National Values and Nation-Building – Out of Sync Concepts?

There have been several papers lately on issues such as governance, democracy, national values, citizenship, and related topics, mostly analyzing the disruptions in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Some astute observers have noted that we have similar concerns in the United States given the fault lines that became more obvious as a result of the 2016 presidential elections. The common thread is that political societies are constantly evolving, and technology is providing the means to accelerate and mobilize forces for change that are challenging how people are governed. The notion of “consent of the governed” is altering notions of the relationship between a government and the people.

In this blog, I want to look at “civic education,” the process by which citizens become acculturated to a country’s values and its political system. 

I first became conscious of the importance of civic education in my eighth grade “civics” class, as it was then called, which looked at the United States and how it pursued its interests at home and abroad. There was no discussion about the correctness of the national values on which these interests were based. It was assumed that our values were the best model for any country to emulate. This experience focused my interest on wanting to make the US better understood in the world by engaging in programs that facilitated cross-cultural dialogue. As a son of immigrants, the US for our family was and still is something unique and full of promise. That hasn’t changed in the following 50+ years, and neither has the need for America having an open discussion about its priorities and interests.

Definitions of civic education have common elements. A recent paper by CSIS says “Civic education in schools and beyond teaches citizens how to vote, what their community needs are and what values it holds, and what the social compact between elected officials and their constituents means in practical terms.” A study of civic education in the Arab world conducted by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace listed these characteristics, “This education for citizenship has three main components: knowledge of civic concepts, systems, and processes of civic life, including education for human rights and democracy; skills of civic participation; and students’ general disposition, including a sense of belonging to the state and shared values and ethics.”

The Arab Spring has challenged the notions of citizenship from a top-down perspective as young people and others feeling marginalized threw down the gauntlet to redefine their country’s social contract between the government and citizens, demanding accountability, economic opportunity, transparency, and political inclusion. How this still rings true today, with even more urgency, is underscored in a joint paper from the Atlantic Council and Brookings Institution as part of the Middle East Strategy Taskforce series. The paper, “Real security: Governance and stability in the Arab world,” argued, among other points, that governance was in the process of being redefined and the core issue was one of restoring social trust through dialogue and resolving conflicts at all levels.

One of the key elements raised by several of the panelists is that the process of reconstructing the social contract to achieve sustainable governance is a decentralized, bottom up approach based on local sensibilities and priorities. This means investing in civil society, civic education, and building out the political space for decision-making by local officials.

There are programs that can be helpful. NGOs such as Civitas and Street Law, enable young people and communities to proactively learn how democracy works, the roles of government and citizen, major influences shaping a country’s civic values, and many other topics. The CSIS article is clear that programs that work in one country will not necessarily work in another – an important caveat for those who think that democracy and governance programs can be implemented without thorough consideration of local sensibilities.

It also notes that what is critical in states going through transitions, whether through elections or post-conflict, is “rebuilding trust in the government and educating the voter base on what to expect…Civic education combats disillusionment among voters and opens a dialogue between government officials and citizens.” The importance of building trust with youth cannot be overstated, as they have “unprecedented access to information” but very low rates of participation in their countries’ political space, which is monopolized by traditional players.

Easy to be deceived by data.  fairobserver.com

Easy to be deceived by data.
fairobserver.com

The National Democratic Institute recently published a blog on the potential negative impact of social media on democracy. It builds on this point with the observation that “Social media and the Internet have had a drastic effect on the surprise results of yesterday’s election in the United States, driving the spread of information—and misinformation—at times bringing voters together and, perhaps more often, pushing them apart….It’s important to recognize that this is not a uniquely American trend.” A study  across 26 countries indicates that more than half of Internet users use social media as a primary source of news, and more than 25% call it their main news source. Percentages may be even higher in developing countries with high Internet penetration.

The long-term challenge is to protect the government-citizen interaction from malicious and misleading attacks from external and internal foes. As NDI points out “Creating and protecting safe platforms on the web for genuine political discourse will require collaboration among a host of actors. Governments, technology companies, media outlets, the academic community and organizations around the world must come together to develop policies and practices to aid civil society and citizens in addressing this problem, and build norms and standards for democratic governments to support an open Internet.”

