Challenging the Past in Rebuilding the North of Lebanon – Competing Visions

By many accounts, Tripoli was once on par with Beirut as a leader in commercial and economic activities. Dating back at least to the 14th century BCE, it has many historical and cultural sites, including the Citadel of Raymond de Saint-Gilles, the largest Crusader fortress in Lebanon and the  second largest amount of Mamluk architectural heritage on earth (behind Cairo).

It is now seeking to recapture its economic prominence. Several sources make note that “A Tripoli development plan called ‘Tripoli Vision 2020’ has been formulated and supported by a number of advisory councils including influential key government officials and prominent businessmen in the city. The goal of the project is to provide a comprehensive framework consisting of promoting investment, training, re-skilling, talent placement, and output promotion to reinvigorate the city’s economy.” A number of these projects are included in the Capital Investment Plan that garnered broad international donor support at the recent CEDRE conference in Paris.

Financing aside, there are many obstacles to promoting economic growth and delivery of essential services in the north of Lebanon. This blog will focus on two competing visions: that of Salafist militants who are a source of continued instability in the region, contrasted to the work of the NGO Levant Local www.levantlocal.com, which is pioneering work among youth to deliver social services to underserved and marginalized communities.

A recent article by the Carnegie Institute Middle East Center focused on Salafism in the region, defining it as a “Puritan Sunni religious movement advocating a return to the practices of the al-salaf al-salih, the companions and successors of the Prophet Muhammad.” The article points out that before the civil war and the rise of Hezbollah, Salafism was only marginally present in Lebanon among the Sunni communities, which make up some 90% of the population in Tripoli area.  According to the research presented, “it is apparent that, at its core, the rise of Salafi militancy in Lebanon stems from a sociopolitical revolt—one that originates in disaffected urban areas where the growth of Salafi groups has more to do with social dynamics than with any supposedly ideological appeal of extremism.”

In fact, individuals and groups studied appear to adopt Salafism to receive subsidies from outside funders, and use religious rhetoric to justify “Acts of violence that seem like Salafi militancy but rather align more with long-standing local traditions of social unrest; or providing a vocabulary and platform to contest local sociopolitical marginalization.”  If that is accurate, then the recent rise in Salafi militancy reflects local grievances, identity conflicts, and competing power networks. As with militants from Morocco to Iraq, seeing them only through a security perspective obscures options that may be effective in defusing tensions, reducing instability, and rebuilding communities.

Another critical factor throughout Lebanon, but quite visible in the north, is the economic marginalization of large parts of the Sunni population, where the gap between the privileged and the poor is quite significant. “In Tripoli, where Sunnis constitute the overwhelming majority of the population, 57% of the residents are poor—a far cry from the 28% national average. Yet what is of even more concern is the fast-growing urban segregation between the gated neighborhoods of the well-off, where basic services function, and the marginalized districts, where residents struggle with worsening insecurity, deteriorating infrastructure, poorly performing public schools, and high poverty rates.”

It is in communities that feel marginalized, deprived, and decoupled from the country’s power structure that the Salafists are making inroads, using Gulf money to open schools, run charities, fund orphanages, and help refugees in the absence of the state. And it is in this contested space that Levant Local is taking a stand, investing its resources, and working to make a difference.

The Carnegie study concludes with the statement that “A key priority for the Lebanese government should therefore be to design an ambitious nationwide plan aimed at reducing unemployment, mitigating the spread of the underground economy, developing infrastructure that provides public spaces and deals with overcrowding, and fixing a crumbling public school system. Only confidence in the state and in its capacity to assure the welfare of marginalized citizens will quash the thirst for a social revolt.”

Local efforts to support youth and marginalized

While the national Capital Investment Program and Vision 2020 move through the system, Levant Local is leveraging local resources and ambitions to promote safe spaces for young people by equipping them with knowledge and skills to combat extremism; and they are helping Syrian refugees acquire the tools to build the future Syria. What makes their approach vital? Think of the government as a top-down approach that has to move through the vagaries of the Lebanese political system, and Levant Local as a grassroots strategy. It is empowering young people, women, and local and community groups to develop solutions with limited resources without the numbing bureaucracy that constrains the operations of international NGOs and government agencies.

A few statistics comparing Northern Lebanon (NL) to the Bekaa Valley (BV) area highlight the scope of the challenge. There is 3 times the number of Lebanese in NL (791K to 275k), and it has 9 times the number of people living below the poverty line (608k vs 66k). Although both have a similar number of Syrian refugees (350k), many more Palestinian refugees live in NL (87k vs 6k). So how does NL deal with more than a million poor Lebanese and refugees when it has less political clout and access than other regions? It relies on the resilience of its people, the energy of its youth, and hopefully the wisdom of local leaders who understand that the future of Northern Lebanon rest on an inclusive, dynamic, and power-sharing formula that gives all Lebanese a chance to achieve their dreams.

For more details on how Levant Local works in North Lebanon, go here https://levantlocal.com/

 

 

International Donors Conference on the Sahel, Much Ado…Will It Make a Difference

 

According to a number of reports, more than 60 delegations and 14 partner countries gathered in Brussels last month to put meat on the bones of the G5 Sahel force set up in 2017 to enable Mali, Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad build their military capabilities to conduct anti-terrorism operations in their countries and along their borders. There were also discussions concerning the need for social and economic development to address underlying local issues that feed dissatisfaction and instability.

