region and beyond.

An open conflict between Israel and Iranian-backed forces would add to the entanglements and chaos in Syria. It would also risk pulling neighboring Lebanon or other Arab states into a new war, too,” according to the Post article.

All of the recent regional escalation cloaked continuing domestic devastation as Syrian attacks continue on civilian facilities. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, underlined the need for urgent international action to protect civilians caught up in “wave after wave” of deadly airstrikes. “The no-holds-barred nature of this assault is evidenced by reports that at least nine medical facilities, six of them in Idlib and three in eastern Ghouta, were hit by airstrikes. “Even by Syria’s atrocious standards, these are exceptionally deplorable developments – and a cruel irony given that both have been declared ‘de-escalation areas.”

 

And the Walls Came Tumbling Down, Up, Then Down Again

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 The New Year has some new looks and some old threats along Lebanon’s borders. Part of the good news is that Lebanon’s five official border crossings with Syria are all open, some of them closed for five years. Maybe more importantly for the Lebanese, the government has finally removed security barriers in the downtown section around Parliament Square, which were not only an eyesore, but a death knell for the businesses that once thrived in the area.

When I visited Lebanon in 2006 with my children, there was no better time than being part of the happy crowds strolling along the streets watching the World Cup and savoring the nightlife of Beirut. The area was closed off after a show of strength by Hezbollah in response to the government trying to reign in its illegal ITC network. Then the area was the site of large-scale demonstrations during the trash crisis.

This made it a flashpoint for anti-government actions with the result that the area was barricaded except for a bit of foot traffic. One of the most attractive centers that Solidere built in the reconstruction of Beirut’s downtown became a virtual ghost area, soon to lose its luster to Beirut Souks, a misnamed tribute to the original shopping district of the city.

According to a recent article, “Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri ordered the roads leading to the Parliament Square open days after the square witnessed its largest New Year’s Eve celebration, with thousands of revelers, as part of a government initiative to revive the area. Berri on Wednesday urged business owners, restaurants, hotels and offices in the area to reopen after many of them had closed down, having given up on the area attracting visitors again.”

Well, that was one source of optimism. Another is that the last official border crossing at Qaa between Lebanon and Syria that had been closed is now opened. With a large sign “Welcome to Bashar al-Assad’s Syria” greeting those who use the crossing, there is a not so subtle reminder on the sign that “The Lebanese and Syrians are one people that live in two brotherly lands.”

The Syrian government, under Assad father and son, insisted that there was no need for an ambassador to Lebanon as the countries were one peoples divided by the Great Powers. While this sentiment once had some popularity in Lebanon, that faded under the Syrian presence after the civil war and has diminished even more with the hosting of more than 1.5 million Syrian refugees in Lebanon.

While the opening is good news for local residents on both sides of the border with property, family, and friends now accessible, it is not seen as an indication that Syrian refugees may soon begin to return home. At this point, the main beneficiaries are Syrians who can come to Lebanon and finds goods and products unavailable in war-ravaged Syria.

The newly opened “Chtaura-Homs road,” according to one article, “Used to be a busy artery, with hundreds, if not thousands, of cars crossing the border every day. But clashes between different rebel groups operating from Syria and the Lebanese army forced its closure.” This past year, with the territory back under government control, “All five official border crossings between Lebanon and Syria are now open and controlled by the Syrian regime.”

Chtaura is a key city in the Bekaa valley, a major agricultural area in Lebanon long under the control of Hezbollah. Locals are hoping that in time the situation will normalize and customary business will resume. This is critical for the Bekaa, which is “one of Lebanon’s poorest regions and houses a disproportionate number of Syrian refugees compared to the rest of the country because of its proximity to the border. There are a little under 1 million Syrian refugees registered with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, of whom roughly 350,000 live in the Bekaa Valley. However, Lebanese officials believe that the number of Syrians that fled to Lebanon because of the war is closer to 1.5 or 2 million people,” according to an article in Al-Monitor.

The article noted that “Those who are tempted to go home are still wary of the economic situation back in Syria. Askar, a young agricultural worker, fled Homs to Qaa several years ago with 100 extended family members. “[God willing] we will go home soon. But there are still problems. We will not be able to live like before. For now, the situation is still better in Lebanon, as I can find work here.”

According to a Lebanese security official interviewed by Arab News, “the whole issue could be limited to local residents only, because there are Lebanese citizens who have properties in Syria, and there are Syrian citizens who have relatives in Lebanon, otherwise we do not expect the return of Syrian refugees to inland Syria.” He estimates that there are about 30,000 Syrian refugees in the border area.

Noting that the open crossing with enable better control of the movement of refugees, “the actual return of refugees is still awaiting a political solution for the war in Syria, which involves tackling the issue of refugees.” However, the source said that “opening the border crossing is part of field preparations for any future step in this direction.”