Protecting this valuable suite of tools for promoting democratic values in the coming years will require significant efforts to shield political discourse from those who would damage a country’s transition to a stronger national consensus on its key values. The need for inclusive dialog for countries in transition can have no better starting point than a refresher course on a country’s national values and social contract.

 

Large image:Flickr.com

What is “Inclusive” Democracy?

And what are a country’s national values?

Much of the commentary following the recent US presidential election is about if and how “American values” will be defended and promoted by the next administration. Potential appointments, speeches, and interviews of President-elect Trump and his surrogates are parsed to speculate about priorities and possible actions that may or may not become emblematic of the new administration. Yet aside from generalized nods towards “making America great again,” there does not seem to be a coherent definition of which values are most salient at this time and under what circumstances.

Some would argue that values are enduring, not situational. Yet the relevance of specific values to what one believes is right and actionable is not always clear, particularly when there is confusion about the transactional nature (this for that) that characterizes most global political exchanges. As we look  at the results of these elections, we can’t help but question which “American values” will be most important to President Trump as he takes office and begins to steer his agenda through Congress and has to deal with groups of engaged citizens.

A recent article on the emerging Trump policies noted the importance of interests in framing how values are expressed to the world at large. There is often confusion between interests and values, the former situational and subject to negotiation, while the latter are supposedly existential and often more enduring than interests. But that distinction doesn’t explain how values become honored within a culture, how they are acquired, and how they evolve or not over time.

In the US, we have several foundational documents that characterize American values: life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness, equality, and justice for all, to list the more obvious. Over several hundred years, these have evolved into notions of democracy, human rights, equality before the law, defense of the homeland, and peaceful relations with other nations, among others that most Americans, at least conceptually, would agree on.

image: Tipperary Republican

image: Tipperary Republican

This is not the case in most of the developing world where constitutions are sometimes treated as ephemeral statements that reflect political conditions at the time of independence including, prevailing political centers in the regime, strong cultural mores, and dominant themes such as anti-colonialism, third-world solidarity, and the language of rights espoused by the UN. As countries in the MENA and Africa move through post-independence to more robust political systems, they face the challenge of defining their national values anew, promoting their adoption within an adaptable framework, and sustaining relevance to governments and citizens alike.  This is especially difficult as subgroups within the country start to differentiate their unmet aspirations from the prevailing narrative associated with the national identity.

Ultimately, the central question is how countries can adopt core values that are resilient over time and accepted by the vast majority of citizens. These shared values are at the heart of a country’s social contract that embodies the mutual obligations of the leadership and the people. And it is the erosion of these basic ties that are at the heart of the current contradictions in forming a “more perfect union.” The Arab Spring as well as the wave of populism in Latin America and Africa are both reactionary in terms of dissatisfaction with the status quo, and proactive as people seek to find a responsive, inclusive, transparent national political culture.

Part of the problem is that in many countries, the depiction of national values at the time of independence has come under criticism as either having been imposed by elites who drove independence, borrowed from regional and international organizations (think the AU and UN for example), or come about through consensus building among various groups, which often includes resolving conflicts and expanding definitions of nationality, while excluding others.

The current unrest in these countries in transition reflects the nexus of two currents: the need of citizens to articulate their own narratives abetted by technology, and the mistrust that divides rulers and citizens as the original social contracts have lost their relevance and binding power. In the case of the US or anywhere else, the issue of how values are formed and sustained continues to be relevant as technology and external influences are redefining what matters in building national cohesion in a country.

In my next blog, I will look further into what tools can be useful in this emerging definition of “nation-building” and national values.

 

Featured image from the Immigrant Welcome Center

 

So What about Tunisia?

Government Faces Legacy and Aspirational Challenges

Perhaps it was too much to expect, that Tunisia could overturn a decades long autocratic state, create inclusive political space and a responsive and inclusive economic strategy, and fight off external security threats, all in ten years. Regardless, one thing is clear, the majority of Tunisians are committed to peeling back years of political and economic decay and restructuring their society to be more inclusive and equitable, but how?

There are many analyses of where Tunisia is headed – it even comes up during US wine tastings of Tunisia’s finest (another one of those pesky Muslim countries that grows and enjoys wine!). And there is consensus on the key issues, but the how to get there and who will have to make the sacrifices engender a great deal of debate.