The meeting was co-hosted by the EU, the UN, the African Union (AU), and the G5 under the auspices of Nigerien President Mahamadou Issoufou. Pledges were made totaling some $509 million for the joint force’s operating budget. Issoufou pointed out that it would only support the first year’s operations and that subsequent annual budgets of $150 million would be needed. France also announced that it would increase its contributions to development and government assistance to the region to more than $1.5 billion over the next five years.

As a post in Euractiv explained, “The aim of the military force is to drive out terrorist groups, smugglers, and organized criminal gangs that are taking advantage of the weakness of the state in certain areas of the region. It is a critical region since poverty, climate change, and the collapse of the Libyan state have turned it into an ideal breeding ground for all sorts of smuggling and could also be a haven for Daesh fighters fleeing Syria.”

Given this complexity, among concerns expressed by several delegations were “There is also a risk that an overly securitized approach could squeeze out equally necessary work on governance, justice, and the protection of local populations,” according to ECFR coverage.

In order to address concerns regarding the appropriate use of the funding, the G5 has set up a fiduciary fund for donations, and the EU now has set up a “coordination hub” for channeling international donations to aggregated and disburse funds within the GF effort. Hopefully, this will “help alleviate the risk already posed by so many international actors intervening in the Sahel, ideally avoiding duplication of efforts and wasted investments,” the article noted.

Coordination of both military and development efforts poses a tricky balancing act for the EU and G5 countries as the EU wants the G5 with intimate local knowledge to play the lead role in developing the military interventions while ensuring that support and assistance are channeled to projects that will best benefit at-risk populations and not exacerbate discrimination against local groups.

Unfortunately, the military situation continues to deteriorate. Attacks by jihadist groups aimed at French and G5 forces, often abetted by locals, have increased; and security operations by the joint forces sometimes agitate local civilians and have created refugee situations in some cases. It has been mentioned that as G5 operations continue, “The tactical need to work with “friendly” local armed actors could end up further destabilizing local security arrangements in the name of combating terrorism.”

This makes it even more imperative that the EU Training Mission (EUTM) and security sector reform in the G5 countries proceed apace, that the rights of minorities are protected, and that development assistance is effectively targeted. As Federica Mogherini, High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs remarked, “This isn’t only about security but also about development. Because there can be no real conditions for security without social and economic development, such as opportunities for young people and women in the region.”

The Euractiv post listed that “France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the UK, the EU, the World Bank, the African Development Bank, and the UNDP have announced that the Sahel Alliance will collect a total of $7.4 billion to finance development projects for the next five years. These funds will go towards the 500 projects that will be set up in the countries of the G5 Sahel, and will be based on six main areas: employment for young people, rural development, food security, energy and climate, governance, decentralization, and access to basic services and security.”

Concerns with a balanced, coordinated strategy were also emphasized in a Devex post noting that Mogherini made the point that the EU had invested more than $9.8 billion in the Sahel in the past seven years. Yet, Friederike Röder, director of ONE France, was skeptical of the durability of the commitments. “It’s great to hear announcements for more investment into development in the Sahel, but we need to ensure that the primary objective of this funding is the eradication of extreme poverty and not controlling migration or military objectives,” she said.

Achieving positive results in the next few years will take more than infusions of money. Reliable coordination and collaboration across the spectrum of military and development programs can only be built on commitments to transparency, effective communications, transnational cooperation, and consensus that is a rare commodity in the region. With the Sahel still liable to increased infiltration by outside militants and jihadists, and the existing unstable political environment, it will take leadership that embodies a long-range vision of building states out of insecure territories based on tribal alliances.

ECFR Report Gives Mixed Grades on Counterterrorism Strategies to Morocco and Tunisia – Part 1

A recent study by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) illustrates the challenges of proposing approaches to terrorism prevention in other countries whose methods may at times conflict with Western values of due process, reflect local power dynamics that are unique to each country, and reflect how those governments view tradeoffs between short vs long-term efforts to combat terrorism.

Europe is increasingly concerned that the large numbers of foreign fighters returning from the Middle East to the Maghreb, particularly Tunisia and Morocco, will in time spill over to Europe creating much larger threats than previously encountered. “European countries have a strong interest in understanding security threats that emanate from North Africa, and in working with North African countries to address them,” according to the study. The study has several themes: the nature of security challenges in the Maghreb with attention to how they counter threats within their borders; the types and level of cooperation with the EU on countering terrorism; how each country is fighting terrorism given their unique societies and histories; and how their strategies impact the EU’s options for cooperation and collaboration.

While most of the analyses believe that Tunisia and Morocco are making important and successful efforts in their struggle with countering terrorism, “Nevertheless, the countries’ counter-terrorism strategies share a common shortcoming: both Morocco and Tunisia have prioritized the prevention of attacks and the disruption of terrorist cells, but have failed to pay sufficient attention to the legal and judicial framework for handling people detained on terrorism charges – or to the wide range of factors that contribute to radicalization.” This caveat has as much to do with the historical roots of notions of justice in both countries as well as structural and resource constraints faced in dealing with those groups at risk of radicalization.

The study calls for stronger cooperation and integration of efforts between the EU members and Morocco and Tunisia who “make up the front line in the EU’s efforts to establish zones of security on the southern shore of the Mediterranean.” It specifically mentions the need for “greater attention to areas such as the treatment of arrested suspects, socioeconomic factors that may contribute to radicalization, and the state’s broader relationship with communities that are disproportionately vulnerable to terrorist recruitment,” as critical priorities in terrorism prevention.

Tunisia – changing of the guard

Given the terrorist attacks in 2015 that exposed the weaknesses in Tunisia’s security platform, “With substantial foreign support, the Tunisian authorities responded to this moment of crisis by launching a program that restructured the security services and improved the country’s defenses against terrorism.”