An indication of how unresolved the situation is was a statement from Prime Minister Hariri’s office that “those who think the war in Syria is over are mistaken.” Without a formal rapprochement between the two governments, which will be difficult given the enmity between the Prime Minister and President Assad, the opening is symbolic and functional, no more.

From the Lebanese side, the regional representative of Lebanese General Security, Major General Abbas Ibrahim, inaugurated the new General Security center without coming to the Syrian side. He said in a speech that the inauguration of the center “is of great importance at these exceptional sensitive times. We are here to set the borders of our homeland with efforts and sacrifice.” He also said that “the cooperation with the Syrian side is within the limits imposed by the procedures and laws,” stressing that “the policy of dissociation has nothing to do with opening the border crossing.”

Of course, Israel is looking closely at any movements by the Syrian government or its ally Hezbollah to change the status of the current borders, an issue I will explore in my next blog.

Border War of Words Threatens Economic Recovery of Lebanon and Dissociation Policy

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Recent movements by Hezbollah and the Syrian Army on Israel’s northeast border and the strong likelihood of no US disapproval of any upticks in Israeli militancy regarding the Palestinians, Hezbollah, or its borders, has prompted statements and actions by Israel’s right that portend bad news for Lebanon’s stability and security.

While Lebanon’s government and citizens are pressing for more economic development, stability in the political arena, and incremental reforms needed for infrastructure projects, the war of words on the southern border are heating up, most recently around the visits of Syrian, Iranian, and Hezbollah military leaders to the area. The most immediate effects are the potential to divert government funds away from development to security, discourage international investors from entering Lebanon, and cast doubt on the stability needed to move ahead with the May elections

Recent flare-ups include the statement from the IDF spokesperson Avichai Adraee telling Hezbollah to refrain from any aggression “because we are going to surprise you if you dare. Maintaining stability in the region is a common interest of the Israeli and Lebanese sides, but if you dare, we will surprise you.” Of course the root cause of the recent resumption of hostile exchanges is Iran’s success in support the Assad regime’s hold on power. Adraee said that “Hezbollah has been working as an Iranian arm in Lebanon and sacrificing Lebanese to foreign interests. [and that Israel] is closely monitoring what Hezbollah is doing as well as what is happening on the border and beyond.”

This past week, the Israel’s security cabinet met several times to review conditions along Israel’s northern border, discussion which were reported to be “extremely significant.” Among the issued reportedly discussed were Iran’s activities supporting the Assad regime, its likely control in the near future over most of Syria, Hezbollah’s possible next actions, and options for dealing with growing Iranian presence in Syria.

Also noted in the article is that PM Benjamin Netanyahu has expanding his conversations with world leaders on Iran’s efforts to set up bases in Lebanon and Syria using Hezbollah and Syrian Shiite militias as proxies. Among his most immediate concerns is that “At the end of December, Assad’s troops, accompanied by Iranian-backed militias and the Hezbollah, took over the Syrian Golan from the rebels, giving the government control over the Golan Heights, captured by Israel from Syria during the 1967 Six Day War.”

Adding more incendiary comments from Israel,

the IDF Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot said that Hezbollah was the most serious threat to Israel followed by other Iranian-backed jihadist groups in the border areas. Without giving his sources,, Eisenkot mentioned that “Each year Iran sends between $700 million to $1 billion to Hezbollah, $100 million each to Shiite militias in Syria, Shiite militias in Iraq, rebels in Yemen, and to the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas terrorist groups.”

He repeated charges that “the Hezbollah terrorist group has transformed from a so-called defender of Lebanon to an Iranian proxy in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen,” with significant defense capabilities as well as the ability to attack Israel.

Eisenkot noted that with regard to Syria, the IDF will continue to strike targets in Syria to prevent build-up of a military capability and presence on the border by Iranian-backed Shiite militia. These statements came on the heels of a heightened movement of Iranian-backed militias into Beit Jinn, close to the border with Lebanon and the last significant rebel-controlled area on the border.

This is problematic for Israel in that “After years of cultivating ties with rebel-held forces across the border in the Golan, Israel now faces the prospect of the return of forces from the Lebanese Shiite Hezbollah army and fighters commanded by Iran.” This will also impact Israel’s so-called “good neighbor policy” that provided humanitarian assistance to Syria’s rebel-held villages.

In light of the incremental success of the Syrian regime and its allies inching closer to the border areas, some Israeli analysts are encouraging the Israeli government “to bolster the pockets of non-regime holdouts…[by] quietly trying to broker a cease-fire deal between Druze, Muslim, and Christian areas…to communicate to villagers that they should avoid cooperation with Hezbollah and Iran, and focus on their local interests rather than foreign powers.”