As I noted in my recent blog on Morocco, forming a national strategy is a bit easier when you have a king who reminds his citizens about their obligations towards each other and responsibilities within the context of government serving the people. Yet, even King Mohammed VI has expressed frustration with officials and cultural luddites that see the past as the only guide to the future. And he is giving the Parliament, civil society organizations, and NGOs plenty of space to figure out how democracy will work in Morocco and the burdens of not delivering.

So it is with Tunisia. Everyone is rooting for its success, but it is still fighting past demons of inequitable political and economic empowerment, structural discrimination against women and youth, entrenched elite power networks, and lack of robust economic growth to generate badly needed employment. Among the recent reports of note was published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace authored by Maha Yahya, after extensive research in the country. The report came out before the most recent government shake-up so it is useful to compare the recommendations in the report with the latest policies espoused by the government.

The major concern expressed in the report was the “The spreading disillusionment and alienation of large swaths of Tunisia society and their burgeoning misgivings about their prospects for a democratic and stable future.” Both the political and economic spheres are characterized as out of touch with young people, beholden to elites tied to the old regime, not rigorous in developing inclusive strategies to promote prosperity in the inland areas, and lacking long-term strategies to ensure equitable participation in the political and economic life of the country.

Relying on various polling data, Ms. Yahya points out that in 2014, 50% of Tunisians point to corruption, especially in the health services and police, as widespread, and close to 70% believe that the government is not proactive in combating corruption.

Similarly, it is not surprising that 80% of those 35-49 believe that strong economic growth should be the country’s first priority. Less than 9% of rural youth and 31% of urban youth expressed any confidence in the political system, while more than 80% believe that their local imam and religious organizations are credible. This has serious consequences. “In the 2014 elections 80% of 18-24 year olds did not vote in the parliamentary elections and largely abstained from the presidential election.”

As Nabil Fahmy, former Foreign Minister of Egypt recently noted, “Domestic social and sectarian grievances are still very much a part of Tunisian politics. The Tunisian government must tread carefully, and it cannot assume that all of its citizens are satisfied with the new arrangements.”

Recommendations

The primary recommendation made in the Carnegie study is that “Tunisian political elites need to rebuild the bonds of trust between the citizens and their state, strengthen democratic institutions, and uphold the principles of equity and social justice enshrined in the constitution.”

Voters waiting their turn. cartercenter.org

Voters waiting their turn. cartercenter.org

Regardless of the overarching concern with border security and counterterrorism, the country needs to continue to build on the 2012 National Council of Social Dialogue to build “a common platform for dialogue on basic principles among political parties, civil society organizations, and the private sector, and for reflecting the basic concerns of Tunisian citizens.”

The government has committed to far-ranging economic and political reforms, which need to be defined and sequenced with special attention to addressing regional disparities. An innovation in the MENA that definitely has applications throughout the region is the country-wide use of technology to link state and citizen. While Jordan and others have instituted some e-government programs to promote transparency and communications, the Tunisian goal is more robust and has the potential to generate effective bridges between youth and decision-makers.

It was recently pointed out by a former government minister that the country is moving to equip its people with 21st century technology, for example, promising internet access throughout the country by 2020, but the government is narrowly focused on issued defined in the 20th century using laws and institutions based on 19th century or before models…not, he fears, the most effective equation for success.

Some hard facts…the global economy is undergoing traumatic transitions wherein two-thirds of many jobs will disappear, reflecting increased computer-driven capabilities; and all countries are searching for strategies to prepare market-relevant workers. Put building walls and threatening companies aside. The disruption of digital technologies is here to stay. Some countries will remain competitive with human capital as long as the costs are competitive with new technologies, and that won’t last long.

The former minister suggests three points of impact on countries. First, the widespread availability of Internet, either as a government policy or as a result of market forces, will diminish the isolation of rural areas and forge bonds for mobilization and action that can be used for many purposes. Secondly, digital education will provide equality of access not only within a country but to the world of global classrooms, changing the way we value and accredit education and skills acquisition. National education policies will of necessity need to incorporate these opportunities. Also, for many reasons, technology will lead to greater government transparency as administrations forgo paper and rely more on computer-based cashless transactions, hopefully reducing at least one channel for corruption. All of these will change the forms of government structure and services in the coming generation and require a 21st century constitution reflecting the digital ties between state and citizens.