On balance, the study gives the government high marks in that since 2014, it has markedly improved the army and internal security forces’ capabilities, training, equipment, and coordination.

“In 2015, the government launched the National Commission on Counter-Terrorism, which joined the National Security Council in developing the new, comprehensive strategy on counter-terrorism and extremism unveiled in 2016.” As the study points out, it bears “a strong resemblance to European models, this strategy centers on the four pillars of prevention, protection, prosecution, and response to attacks. Finally, in early 2017, Tunisia set up the National Intelligence Centre, an institution designed to overcome problems with coordination and information-sharing between intelligence agencies that had plagued the country’s counter-terrorism efforts since the revolution.”

These steps, plus the construction of barriers in a militarized zone bordering Libya and Algeria, along with enhanced surveillance and detection equipment, are key factors in the country’s upgraded capabilities. The report states that “Tunisia stands out among North African countries for its readiness to work with international partners on reforming and improving the capability of its security sector. European officials generally agree that Tunisia’s security services have considerably improved their capacity to prevent and respond to terrorist threats since 2015.”

On the other hand, it notes that, “Nevertheless, the overhaul of Tunisia’s security and counter-terrorism strategy and structures has failed to resolve some problems and even created a few new difficulties. The reform of the security services under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior has made little headway… as many officials continue to believe that police transparency and accountability would be an impediment to fighting terrorism.”

While Tunisia has sharpened its skills to prevent terrorist attacks, there still remain several concerns that must be addressed according to the report. First of all, the internal security services need to be reformed, especially reducing its immunity for violating human rights and arbitrary arrests and detention. “Using emergency powers, the security forces have carried out thousands of raids and house searches without judicial authorization, and placed dozens of people under assigned residence orders,” it states, calling for independent oversight of its operations.

Additional challenges include the economic impact of border closures with Libya, which severely restrict cross-border trade; and more importantly, the lack of a comprehensive government-wide strategy for dealing with radicalized individuals. Also of concern is the lack of intelligence on Tunisian diaspora in Europe, in sharp contrast with Morocco, which has significant interactions with its intelligence counterparts in Europe.

Among its conclusions regarding Tunisia, the study recommends, “In Tunisia, international partners should follow through on existing reform programs, encouraging further openness within the Ministry of the Interior to help the institution improve its cooperation with the country’s citizens. Greater professionalism within the security services would make it easier for European partners to share intelligence with Tunisia. European countries and the EU should also encourage and support Tunisia in developing programs to promote religious education and awareness, gearing them towards pupils and their families from an early age.”

In my next blog, I’ll look at the ECFR assessment of Morocco’s counter-terrorism capabilities and strategies.

The Way Forward – Counterterrorism Cooperation between Morocco and the EU – Part 2

In many ways, the headline Morocco: capabilities and deficiencies of a strong state sums up the section of the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) study on counterterrorism cooperation between the EU and Morocco and Tunisia. While it notes Morocco’s breadth of capabilities and its reputation as “a model of political stability, economic development, and regional integration in Africa and the Middle East,” the study goes on to say that “Morocco’s approach to counter-terrorism is inseparable from the state’s tight control over its domestic population and its undemocratic and unaccountable political system;” a harsh and only partially accurate rendering of Morocco today and its commitment to countering both domestic and international terrorism.

Morocco is supported by Europe and the US in building its CVE tactics and skills, and has initiated a number of programs, with international assistance, to diminish the economic drivers that support radicalization such as unemployment, wealth disparity, corruption, lack of transparency, and marginalization of rural and underserved urban populations. It has also taken on a broader role as co-chair of the Global Counterterrorism Forum.

While the study acknowledges Morocco’s success in thwarting plots internally, it expresses reservations that can be summed up as “at what cost?” Calling Morocco a “surveillance state,” it points out that both “domestically and abroad, Morocco has a proven track record of expertise in human and signals intelligence. Morocco operates as a tight and effective security state, working through an extensive network of security officials and informants that blankets the nation.”

It allows that “European officials have admitted that a number of attacks in Europe might have been prevented had domestic intelligence services been allowed to employ the kind of human intelligence network established in Morocco.” Some detail on these capabilities is instructive. Aside from a national network of some 50,000 locally-sited observers, called mqadmin, who report suspicious activities and personalities, there is a national coordinating center for combating terrorism, the Central Bureau of Judicial Investigation (BCIJ). While the mqadmin ”have an ambiguous status as both official and temporary public servants, a situation that is convenient for the authorities, which avoid accountability by keeping the mqadmin’s role and potential role unregulated, [they] have a reputation for involvement in corruption and human rights abuses.”

The BCIJ, on the other hand, has earned recognition for its effectiveness in breaking up cells of potential terrorists. Morocco is also expanding its work in signals intelligence with the assistance of its European partners, primarily France, the UK, and Germany. The study says that “The Moroccan authorities use a variety of pre-emptive digital surveillance techniques to identify and prosecute suspects, such as monitoring phone calls involving individuals on watch lists, and registering suspicious internet searches. In all, the Moroccan authorities are believed to use 19 human and digital platforms to monitor the population, including on the dark web.”

With these instruments and the new reconnaissance satellite launched in November 2017, Morocco has an integrated effort to counter terrorism, monitor movements on its borders and in the Western Sahara, and track migration in the open spaces of the Sahara and Sahel. An additional tool, dubbed Operation Hadar is also of great value. “The operation was designed to protect Morocco from terrorist infiltration using patrols of airports, train stations, and other transport hubs, as well enhanced border monitoring.” Initially deployed in large cities, it is now being extended throughout the country, the study notes.