While this may differ in many ways from the South Lebanon Army, which was allied with Israel until it was disbanded in 1980, it poses a threat for Lebanese who would then be exposed to retaliation from the militant and heavily-armed Hezbollah. Today the Iranian presence and influence in Syria most troubles Israel, and could lead to preemptive actions that damage Lebanon’s infrastructure and security capabilities.

What this means for Lebanon in advance of the May Parliamentary elections is unclear. Unless the government has unfettered access to Lebanese civilians throughout the country, there may be challenges to the results and once again push Lebanon into political stalemate.

The Debate Is Not Over – Dissociation Vs Hezbollah’s Regional Ambitions

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Although the government of Lebanon agreed this week to a renewed commitment to dissociation, Hezbollah’s representatives said that it was nothing different in content from the previous Cabinet agreement and reserved the right to issue its own position. Importantly, the restatement enabled Prime Minister Saad Hariri to withdraw his resignation and take up his position in the government, which has a full agenda in advance of the May 2018 Parliamentary elections.

As a recent article by an analyst at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy put it, “Now that Hariri has returned to Lebanon and suspended his resignation, the question is no longer about him. Rather, it is how Iran will move beyond this hurdle to consolidate its achievements in Lebanon and the region.”

This is the obvious conundrum. Will Hezbollah continue to act as Iran’s proxy across the region and continue ramping up its military presence in Lebanon threatening Israel, or will it resume its Lebanese character and limit its ambitions to its home country?  As the article points out, “When Hizballah decided to join Iran’s regional foreign legion, it was only a matter of time before Lebanon would be dragged with Hizballah to the regional confrontation. Now, any dialogue among the Lebanese people or possible resolution to nation’s crisis is going to be tied to regional negotiations over the conflicts in Syria, Iraq and Yemen.”

To successfully navigate between its commitments, to Iran and Lebanon, Hezbollah will have to choose between continuing its involvement in Yemen and Iraq while advancing towards a more nuanced and evolving posture in Syria. In fact, Hezbollah could be helpful in working with the Lebanese government to reduce threats along the border as hostilities wind down, and provide pathways for solving the refugee presence in Lebanon and well as its participation in Syria’s reconstruction.

Analysts are offering two contradictory scenarios: the entire episode has strengthened Hariri’s hand and weakened Saudi Arabia, or weakened Hariri and strengthened Hezbollah. What is even murkier is how public opinion will morph from now until the 2018 Parliamentary elections.

And what are the Lebanese saying about this?

Implications of the Hariri crisis on the election results are very hard to predict. According to NDI, despite some naysayers, the new election law does not of itself favor Hezbollah. It puts more districts up for grabs, and Hezbollah may benefit because of its better organization. If enough young voters are mobilized in these competitive districts around capable candidates, the results may not reflect the usual sectarian patterns.

According to a Washington Institute article on political affiliations among Lebanese, it points out that “a reasonable estimate is this:  around 40 percent are Shia Muslim; 30 percent Sunni Muslim; 25 percent Christians (Maronite, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholic, Armenian, Protestant, and other); and the remaining 5 percent mostly Druze, plus a few other small minorities.”

“Asked about their attitude toward Hezbollah, the extent of Lebanese sectarian polarization is sharply evident. Among Sunnis, 85 percent express a negative view and just 14 percent a positive one.  But among Shia, the proportions are almost exactly the reverse:  88 percent voice a positive opinion of Hezbollah (including a striking 83 percent “very positive”); while a mere 11 percent say they have a negative opinion.”

What is critical about these numbers is that they are no longer the only indicator of voting outcomes in the Parliamentary elections. Political affiliations in the abstract do not always coincide with voter behavior. “For example, in the 2016 local elections, 45 percent voted against Hezbollah and affiliated Amal candidates, even in their supposed stronghold of Baalbek.”

The Christian voters are likewise is flux. “Lebanon’s substantial Christian minority remains split almost down the middle on Hezbollah: 45 percent in favor, 55 percent opposed.  Yet almost half of Lebanese Christians still apparently adhere to the view of the country’s Maronite president, Michel Aoun, that Hezbollah represents a positive player in the Lebanese arena. How his position evolves, if at all, in the coming months will be telling.

Despite disagreements about Iran and Syria evident among the respondents, there was a high degree of agreement regarding support for coexistence between Sunnis and Shias and the overriding importance of domestic reforms compared to foreign policy.

Moving on

The international pushback that reversed Hariri’s sojourn in Riyadh demonstrated that Lebanon has an intrinsic value to Western countries that value its role as a buffer state that strives to preserve it tolerant, multi-confessional character in a very tough neighborhood, made more dangerous by Iran’s aggressive policies in the region. The zero sum game between Saudi Arabia and Iran can have no winners without dangerous and unprecedented instability throughout the region.