As Tunisia struggles to implement the pledges of the new government, it faces tremendous entrenched interests, from political and economic elites to trade and other unions protecting their turf. Exhorting Tunisians to do more with less will not save the day in the short term. If and how Tunisia succeeds may point the way ahead for other MENA and African countries.

 

image from shutterstock.com

Is Morocco On Course?

Morocco’s second election since the adoption of the new constitution in 2011 resulted in the appointment of Abdelilah Benkirane as head of government, since his moderate Islamic party, PJD, had the highest number of votes. He is currently in the process of negotiating a governing coalition.

To outside observers, this seems consistent with the norms of a democratic election and so is not remarkable. However, it has a much larger significance for several reasons. First of all, the results reinforce the reality that free and fair elections are a consistent feature of political life in Morocco. There are winners and losers, and the process moves towards peaceful outcomes and transitions, if necessary. Secondly, the results indicated the rise of a strong party, the PAM, in opposition to the PJD-led government, another healthy sign of a society in which no one party has the monopoly on the national discourse. A third consideration is that King Mohammed VI showed his support for the electoral process by immediately appointing Benkirane to form a government, a critical step since PAM is known to be strong supporters of the palace.

Most important in the long run, the election underscores Morocco’s advance towards greater civic engagement and government accountability, a consistent theme in the King’s speeches, most recently to the opening session of Parliament, itself continually including more women and youth members. And this is probably Morocco’s strongest asset, the blending of the King’s leadership with a government supporting ongoing reforms that bring Morocco in line with human and civic values that solidify its democratic elements.

Intentions are certainly not enough. The reform agenda is still incomplete. And the gap between passing and implementing legislation cannot be ignored. The King himself complained about the inadequate understanding and enforcement of the Family Law (Moudawana), which provides significant policies for women’s empowerment. Judicial independence is still to be attained; the regionalization process devolving certain powers to local governments has yet to be fully codified with institutions and human resources prepared to implement it; and there are gaps in the educational infrastructure and approach that are an obstacle to fully developing the country’s human potential.

These issues and many more were raised during the election, another positive sign for Morocco’s democracy. Most importantly, aside from a defensible prohibition on pre-election polling (which can be appreciated given the cornucopia of contradictory results of the myriad polls in the US at this time), Morocco has achieved a seasoned election process. As the political parties mature and the number of serious parties shrinks from the 30+ in the recent election, the opportunities for more robust and vibrant political campaigns can be realized.

Casting Ballots are only one small piece of democracy

Casting ballots are only one small piece of democracy

Over the longer term, Morocco’s elections have another very important function – to build needed credibility in the political system. Some international election observers suggested that the turnout of 43%, while comparable to democratic elections elsewhere, may signal dissatisfaction with political parties. In fact, there are signs that the political parties are getting the message that defining positions, seeking to be more inclusive, and listening to constituencies are critical to their survival and success. Shake-ups are already underway in those parties that fared poorly. Another lesson learned in the recent elections.

Finally, another issue to be reckoned with is how legitimate political mechanisms, such as elections, contribute to Morocco’s internal coherence and ability to govern. The lack of credible mechanism is commonly mentioned an indicator of “state fragility.” As Thomas Carothers points out in a recent Policy Brief produced jointly by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Center for a New American Security, and the United States Institute for Peace, a common feature of fragile states is the systematic exclusion of its citizens. And the commonly defined prescription is “inclusive governance.”

If inclusiveness is the glue for building stability and the social contract, then Morocco is surely headed in the right direction. Elevating the Amazigh language as an official language for the government and educational system, broadening the role of civil society in in policy-making, and the King’s insistence, in his latest speech, that the government remain focused on providing quality services to the people – are all positive trends towards inclusion. People are already more empowered due to digital technologies; the government and institutions must keep pace develop credible and effective communications strategies in order to proactively discharge their responsibilities.

As the Policy Brief concludes:

When a government closes off space for independent civil society, it is creating a significant structural obstacle to achieving inclusive governance and positive state-society relations. An active, diverse civil society is the key to empowering marginalized groups, creating multiple channels for citizen participation, mediating diverse interests in a peaceful fashion, and in general creating state-society relations based on mutual communication, respect, and consensus.

This is where Morocco is headed and the country is well on its way.