The role of King Mohammed VI

As the study points out, “As commander of the faithful, the king retains overall religious authority in the country, enabling the central government to not only retain a measure of religious legitimacy but also to dictate which religious practices and interpretations are deemed acceptable – including those among the religious establishment.” Control of the religious establishment includes media distribution of approved religious texts and sermons, controlling the issuance of fatwas, and treating imams as public servants.

Other initiatives include Morocco’s pioneering work in involving women counselors, mourchidates, in communities and rural areas and the training of imams from Africa and Europe. Also, “Morocco has established a religious council for the Moroccan diaspora in Europe, aiming to assist host countries with religious education. Together with intelligence cooperation, Morocco’s religious training initiatives appear to be a form of security diplomacy designed to improve the country’s reach and international standing.”

While complimenting Morocco on its efforts, the study is concerned that “Indeed, counter-radicalization remains Morocco’s weak point. The fact that the security services have thwarted a high number of terrorist plots reflects their capacity to detect and prevent attacks, but it also indicates the extent to which many young men and women remain susceptible to extremist messaging. In an all too familiar pattern repeated across the world, the government points to the tactical successes of its counter-terrorism operations while downplaying the underlying conditions that necessitate these operations.”

The EU study finds that the government’s outreach to the EU and US for help in prison reform, rehabilitation, police corruption, and training medical staff to recognize signs of abuse are moves in the right direction. It recognizes that “Moroccan counter-terrorism cooperation with both European countries and the US is not only a security endeavor but also a crucial component of Rabat’s long-term efforts to strengthen economic and political ties with these countries. Morocco aims to minimize international outcry over the Western Sahara issue, encourage greater foreign investment and tourism, maintain access to Western military equipment and training, and promote Morocco’s integration into NATO’s strategic plans.”

The path to more effective collaboration must reconcile, according to the study, Morocco’s commitment to a robust CVE strategy firmly grounded in the Moroccan experience, which may or may not take into consideration concerns of its friends in the EU and US on such issues as human and civil rights, internal security and judicial reforms, and social and economic disparities among the population. Working through these issues of accountability and equitable development are as important to the EU as Morocco’s stress on security within stability in the short term. In this regard, the study overlooked two facts in Morocco’s efforts to reduce economic disparities: its national campaign to promote development in rural and marginalized communities, and its need to attract foreign investment to ensure a steady growth in employment opportunities. Facing these concerns as well as the challenges of returning militants from conflicts in the Middle East and elsewhere are the next chapter in this complex saga.

Building Resilient Communities to Combat Terrorism

Two recent publications tackle the issue of state fragility and policy choices for the US in addressing vulnerable countries and communities. An inaugural paper directed at the incoming administration, is a result of a joint project by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Center for a New American Security, and the United States Institute of Peace. It is aptly titled “U.S. Leadership and the Challenge of State Fragility,” and is co-authored by William J. Burns, Michele A. Flournoy, and Nancy E. Lindborg, all veterans of the US government, respectively at the State Department, Department of Defense, and USAID.  Additional Policy Briefs are already being published “to discuss the implications of fragility on existing U.S. tools, strategic interests, and challenges.”

The second is a series of blogs being published by the National Democratic Institute (NDI), which deals with “supporting democratic resilience to violent conflict.” Both efforts seek to focus conceptual and policy-making energy on lessons learned since our involvement in Afghanistan and how the US can avoid the pitfalls of what had been called “nation-building” and other efforts to promote democracy and governance in emerging political societies.

‘State Fragility’ poses four criteria for making policy choices: clearly articulating US priorities;  allocating limited expertise and resources;  and building on international support and and local capabilities for building resilience.  What is of particular interest is the assumption that those countries that are managing their affairs are less of a priority in this series because the failures of fragile states have a higher probability of destabilizing the country and surrounding nations.

In the MENA region, this means that more effective state actors such as Morocco will have to continue to expend high levels of energy and resources to combat extremist forces that seek to undermine its security, stability, and prosperity. Others working to implement a comprehensive CVE strategy, such as Tunisia, or those with a go-it-alone approach based on local sensibilities, i.e. Algeria, will have to rely primarily on its own capacity to continue the fight against radicals.

Protecting Democratic Gains

In this context, the NDI series aims directly at what we know will enable the path to democracy for those countries already committed to that mission. Although the pace of democratization may be too snail-like for some observers, there can be no doubt that the trend toward greater political accountability and local decision-making is becoming more prevalent in countries not in conflict in the MENA region.

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Why is this critical? As the NDI paper points out, “A key goal of democratization is peaceful politics. Political battles may be inevitable, but in stable democracies they are not waged by armed groups, but through institutions such as elections, parliaments, the media, and civil society organizations.”

Morocco, on the eve of its second parliamentary election since the new constitution was adopted in 2011, recognizes the crucial value of building political institutions resistant to political manipulations. The process has been and continues to be a lengthy one with several moving parts: local elections reflecting the regionalization policy of devolving more political decision-making to locally elected officials, a judiciary and election commission increasingly independent of the central government, a cabinet lead by the party that garners the largest number of votes, and greater freedom of appointments by the government rather than the palace, among other factors.

There are many studies that indicate that countries that mature into full democracies “have the lowest levels of violence towards their own citizens and are more peaceful neighbors than autocratic states.” Thus NDI engages countries that are evolving their democratic institutions, policies, and values.

Morocco is consolidating its democratic advances by empowering civil service organizations to act as advocates and service providers, pressing political parties to build constituencies based on policies and capable candidates, and prodding Parliament to take significant responsibilities for building an accountable process for debating and enacting legislation.