Even President Trump’s official recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel will only for a moment be a common cause among Sunnis and Shias. It only opens the door for Hezbollah to reassert its presence in the south and make menacing noises that may, though misjudgment and miscalculation by either party, lead to a catastrophe for Lebanon.

So the tension around the resignation and restoration, coupled with the US announcement on Jerusalem may only result in more instability in the near term, hopefully dissipating before the election season begins.

As the European Council on Foreign Relations noted in an article, “The collective memory of Lebanon’s own civil war and the buy-in of key political leaders to the current order still hold firm. But renewed political paralysis and associated economic shock – which could be made considerably worse if Riyadh tightens the financial noose – will feed intensified instability and the further hollowing out of the state.”

It further states that “These are precisely the conditions which will help Hezbollah reinforce its parallel, non-state ascendancy,” which may be worsened if the war of words about Jerusalem turns violent.

Lebanon’s hope in the run-up to the election is that “A broad-based government and legitimate parliament, even if it includes Hezbollah, still likely represent a better means of establishing some political counter-weight to the group’s dominance. It is also key to providing the governance services needed to maintain the semblance of a functioning state able to act as a legitimate alternative to Hezbollah.”

The Hariri episode is but the latest in the continuing and challenging efforts to rebuild Lebanon’s role in the region as a hub for intellectual, cultural, and economic progress.

 

The Saga Continues – Lebanon’s Stability Compromised by Regional Intrigues

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Since Michael Hudson penned his opus on Lebanon, “The Precarious Republic,” I have been addicted to looking behind the curtain to try and understand goings-on in that sliver of a country, endowed with incredible beauty, and multiples of people who claim it as home. The book was written in 1968, that’s 50 years ago, yet the core facts resonate today – Lebanon is a multi-sectarian home to affinity groups that lack a central defining identity as “Lebanese,” always adding a hyphen for their sect, tribe, or religion.

When I first went to Lebanon in the early 70s, this was apparent in the Palestinian, Armenian, Syrian, and other peoples one routinely met in the cabarets and alleyways of Beirut. The World Lebanese Cultural Union was pushing to have Lebanese abroad included in the political life of the country, and Israel routinely bombed “guerilla” havens to remind the country that it had an obligation to protect Israel’s border. Newspapers flourished, each subsidized by a regional power broker or a local one with enough money to literally give away their opinions. It was heady and crazy at the same time. The seeds sowed for Lebanon’s coming traumas were real, constant, and obvious to anyone who took the time to push past the reality show and ask “what’s next?”

Well, it’s show time…Lebanon is deep in crisis, with deepening domestic fault lines being exacerbated, as usual, by external actors who think that Lebanon is the school playground for beating on rival gangs.

The Prime Minister resigning as a “hard shock” to the nation; the Maronite Patriarch visiting the King of Saudi Arabia; Hezbollah’s Secretary-General appealing for calm; the President calling on the PM for clarity; and conspiracy theories and realpolitik crashing headlong into the Mediterranean, only to end up floating on the polluted shoreline. What are we to think, what are we to hope about resolving this latest mess before Lebanon is caught between the Iran-Syria-Hezbollah-Israel vise or the Saudi Arabia-Israel-Hezbollah-Iran conundrum?

First reality check, Security for Israel at any cost is not a sustainable security. While Hezbollah and Lebanon may be relatively easy to attack, the consequences to regional stability are quite complex. The resulting high number of civilian casualties, widespread destruction of infrastructure, and deterioration of the Lebanese central government’s authority will actually exacerbate threats to Israel’s security, further destabilize the region, and leave the main protagonists, Syria and Iran, backed by Russia, unscathed.

Israel may thunder all its wants at Lebanon for its legitimate as well as its contrived agenda, the bottom line is the same – Lebanon cannot change its internal reality, it is in an impossible situation. Hezbollah outguns the LAF but doesn’t want another civil war, since that would distract from its self-defined role as a defender of Lebanon’s territorial integrity. Israel’s war messages give Hezbollah greater credibility in the minds of the local Lebanese and Arab people.

Second reality check, Hezbollah has to decide, is its future in a multi-confessional Lebanon or is it truly an Iranian proxy that will allow hundreds, perhaps thousands of Shia and other Lebanese to die for Iran? The Saudi distemper towards Hezbollah corresponds to Hezbollah’s disregard for solidly endorsing a policy of disassociation from regional conflicts. It is time for the party of God to calculate where it should be placing its bets and realize that it has a very good deal in Lebanon but only if it is committed to the country’s independence and territorial integrity.

If war comes, the likely humanitarian crisis, which has already resulted in Lebanon hosting 1.5 million Syrian refugees in addition to the hundreds of thousands of Palestinians, Iraqis, and others in the country, will add large numbers of internally displaced Lebanese to the mix, resulting in a fragile state teetering on becoming a failed state…just what the region doesn’t need.