Tunisian faces as many internal as external challenges ranging from manipulations by traditional power centers to sustain the status quo,  parliament that struggles to move out of crisis mode, and rapidly evolving security services to combat internal and external threats.

As the NDI blog points out, its work is to build “conflict resilience at all of these levels – institutions, policies, and norms –  simultaneously, by promoting peaceful elections, bridging conflict divides, supporting effective post-conflict transitions, and ensuring citizen security and inclusive political processes.”

Through its programs in Morocco and Tunisia, NDI promotes the adoption of effective strategies that enable the country to evolve its democratic capabilities. In these efforts, NDI’s programs are strongly facilitated by King Mohammed’s commitment to enhancing the capacities of all members of Moroccan society to take up their full roles and responsibilities as citizens.

In Tunisia, democracy capacity-building is hampered by the need “to foster a more representative political environment where political parties compete effectively on behalf of citizens’ interests, parliament conducts responsive legislating and oversight, and civil society plays an active role in overseeing the political process,” efforts which require a degree of internal stability which is still evolving.

The MENA region needs success stories to encourage citizens to press for needed reforms rather than opting out of politics as usual or turning to more militant alternatives. It is in America’s interests to consistently and sustainable support its friends.

 

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Women can Play a Critical Role in Combating Terrorism

Women should be encouraged to take a greater role in counterterrorism efforts as women and girls are disproportionately affected by terrorist violence. This was the message brought home in a speech by Sarah Sewall, Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights at a recent gathering. She was speaking about the critical importance of including countering violent extremism (CVE) in the agenda for Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) programs that exist in many countries.

As Sewall noted, “In too many areas around the world, violent extremists threaten generations of hard-won progress for women and vulnerable minorities. To defend that progress – and to prevent a reversion of what Secretary Kerry calls ’medieval thinking’ – we must defeat violent extremism.”

She pointed to the grim reality that while military force is effective in defeating terrorists, “it cannot defeat terrorism.” The Under Secretary called for increased funding to strengthen the capacity of “local voices of tolerance and inclusion.” Sewall was concerned with the ability of military power to diminish “underlying grievances” that lead to growing extremist threats.

Women voices raised for peace.  peacewomen.org

Women voices raised for peace.
peacewomen.org

The role of WPS actors globally, including efforts by the private sector, foundations, and NGOs, is crucial to addressing marginalized and at-risk communities. Threats from extremists have become so transnational that Sewall believes “we cannot reduce extremist violence without women.”

In this regard, she made specific reference to an initiative in Morocco. “In Morocco, we’ll help women’s groups speak out against violent ideologies. And in the Morocco program, it’s not just inclusion as process. We’ll make sure that women are not only included in trainings but also the substance, for example by ensuring that trainings include a focus on the specific factors that can drive women to terrorist groups. We’ll be sure that women are included in our baseline data, analysis, and metrics to evaluate impact. We’re hopeful this North Africa pilot will lead to best practices as we mainstream gender in our CVE programming.”

This initiative and others like it, included the well-regarded training of imams, both Moroccan and foreign, and women and men religious counselors, brings together a whole society solution to attacking the spread of terrorist ideology. The Under Secretary was quite blunt in her assessment of the challenges ahead.

“Violent extremists threaten everything the women’s community has worked to achieve. So let’s work together on behalf of this fundamental truth – defeating violent extremism is essential to women’s empowerment, and women’s empowerment is fundamental to defeating violent extremism.”

Recognizing the Threat of Women Terrorists

The recent arrests in the so-called “Notre Dame plot,” an attack this past week against a police station in Mombasa, Kenya, and the increasing numbers of women identified as “warriors” on radical websites increasingly challenge counterterrorism officials to forge effective countermeasures.

In Paris, the latest information is that it was a Paris train station, not Notre Dame, that was  the target. The four women charged with terrorism have been on the watch lists of the French government and were apprehended quickly when the owner of the car containing the gas cylinders was identified as the father of one of the women arrested. The four have been hailed as warriors by various jihadi websites.

In the Kenya attack, Reuters reported “that three women wearing hijabs snuck into a police station under the pretext of reporting a stolen phone, then stabbed a local officer and set fire to the building with a petrol bomb before all the three were shot dead.” The attack could have been much worse, as Kenyan authorities also recovered an unexploded suicide vest, two bullet-proof jackets, and an unused petrol bomb from the dead suspects. It is suspected that women are directed more toward suicide attacks because those do not require the same rigorous military-level skills and training available to men. This chilling reality, reminiscent of women resistance fighters in the Algerian war for independence and female bombers (mostly brain-washed girls) used by Boko Haram and the Viet Cong (separated by 60 years, yet still a potent reality), is reflected in several articles in The Independent, which further reinforce heightened concerns with women terrorist cells. Based on existing research, women are taking a much more visible role in attacks against civilian and military targets because their physical appearance is perceived as less threatening. This leads to the UK experience that, according to recent data, more women were arrested on terrorism charges year-on-year from 2014 to 2015.

Under Secretary Sewall called on WPS organizations around the world to take a leadership role in integrating CVE into their programs. She stressed that “In high policy discussion and advocacy, in field work and programming, in mentorship and capacity-building – there are countless opportunities for the WPS community to advance its central objective through CVE. CVE needs your help – your issue advocacy, your expertise, your sustained engagement on this agenda.” It is a call to action that underscores the centrality of women in promoting security and stability.

Security in the Sahara Not a Shell Game

Threat not Overstated; Remedies Require “Losing Old Paradigms”

Contradictions are not rare in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region when it comes to politics and diplomacy. This is particularly evident in the continuing efforts to resolve the Western Sahara conflict. While all of the parties voice concern over the lack of a resolution, most, namely the Polisario and Algeria, are unwilling to offer credible options for how to do so, essential for regional cooperation needed to address extremist threats emanating from ungoverned spaces and, unsurprisingly, a lack of regional coordination.

The stalemated negotiations atrophying in the UN Secretary General’s office have underscored these concerns about how this situation impacts regional security and yet have offered little in the way of realistic options for resolving the conflict.

From the UN perspective, one needs look no further than the UN Secretary General’s report on his trip to the region. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon noted “The frustrations I witnessed among Western Saharans, coupled with the expansion of criminal and extremists’ networks in the Sahel-Sahara region, present increased risks for the stability and security of all the countries of this region. A settlement of the Western Sahara conflict would mitigate these potential risks and promote regional cooperation in the face of common threats and regional integration to bolster economic opportunity.” And yet, rather than use the security imperative to spur action towards a resolution, Ban Ki-Moon’s actions prior to the report put a negotiated political compromise further out of reach.

The Security Council’s response has been to once again reiterate the importance of working with the parties on a negotiated political settlement. One can only hope that the future of the UN’s presence in the territory will move forward toward a realistic settlement that would not rely on dead initiatives like a referendum, but engage in discussions built on achievable solutions. Only then will the region be able to revive some sort of effective security coordination among all the state actions.

This has yet to be realized despite clear deterioration of security in the Sahel-Sahara region, largely because of ongoing regional rivalries and the antiquated thinking of Algeria and the Polisario. As Professor Mohammed Benhammou, President of the Moroccan Center for Strategic Studies, noted in recent article, “Regrettably, in the Maghreb the conditions for cooperation do not always exist due to antiquated thinking, particularly over the Sahara. The closed border between Morocco and Algeria has impacted most regional relationships. For example, Tunisia, Libya, and Mali are forced to develop security strategies with both countries separately at the expense of a more effective coordinated regional strategy.”

Some of the challenges to developing such a regional strategy, particularly with regard to Algeria’s role, are outlined in a recent article in the Sada Journal about the reconstitution of Algeria’s security forces. As the author indicates, the restructuring of the security services (DRS) over the past two years, designed at least in part to improve counterterrorism capabilities, has done little more than eliminate a competing power center to the presidency.

Another part of the current strategy – highly visible counterterrorism operations to “rebuild popular confidence in the Algerian military’s ability to maintain public security,” thereby, “sending a message to France, its neighbors in the Sahel, and other countries interested in regional security that Algeria is still the dominant player,” also rings hollow given Algeria’s increasing difficulty in securing its own borders. Not to mention when one considers the failure of Algerian regional initiatives such as the Joint Military Staff Committee (CEMOC), which purported to be a regional security mechanism that was convened without Morocco, largely because of the dispute over the Sahara issue.

This is hardly a recipe for effectiveness and conflict resolution. Unless the old paradigms dissipate in order to activate true regional security cooperation including all stakeholders, Ban Ki-moon’s fears will become even more tangible and immediate.

 

 

 

The Best Intentions Do Not Always Make Great Policy

To Fix Its Middle East Policy, US Must Support Assets while Confronting Challenges

If you think the label “silly season” only describes tsunamis whirling around the national elections, you’re missing an important contest among US think tanks to frame policy options for the next administration. What’s interesting about the exercise is that it doesn’t matter who wins, since the same realities, domestic and foreign, face whoever is elected.

Options and solutions proposed by think tanks, in any case, reflect their particular points of view, priorities, and insights into what the previous administration has done right or wrong, or didn’t pay enough attention to, or ignored at America’s peril. And this is especially clear with countries where our interests diverge, such as China, and more intriguing with those countries where the US has shared interests, such as the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). What is also clear from past administrations is that the MENA region is where good intentions regarding countries from Morocco to Iraq often fail to deliver consistently sound and actionable policies.

The Center for a New American Security (CNAS) recently launched its foray into this tangle of good intentions with the analysis, “Reset, Negotiate, Institutionalize – A Phased Middle East Strategy for the Next President.” It is well-reasoned and documented, enumerates feasible steps, and clearly focuses on protecting what remains of America’s alliances in the region without jeopardizing our ability to adapt to changing circumstances.

That said, whether it’s CNAS, SAIS, CSIS, AEI, CEIP, or any other of the more than 100 foreign policy think tanks in Washington, DC, almost any position on an issue can be found. For example, the recent GCC Heads of State meeting generated pro and anti Saudi Arabia and pro and anti Iran articles, providing support for obviously opposing views, all reflecting someone’s definitions of America’s national interests in the region.

And then there is the question of priorities – when will Morocco, for example, receive the same attention as the UAE or Qatar? All are allies and have important regional roles to play in promoting stability and security, yet it seems that unless  a country or a region is in triage, it has to speak up loudly and visibly to be heard.

Secretary Kerry Greets King Mohammed VI

Secretary Kerry Greets King Mohammed VI

Morocco is an excellent case in point. The only mention of Morocco in the CNAS report is as the host for the talks to constitute a government in Libya. Absent from the only map in the report is everything west of the Levant. No mention is made of the growing threats to North Africa, and Morocco in particular, from Daesh and other extremists, nor is there any commentary on the flow of fighters from the region to the Syria-Iraq war zones and back.

Yet Morocco has steadfastly support America’s interests throughout the region, and for this, Daesh has issued numerous threats against the country. Morocco plays a key role in Jerusalem through King Mohammed VI’s role as head of the Jerusalem Committee. It also has the most robust security service cooperating with the EU and the US in combating terrorists who have already caused great damage to Europe’s sense of equanimity and attitudes towards immigrants fleeing combat zones.

Morocco recently became co-chair of the Global Counterterrorism Forum, and the country’s special counterterrorism bureau recently intercepted jihadists intent on bringing chemical weapons into Europe through Morocco. What more can be asked of our ally? If the report is an example, without being more proactive, the US is in danger of a growing breach with our friends.

It is in this context that King Mohammed spoke out at the recent GCC-Morocco Summit about the impact of not respecting old and tested friendships. “There have been new alliances which may lead to disunity and a reshuffling of roles and functions in the region. In fact, these are attempts to foment strife and create chaos, and no country would be spared. It could have serious consequences for the region, even the world at large.”

The king then went on to detail how Morocco was diversifying its “partnerships at political, strategic and economic levels,” to include Russia, China, and India. He believes that the GCC and Morocco and Jordan “Are facing conspiracies which seek to undermine our collective security. They want to destabilize the few countries which have managed to safeguard their security, stability and political systems.”

So when think tanks look at the MENA region, it may be more impactful to think beyond conflicts in the Levant and Gulf to also address threats to America’s interests at the other end of the Mediterranean. For example, the CNAS report recommends that as a first step, the next president make a trip “focused on America’s closest regional partners,” starting with the Levant and the Gulf, “and possibly Egypt,” clearly aimed at damping down instability in Iraq and Syria.

Yet the conflict and chaos that drive these priorities are inexorably moving across the region and will metastasize if not confronted with a robust US and EU led strategy in partnership with friends like Morocco.

Progress Requires Empowering Youth, Not Deriding Them

Need to rethink assumptions about Arab work ethic

Jessica Ashooh, deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Strategy Task Force, took aim at several of the comments about Arab youth made by President Obama in his now famous interview in The Atlantic. While decrying the overall dismal state of the political life in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), the president remarked that Arabs, frankly, weren’t up to par with their counterparts in Southeast Asia, which, he said, “is filled with striving, ambitious, energetic people who are every single day scratching and clawing to build businesses and get education and find jobs and build infrastructure.”

The president is, of course, entitled to his opinions. But given his stature, these somehow get translated into truth, which, in this case, supports stereotypes that disparage a generation of Arab youth, who are similarly engaged in a significant struggle to build value, create jobs, and improve their quality of life. This feeds into the common misperception that somehow “Arabs” do not share American interests in the MENA region.

Yet time and time again, from the high level of joint military cooperation such as the annual African Lion exercises to the multitude of education, training, capacity-building, and entrepreneurship projects the US supports though economic assistance funding, we indeed find significant alignment with our friends, such as Morocco, in the region. Despite the fact that being a “friend of America” entitles you to be on the ISIS/ISIL/Daesh hit list, we find youth throughout the Arab world actively engaged in challenging the status quo and building quality life options.

Contrast what the president had to say with a recent World Bank blog posting. “As you walk through the ancient market in Fes or that of any other medina in Morocco, pass a vibrant hair salon in downtown Casablanca with the feel of a beauty mega-factory, or see young people on a street corner in Rabat waiting to be picked up for a day job in construction, you cannot but be impressed with the entrepreneurial spirit on display. The young people hard at work across the country are part of a huge army of Moroccan youth, many of whom have less than secondary school degrees, stuck  in the informal sector with limited opportunities for a good, steady income.”

women cashiers WBThroughout Morocco, which is emblematic of the vast majority of Arab youth, young people are striving to find the means to acquire skills, financing, teams, and markets that will change their futures for the better.  As Ashooh writes, “Beyond the noise of the ISIS horror show, young Arabs are seeking education and starting companies at record levels, using technology to improve not only their personal prospects but also their societies.”

Morocco provides a multitude of examples of start-ups that are nurtured in facilities and labs with resources that support entrepreneurial teams of men and women working in collaboration to redefine how technology can benefit sectors from small-hold farms to mature information systems. Combined with the country’s dedication to renewable energy and improved health services, opportunities for enhancing quality of life are increasing daily.

The government senses that it has a key role to play but, rather than regulate how entrepreneurism should evolve, instead is listening to the youth and their allies in the private sector to encourage and abet an entrepreneurial eco-system. With increased access to early and second stage financing, business fairs to demonstrate new applications and technologies, and increased attention from private investors, youth are reaching for opportunities that simply did not exist even five years ago.

And while developing and using technology require a defined skill set, there are many other technologies that can be applied by those with a less formal education in areas such as agriculture, hospitality services, small-scale energy, home and health care, and artisanal crafts. These latent skills are accessible to previously illiterate village women, poorly educated rural youth, and those enmeshed in the informal economy. It is about options; it is about change. Remarkably, women make up some 35% of the start-ups in Morocco, 10 times the ratio of women-led tech startups in the US.

So if President Obama wants to see what the majority of MENA youth are focusing on, he should visit one of the dozens of tech fairs held each year in Morocco; or visit incubators that are borne of university-private sector partnerships. He should listen to the aspirations of those who every day are striving to make a difference in their lives and their communities.

A Competition of Successful Student Initiatives for Countering Violent Extremism Previewed at State Department Showcase

The “Peer 2 Peer (P2P): Challenging Extremism” project, launched in spring 2015, is based on the premise that empowering student “experts” in reaching their peers was a critical strategy in efforts to combat extremist propaganda. The idea was simple – create a competition in which “Teams were tasked with developing campaigns and social media strategies against extremism that were credible, authentic, and believable to their peers and resonated within their communities,” according to the program brochure. Last week we saw the results of the second P2P competition.

Who better to build this program than EdVenture Partners (EVP), which has been developing innovative industry-education partnership programs for more than 26 years? Their programs provide students with hands-on experience in finding solutions to real-world challenges. In fact, it was EVP that developed the “Brand Morocco” competition, which brought together schools in North America and Morocco to design marketing campaigns aimed at US companies to promote key sectors in Morocco.

As the danger of extremists manipulating social media to attract youth and the vulnerable has become a major concern of governments and NGOs, the need for a multifaceted counter-narrative became apparent. EVP, with its network of more than 800 schools, worked with several US government agencies to shape the P2P campaign, and it has been growing exponentially, attracting high visibility corporate partners such as Facebook. This year, teams from 45 universities in 17 different countries participated; the target for next semester is more than 100 universities in up to 40 countries.

How it Works

Working with their professors, student teams immerse themselves in the project casebook that is full of details on how to proceed, information on the project’s objectives, and the anticipated end product. The teams then undertake research to define and better understand their target market and build a social media strategy to reach out and influence their peers.

Students receive a budget to produce an actual campaign, implement it, and measure the initial results – all within one semester. A key criterion is that the campaign can be duplicated and utilized elsewhere, so sustainability and scalability are critical.

The fall 2015 finalists were: Lahore University of Management Sciences, Lahore, Pakistan; the US Military Academy at West Point, New York; and the Università della Svizzera italiana in Lugano, Switzerland. Honorable mentions included Alfaisal University in Saudi Arabia; New York University; Rochester Institute of Technology; University College London in the UK; University of California, Los Angeles; the University of Cincinnati; and the University of New Mexico.

And the Winners Are!

The team from Lahore won first prize on the back of their FATE campaign. FATE is short for “From Apathy to Empathy,” focusing on the dangers of people become inured to violence when it is so overwhelming and part of their daily lives. Using their own country as the baseline, the students outlined the dangers of apathy across several dimensions, including weakening of religious tolerance, lack of awareness of options to counter violence in their communities, and the dehumanization of victims, who are treated as numbers.

The work they undertook was incredibly diverse and demanding: focus groups, media advertising, outreach to local schools and universities in Pakistan and the region, engaging experts, and mobilizing social media. You can check out their Facebook link at https://www.facebook.com/fromapathytoempathy/ for more details and descriptions of their outcomes to date. They also developed several hashtags, including #challengeextremism – which is a virtual poster campaign — and #notjustanumber – aimed at students. An arts component has also been developed along with partnership with NGOs and other universities. With close to a half a million impressions on Facebook, reaching 380,000 people with close to 15,000 likes, they are off to a tremendous start.

The team of cadets from West Point, who came in second, had an innovative approach to reaching out to the target populations – attract them directly through social media using #Let’sTalkJihad. The campaign creates a home where young, restless, and searching youth can find out more about Islam, what’s going on with others in their demographic, and be exposed to scholars and advocates and peers who can relate to them across a range of topics and interests. Their website, http://www.letstalkjihad.com/, guides the viewer through several options for discussion, discovery, and contemplation, giving them resources and contacts to enable them to talk about what’s on their mind, in several languages, for Muslims and non-Muslims alike.

Their presentation was quite polished, with anecdotes about the responses they are getting across the country, from “impressionable, at-risk youth” who access social media and the internet in search of answers. The target populations of Muslims and others who are in the middle — that is, neither totally disengaged nor already committed to the message of militant jihad — have been responding. They are being funneled to the website, which is creating a sense of community for young people to explore, ask, and learn from credible sources. In the few months since the site went active on Facebook, there have been 836,000 content views.

A very different approach was taken by the third-place finishers from Switzerland. They believe that if people are sensitized to the importance of preserving cultural heritage, they can be mobilized to protect endangered sites and artifacts. So their campaign, Faces4Heritage, www.faces4heritage.org, targets the one billion annual transnational tourists through various social media, to influence their perspectives and attract them to support initiatives to build peace through preservation.

The team found a ready ally in UNESCO, and they are partners in promoting protection and conservation of heritage sites. An innovative logo, which is half of an artifact that depicts a face, invites the reader to place their face in the other half of the logo – inspiring the message of “Faces for Heritage.” Pointing out that heritage is a major part of our identity, their goal is to engage travelers, tourism professionals, and heritage leaders to denounce destruction of heritage sites. The campaign is also on Facebook and Twitter and is being supported by tourism associations, museums, public institutions, Wikipedia, cultural events, universities, and NGOs. They have developed an online course that is already heavily subscribed. To date, they have had 680,000 visitors on Facebook for 1.6 million impressions, and 575,000 Tweets to their hashtags.

Tony Sgro, founder of EVP, sees these projects, and the dozens more that were submitted, as significant proof of concept for the P2P program. “The results clearly show that using social media is a powerful tool to mobilize youth everywhere in the world, against extremism. The creativity, imagination, discipline, and passion behind these campaigns indicate how powerful this mobilization can be. Our goal of doubling the number of schools next semester and even more growth after will enable P2P to become a significant non-violent alternative to the extremists’ message of hate.”

Judges for the finalists’ round of the competition were four government officials working in the fields of counterterrorism and public diplomacy, as well as Monika Bickert, Head of Product Policy at Facebook, and Jessica Stern of Boston’ University’s Pardee School of Global Studies. One fun anecdote – most of the finalists from overseas had never been to the US before so they were treated to a White House tour. As they were going through the halls, President Obama and Vice President Biden stopped and said hello. Selfies and smiles all around!